Meaning and Space

Reflections on "Now, In This Space, 'I' am Facing Something"

By Yasushi Kuba

Introduction

When you hear that the themes of this book are "space," "existence" and "meaning," you may think that what I am going to discuss is too abstract. But I am thinking about them very concretely. The themes are that "the space is spreading," "there is something here," and "I sense some meaning here." If I add the theme of 'I' (the subject and the self) to the others, you may think there are too many. Actually, the theme I am going to discuss is only one. The theme is that "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something," and in this facing, meaning arises.

You may still feel that what I am going to talk about is incomprehensible. There is a reason for this. What is called the "theme" of an article is usually what 'I' am facing in the article. If the theme is "psychology," the writer is going to speak about psychology, or to face the mind of the human being and say something about it. If the theme is "an environmental problem," what the writer is facing is an environmental problem, so the writer will say something about a particular environmental problem. But the theme of this book is that "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something" itself. We are going to face the occurrence "now 'I' am facing something," and think about what it is. If you feel the theme is complicated, it is because the object we are going to face is not something fixed; what we're going to face is the very process of facing something and finding meaning.

You face various objects in various kinds of space. You face an apple in a room and think it looks delicious. You face sentences in a book and try to understand them. You face someone in the street and exchange greetings. Sometimes what you face is yourself. In psychotherapy, a man faces himself and finds something that is a part of him. Although it is a very usual occurrence to face something, the fact that the 'I' and the object are surrounded by space, or that who is facing the object is the 'I', is not manifest and rarely attracts our attention. But it doesn't mean the theme is not important. Rather, the theme is the essence of our being in this world.

I have developed my thoughts in the practice of psychotherapy. In psychotherapy, the matter "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something" is often paid attention to and considered important. The psychotherapy space is important. The process of the client's facing something is also important, sometimes more important than the content of the interview. When the therapist tries to understand the client, the presence of the therapist trying to understand is an important factor, and the state of the place where the client and the therapist meet is important too. That is because the mind always changes its nuances in interaction with another person, and it appears in various manifestations according to the place – its atmosphere, setting or familiarity.

Of course, this is true not only in psychotherapy but of all human interactions. It is also true even when a person faces a lifeless thing. Every object found in the world is experienced as "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something." So, without reflecting on the theme, "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something," we can't fully comprehend anything.

The aim of this book, or the significance of thinking of this theme is to feel the expanse of space and existence freshly and to sense them as what is meaningful, not mechanical. This is not an abstract or speculative problem. This is a highly concrete problem; maybe it is more concrete than our usual way of thinking in daily life. We may need to remember from time to time that this is a concrete problem, otherwise we may begin to think about it only in our heads, forget to face it, and fail to find meanings in the here-and-now. Actually, this problem can be faced only by the 'I' which is present in space: We can face it only through sensing it and experiencing it.

This book is constructed as follows. In chapter 1, I argue that space for human beings is not abstract and mechanical, but filled with rich meaning. The point of this chapter is that the expanse of space has meaning. In chapter 2, I deal with meaning, not as a linear connection between a symbol and something indicated by it, but as a process in which each meaning is differentiated from whole undifferentiated meaning. The point of this chapter is that meaning has expanse. Chapters 3 and 4 are about the problem of existence. In chapter 3, I reflect on suppositions implied in the word "existence," and try to show with the help of knowledge in physics that the existence of things we usually think self-evident is not an absolute premise. In chapter 4, on the foundation prepared in former chapters, I argue how existing things come to exist in the space in which we are present. I think this chapter is the central part of this book. Then in chapter 5, I focus on the process by which we solidify and find a static object out of the world as a waft of undifferentiated meaning. In chapter 6, I deal with the problem of language from the viewpoint of this process of solidification. In chapter 7, the existence of the 'I' is the theme. In this chapter we arrive finally at the consideration of *the other*. The epilogue is an attempt to place this whole argument into a new context by relating it to our daily life.

Needless to say, this book is influenced by many writings. The references mentioned at the end of each chapter are not enough, since I am often unaware of all that has influenced me. However, I am aware that this book is greatly influenced by Dr. Eugene Gendlin, the philosopher who developed Focusing and Dr. Bin Kimura the psychopathologist.

Although the theme of this book has something to do with the essence of psychotherapy, it is not written from a psychotherapeutic perspective, nor do you need to know psychotherapy in order to follow it. Of course I believe it can stimulate professional psychotherapists. But rather I hope it will be a space in which psychotherapy and philosophy richly resonate with one another. I am convinced that philosophy enriches psychotherapy; I think too that psychotherapy may be able to enrich philosophy.

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Thanks very much.

Chapter 1　Space and experience

The space in which we live

We modern people tend to think of space as a uniform expanse spreading anywhere endlessly, so we think it can be measured objectively. In fact, exact measurement does not deceive us. When ordering a piece of furniture, we measure a corner of a room by a tape measure, and the piece of furniture does fit in the corner. We sometimes intuitively feel "this cabinet may be too big for that wall" or "such a space is enough for that bed," but such intuition is not reliable. Our senses have too much error to measure space exactly.

This error comes from the fact that we sense space in its context. For example, when a large object is nearby, it may make us feel that the space around us is smaller. A space surrounded by wall may be felt quite differently in size from an open space, although they have same size from an objective view. Our feeling of space changes according to our way of being in it and how we use it. The space that is too small for dancing may be felt large enough for a storeroom, yet again, too large for resting. Space for people is closely related to their lives. The space expressed in cubic meters does not contain either the meaning of "spacious" or "cramped." So we can say that our feeling of expanse is richer than the value measured by a tape measure, because a mere numerical value doesn't contain the 'I' (the subject – the doer of recognition or action) relating to the space.

Space often reflects our state of the mind. Our way of experiencing thoroughly changes the aspect of space. When "something opens up a new world," the world really takes on new expanse. When we are overwhelmed by sorrow, the world loses its color or becomes flat; we may be unable to feel its rich expanse. But if the space in which sorrow stirs and from which tears arise is sensed inside us, we can be released from the dull flatness, and the world around us will regain its rich expanse. Feeling the height of the sky or the life of the trees can sometimes become the start to take heart. Our minds are related to our environment. When we freshly experience the world in which we live, the world newly presents itself in front of us with rich expanse. Without rich expanse of space, we may be not able to have freshness of experience.

I use the word "rich" to express a kind of profundity or plentifulness of tacit meaning. The richness of space is sensed only as a kind of expanse, spreading with plenty of feelings or meanings. The richness of space cannot be measured by a tape measure, so of course it is not always true that a large space is a rich space. Richness of space and largeness are two different things. They may have some relation, but a very small space sometimes spreads very richly. For example, we may sense a richer space in a small chapel than at a large athletic field. A pretty flower in a corner of a park may turn that corner into the richest space in the world. Wherever we have a touching experience, rich space spreads and inestimable time flows. We sometimes take a camera along in order to fix the experience, but mostly we can't capture the richness in a photograph. Photographs by amateurs are usually just to help recall the experience; the picture turns out to be quite flat, because the photographer intends to take a picture of *the thing itself*. It is not easy to capture impressive space in a photograph. Sometimes professional photographers can capture the impression or create a new impression by capturing not only a thing itself, but also the spreading of

space and the flowing of time, in which the encounter occurred. In this space and time, there wafts the richness of nuance that touches us.

Sensus Communis and sense of space

It seems to us that our feeling of the richness of space is subjective, not an attribute of the space itself. It must be true because the richness of course exists between the subject and the object. Can't we see the object without subjectivity, and see objectively what it is and how it works? Perhaps, but that is questionable. As we saw in the example of photograph, we experience the object always in nuance or ambiance. For example, we may see various attractive goods at a fashionable store, but the impression the goods gave becomes quite different in the space of everyday life. Although catching a nature of an object without being influenced by ambiance is possible to a certain degree, we can't remove subjectivity thoroughly from objectivity. The problem is that if we remove as much nuance or ambiance as possible, the object loses meaning and becomes flat. The meaning of the object is given by this very nuance or ambiance, and we face the object always in some context of meaning. We can't discuss "meaning" without thinking of its relation to the field in which the object is placed. In fact, we can sense "meaning" only in this very "field" or space [(1)].

> Note (1): To sense meaning as a waft or nuance in space is also important in psychotherapy. For example, a comment which a therapist gives to client must be evaluated not only from the viewpoint of its content; how the comment is placed in the air of the therapy room is an important matter, and whether it enriches the space of interview or not is important, too. This ambiance is sensed as nuance; it includes not only the literal meaning of spoken words but also non-linguistic aspects of communication.
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> Also, to understand a client's inner feeling, it is important to feel the space in which the client lives. A client of mine said that she has been living in a "cold and sad space" since she was born. When we understand the feeling of a person's living space, we sometimes meet the person's world more vividly than when we objectively think about how an event might influence the person's mind. It is too hasty to consider the feeling of a person's living space as the projection of their inner feeling (see note (6) in chapter 5 for an explanation of the word "projection") because such feeling is the interaction between the subject (the 'I') and the world. This "between" precedes the existence of the subject (see chapter 7).

The word "ambiance" expresses the wafting of meaning in space. We can't feel ambiance without a sense of space. "Ambiance" is a kind of nuance felt in the space around the object or between you and the object.

Then, how do we feel "ambiance" or how do we read the meaning in space? Our eyes can't read it. Our ears can't hear it, nor can our skin sense it. Yet we sense meaning with all of them. To express this ambiance we also use words like "smell" or "taste," so these senses must be playing some roles in sensing ambiance. However, if we were getting the meaning through each separate sense, we could not read the ambiance so richly. It is difficult to explain how we feel ambiance, but it seems to be sensed in the integration of our senses.

The data each sense takes in is received in different ways. Although the data from our eyes

and ears have quite different properties, what we sense through sight and hearing is not different worlds but only one world. Touch, smell and taste belong to that one world too [(2)]. What we accept from five senses are integrated into *one expanse of space*, or, to be exact, into one *space-time*. Moreover, in that space-time, not only senses but also behavior is integrated. We locate the object and act on it in the one space.

> Note (2): The sense of taste seems to have nothing to do with the sense of space, but it has an important role in the connection of outer space and inner space because it is at the entrance to our inner space. In the theory of psychoanalysis, to introject objects (take objects in) from outer space into inner space is oral activity.

For example, when you hear an unusual sound from the kitchen, you may look there. You see smoke and it smells like something is burning. You run to the kitchen, stretch out your hand and then pull it back because of the heat. In this situation you locate sound, the sight of smoke, smell and heat in one space. You turn your eyes in the direction the sound comes from so that you know more exactly with your eyes "where" the source of the sound is. Then you act on the object located in the space through hearing and sight. In another example, when you walk along a road, someone calls your name (or taps you on the shoulder); you turn your neck and body in order to look for the owner of the voice. When you see your friend, you smile and walk over to the place your friend stands. You locate the voice and sight in the integrated space and recognize your friend, and act in the same space. The voice and the sight are integrated into one person existing in space, and you act to this same one.

In such an integrated way, we do see, hear, smell, touch and act naturally in one space. However, on reflection, this is a great feature of human beings or animals. In spite of the difference of data from each sense, we gather them into one experience in one space. As a result, the *existence* of an object is realized in the space. In other words, human senses are integrated into one perception that "an object exists in space." Although the existence of one object has a certain substance, this substance is not contained in the raw data from each sense. It is perceived only as an integrated object in space.

Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, had the idea of Sensus Communis, the function of connecting senses. Yujiro Nakamura and Bin Kimura took notice of this concept and treated it in detail [(3)]. According to Kimura (1977), senses and representations are not enough to enable a thing to be there as a thing. It needs Sensus Communis as "the synthesizing function that takes these materials in actual relation to the world and gives body to it." The function of each sense is not enough to let things come into existence; only with the function of Sensus Communis are we able to feel that "there is something." This Sensus Communis "always attends like a shadow when we objectify or speak of various events, and it enriches our use of language by adding various nuances and enabling metaphorical use of language."(Kimura, 1988) So Sensus Communis, as an integrating function of the senses, not only enables the existence of things but also gives depth of meaning to an object.

Note (3): In English, Sensus Communis can be written "common sense." "Common sense" means knowledge or customs common to a people, so its meaning is different from the original meaning of Sensus Communis. However, this meaning of "common sense" has relation to the theme in this chapter, if "common sense" is not a fixed rule but a common understanding which is sensed among the people (in other words, meaning wafting in space).

Adjectives are sometimes common between several different senses; Sensus Communis enables it. For example, although the word "sweet" usually expresses an experience in taste, this word is sometimes used for other senses such as "sweet tone" or "sweet sight." If the word "sweet" was limited to the sense of taste, tone and sight couldn't be sweet, but in fact we understand the nuance of the expressions "sweet tone" and "sweet sight." Without connecting the senses by Sensus Communis, we may not able to feel the "sweetness" of tone or sight. The word "sweet" can express experiences of various senses because the nuance of the word "sweet" stands beyond the difference between the senses. You may think that it is just a metaphor, but metaphor works only by meaning wafting beyond the properties of each sense. Nuance and meaning don't belong to separated senses. Meaning belongs to the integration of senses, in other words, Sensus Communis.

What is Sensus Communis? I think it is exactly the sense of space itself, because senses are integrated in the way that "an object exists in space." Meaning is felt in this sense of space. Data from sensory organs take on meaning in the expanse of space and are experienced by being located in space, as in Sensus Communis. We may not be able to experience the presence of the object without the sense of space. We call lack of lively meaning "flat" or "having no depth" because meaning is essentially spatial. We naturally know that depth of meaning cannot exist in a flat experience.

In the state called "the depersonalization disorder" in psychopathology, lively meaning is lost from the world. The word "depersonalization" means this losing of sense. You may have experienced a time when you become unable to feel meaning in a letter or a word when you saw it again and again. That is the feeling of depersonalization. In depersonalization disorder, depersonalization appears clearly and meaning is lost from the whole world. Although depersonalization disorder patients have no problem with their sensory organs and can recognize things objectively the same as healthy people, the world becomes strangely lacking in reality for them. Along with this lack of reality, the expanse of space is lost too. The world becomes flat like a picture on a screen. In a flat world without expanse, we can't feel the presence of things nor can we sense their substance, because in flatness meaning is lost. Such a change in the world's being in the depersonalized experience tells us that sense of meaning is related to the expanse of space.

Kimura (1981) has written that the place of "Aida" (the space between) is where the meaning exists. Although the Japanese word "Aida" connotes spatial expanse, Kimura himself has noted that he uses this word not as spatial expanse but as the fundamental relationship from which *the subject* (the 'I') emerges. Surely, the place of "Aida" in which meaning arises and wafts is not alluding to physical and mechanical "space." However, this place of "Aida" is still felt as a lively

space in which meaning and nuance waft richly.

Inseparability of space and time

Space is usually pictured in contrast to time, so it is considered as not containing time. But lively space contains time within it. Space and time are essentially one.

This is also true of space in physics. Einstein's theory of relativity shows that space and time are not independent from each other but inseparable. Although the inseparability of human space and time is not the same as in physics, they both contain a common aspect because they equally show the limit of our usual concepts of space and time. The theory of relativity connotes that space and time are not absolute nor are they basic elements for describing the world. Absolute basis is rather velocity, especially the speed of light. Space and time in the theory of relativity are deduced from the fact that the speed of light is always consistent (4). It is not true that space and time are the absolutes that form velocity. It is the process of moving from one point to another that make space and time appear.

> Note (4): For example, when you observe a running train, the speed of the train seen from a moving viewpoint appears differently than from the viewpoint of a standing person. If you follow the train it seems slower and if you go in the opposite direction it seems faster. But in both these cases the train's speed relative to the ground is constant. However, in the case of observing light or an object moving at a speed close to light, something different occurs. Light is always observed moving at the same speed whether the observer stands or moves. Naturally, the relative speed of light to the ground is not constant. The time in which light reaches a certain point and the distance that light moves between two points will change depending to observer's movement. Although it seems an awful inconsistency if considering space and time as absolutes, the theory of relativity gives a complete explanation without any inconsistency.

For human life, as in the theory of relativity, there is a kind of "movement" at the basis of space and time. However, it is not a sharp movement like the speed of light. It is our living process and the waft of meaning we sense in our daily life. Although the word "waft" (maybe also the word "process") connotes space and time, it is not true that space and time exist prior to our living process or prior to the waft of meaning. Rather, space and time are differentiated from one process – from our living or the waft of meaning. This abstract space separated from time is space in a narrow sense, but in this book I usually use the word "space" to mean the process or the waft that is not differentiated into abstract space and time. This is the human space in which we live. Space that is without time and therefore without any movement does not exist actually.

You might think that pure time without space is possible. Bergson, a French philosopher, criticized seeing time from a spatial viewpoint and tried to describe pure time. We usually unconsciously replace time with space. We are treating time as a line in space when we put the day's plans on a time line, or we imagine time to be a stream from past to future. Only in this way, we can have past, present and future in our sight at once. But Bergson thought this was not the true nature of time. According to him, time is pure duration or pure quality. What Bergson

emphasized is that time is not something quantitative like a position on a line, but a qualitative change, *without space*.

It seems impossible to me to picture pure time duration without any space. Rather, time duration is sensed as an expanse of space. For example, although music is seemingly able to exist as a pure time flow, melodies and rhythms actually inspire a sense of motion containing space. When you close your eyes and listen to music, you sense an expanse of space in the sequence of sound. It is not a sense of pure time. You always sense time in the sense of space.

Time is sometimes equalized into something like a uniform line that can be measured. Actually, time is not a point moving on a line but is naturally qualitative. However, that does not mean that time contains no space. Rather, the flow of time is sensed in this space where the 'I' is present. Uniformity or measurability is not the essential nature of space either. Uniformity deprives liveliness not only from time but also from space (5). The significant contrast is not between space and time; what is important is the contrast between lively space-time and quantified, uniform space-time. In uniform space-time, existing objects also become uniform and become "mere things" without unique meaning. Lively space (containing time) invests objects with present-ness and with meaning.

> Note (5): Space has attributes such as size and length but they are not merely abstract quantities. Adjectives like "big", "small" or "long", "short" express not only some quantity, but always contain *meaning* for the 'I'.

We may have to reflect on the meaning of the word "meaning" because we can't understand the implications of meaning wafting in lively space if we consider the word "meaning" only as a linear connection between symbols (words, for example) and things. We must understand the essential expanse and depth of meaning, or in other words, the spatiality of meaning.

Reference

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Chapter 2 Meaning

What is meaning?

The word "meaning" usually expresses a connection between an indicator and the indicated. For example, the meaning of the word "APPLE" is the connection between the sequence of letters, "A-P-P-L-E", and the existence of an apple itself – red and spherical, sweet and sour when you bite into it. If someone stands up stiffening his face in the middle of pleasant conversation, we wonder what is the "meaning" of this behavior because we think the behavior is related to his feelings or the situation. When we say some words or symptoms "mean" something, we think of a linear connection between two items: the indicating symbol (the word "APPLE") and the indicated content (the apple itself).

The word "meaning" is sometimes used without a clear linear connection between the symbol and content. For example, we may say, "Is there any meaning for my life?" or "I feel some deep meaning here." In these examples, the word "meaning" indicates something with no clear outline; it wafts vaguely. If the word "meaning" in the sentence "What is the meaning of life?" had a clear linear connection with something, this question would have a clear answer. But when we try to explain the meaning of life our answer is superficial and essentially irrelevant. The "meaning" of life is beyond words. Still, we can indicate the depth or feeling of a meaning. We may say, "The meaning of life is… well, something like… being present here certainly…" The "meaning" referred to here is not a linear connection. We can touch the presence of "meaning" but we cannot wholly explain it with words. It is a kind of sensing, or in other words, a kind of nuance.

When thinking of "the meaning of life," the word "meaning" implies importance or significance, but they are not the "meaning" I am referring to, which is some waft of nuance around a word or symbol. When I say "Life is meaningless," my words imply the nuance of meaninglessness, worthlessness, or even emptiness. Meaning is this entire nuance wafting around a word (or object). The meaning of the sentence, "Life is meaningless," is this nuance of meaninglessness, worthlessness, and emptiness… But it is not enough to say that "meaninglessness" and "worthlessness" or "a sense of emptiness" are the meaning of this sentence, because these words can't wholly explain the nuance wafting around the sentence, "Life is meaningless." We just revolve around the nuance of the sentence and waveringly give expression to it. We may endlessly add words to explain the nuance, like "acceptance with resignation," "so-what attitude" or "a desperate affirmation." We sometimes come up with words expressing exactly what we are trying to say, but the words still only indicate the nuance; they do not explain it. No matter how many words we say, we cannot express the shade of the meaning absolutely.

So, why do we use the term "meaning" for this waft of nuance beyond words? Can't we keep this term for the linear connection between symbols and contents and choose another term for this nuance? No, there is a reason to call the nuance, "meaning." Meaning as linear connection has a close relation with meaning as nuance. Even when meanings look like a linear connection there wafts a "nuance beyond words" behind it, because the "meaning" as nuance is more essential than the linear connection.

Now think about the meaning of the word "APPLE" for example. The meaning of the word "APPLE" is seemingly clear. It is the red fruit we often see at the store. We usually think that we can define necessarily and sufficiently the meaning of this word; we seemingly do so in dictionaries. If so, a symbol (the sequence of sounds and letters such as "APPLE") and the content (the red fruit we see at the store) have one-to-one connection. But, in fact, that is not true. Various shades of meaning beyond words are wafting there. The shades of meaning or nuances of a word change according to who hears them and in what situation. A man who loves apples may smile at hearing the word "APPLE" (except that when he is full, he may not). A man who does not like them may frown (except that when he knows that the woman of his dreams likes apples, he may not). A man who has good old memories about apples may look off into distance. The word "APPLE" has the nuance of "a crop" for farmers and "a commodity" for storekeepers. Moreover, our behaviors are contained in the meaning of "APPLE"; APPLES are to eat, and we usually need to cut them to eat them (for some people, APPLES may be something to bite into whole). They are something to grow for farmers and to sell for storekeepers. The image of "APPLE" implies various behaviors and is made through a person's active approach to apples. Around the word "APPLE," wafts the full history of a person's experience with apples.

You may think there is a difference between an image of an "APPLE" and the meaning of it. But actually we can't clearly distinguish "meanings" from images. Let us try to define the meaning of a concept (or a word) strictly. If we define "APPLE" as "a red fruit," this category contains strawberries and excludes green apples. We can define "APPLE" more strictly – such as its shape and feel – but we may still be able to discover some exception which doesn't fit the definition but which, strangely, we still know to be an "APPLE," e.g. a strange shaped apple. The meaning as nuance always supercedes the definition. Of course, we can elaborate our definition and make it close to our recognition of "APPLE," but no definition can perfectly express the "*APPLE-ness*" by which we recognize an apple as "APPLE." Anyway, in making definitions, we are only following our intuitive judgment. In the end, we may define "APPLE" as "what I recognize as APPLE," or define it with a strained definition quite apart from our natural sense of it. When understanding the meaning of "APPLE," we really don't depend on definitions or a linear connection of meaning. We understand it in the waft of nuance which contains various personal meanings (1).

Note (1): Even artificial concepts made by definitions have this waft of meaning. For example, an "isosceles triangle" is a clearly defined concept; we study its definition at school, but at first we can't imagine it at all. Only through seeing and maybe handling it do we realize what an isosceles triangle is – "Ah, I see, this is an isosceles triangle" – and it comes to make sense. The more isosceles triangles we experience, the more the nuance of the word is enriched. Mathematicians may hear this word with rich meaning such as its potential applications or its connection with other mathematical concepts. For people who are not familiar with mathematics, an "isosceles triangle" may be remembered as part of a sleepy lecture or a square classroom in which people are restlessly waiting for the bell.

Meaning is always whole

This waft of meaning always exists as a whole, not as a grouping of many general and personal meanings. When we hear the word "APPLE" and sense its nuance, we don't recognize each meaning such as "red," "spherical," "delicious," nor is this nuance made up of these factors. What is sensed at first is the whole feeling of APPLE-ness beyond words. Only after reflecting, like "What is there in this feeling?" or "How do apples look?" do we recognize factors such as "red," "spherical" or "delicious," differentiated from the whole feeling of "APPLE-ness." I call these differentiated meanings ("red," "spherical," "delicious" etc.) "meanings as factors" or "differentiated meanings," while I call the whole waft of nuance "meaning as a whole." Basically, meaning as a whole precedes meaning as factors. We can't fully explain the whole nuance of "APPLE-ness" even if we give all sorts of meanings as factors to explain it. Rather, meanings as factors derive from meaning as a whole.

I will give you an example. Imagine you are with someone who is from Japan. He speaks English a little, but knows very few words. On hearing you talking about APPLE to someone, he asks you – "What is APPLE?" You try to explain what it is – a red fruit, spherical, about this size, sweet and sour and delicious. An "aha!" expression comes over his face and he says "you're talking about RINGO (the Japanese word for apple)!" He understood it not by putting together the features you gave; the whole nuance of "APPLE-ness" is not made just of gathered factors. Rather, the whole nuance is indicated by factors resonating with each other. He has come up with whole "APPLE-ness" not by sharing differentiated meanings. What is shared is the nuance of "APPLE-ness" which the word "APPLE" wafts. We can't find this "APPLE-ness" in the meaning that has been mechanically taken apart into factors. Only when we sense it as one whole is the rich nuance of "APPLE" generated.

I have talked about the meaning of a word, but meaning belongs not only to words and symbols. Everything or every occurrence we encounter in the world has its own meaning or "it-ness" around it. Again, imagine the man from Japan. If he had not ever seen the fruit called "APPLE," what would happen? Even if you gave all sorts of explanations, he would not come up with the sense of "APPLE-ness." If you wanted to let him know the meaning of "APPLE," you would have to give an apple to him and let him sense its nuance. He would need to look at this unfamiliar fruit, touch it, smell it, bite it, hear the crunchy sound, and taste it. You tell him "*this* is an APPLE" and he will get to know its "meaning."

This example shows that the waft of nuance which I refer to as the meaning of the word "APPLE," originally belongs to real apples. More exactly, it belongs to the *experience* such as looking, touching, smelling, hearing, and tasting apples rather than apples themselves which are objectively exist. The existence of one apple is realized by an integration of these experiences in space – in Sensus Communis. The one existing object sensed in space wafts its nuance (it-ness) as one whole. What is realized in the Sensus Communis is one meaning, and existence of the object ("it") is this nuance ("it-ness") itself. Each object is sensed as *one*, and this corresponds to the fact that meaning is always sensed as one whole (see chapter 4 for further explanations).

The word "APPLE" indicates the nuance wafting around the experience of real apples.

Provided that it does, we may wonder, is the word "APPLE" connected linearly to the meaning wafting around the experience of real apples? No, the relation between a word and the meaning wafting around an object is actually more intricate. An object with identity can exist only through being expressed with words; words enable the existence of objects. But I will not go further into the theme of language here. I will consider it again in chapter 6. The following chapters, especially chapter 4 and 5, will give a foundation to this theme. In this chapter, I will focus on basic aspects of general meanings because they will be the foundation for the following chapters.

Resonance of meanings

Meaning as nuance is not static. Meaning as a whole changes subtly or clearly every time we differentiate various factors. Sometimes the meaning of the object suddenly changes when we find an unexpected aspect in it, such as when you witness some kindness in your unsociable neighbor. This happens frequently in psychotherapy. The client's feelings as a whole might be expressed in some words, but when a new factor is found in the original feeling, the whole feeling itself often changes qualitatively. For example, let's assume that a client has "an cloudy feeling." At first, the client says it is anger. But the feeling of cloudiness can't be fully expressed only by the word "anger." Through the process of psychotherapy, the client finds various factors in the "cloudiness": sadness, fear of being abandoned, contempt and other feelings are differentiated. The client possibly has the idea that it is the same feeling which he or she had towards his parents when he was a child. In this process of differentiation of factors, the original "cloudy feeling" changes in its nuance. It possibly becomes something far from "anger," or it possibly changes into quite a different thing, such as "something stiff getting caught in the chest." Psychotherapy doesn't "reveal hidden meanings" because the factors such as sadness, fear and contempt are not originally there but are newly born, differentiated from the whole. Psychotherapy is a creative place in which people face meaning and find new meanings every moment.

As we have seen, although meaning as a whole implies various meanings as factors, the whole is not the sum of the factors; it wafts a nuance as one whole. But this one whole itself is also contained as a factor in some larger whole meaning. As an example, let's think about a chair. Various meanings as factors, such as "to sit on," "seems comfortable," "my favorite" etc., are differentiated from the whole chair. We can also think of parts of the chair, such as legs or a seat, as factors of the chair. (When we pay attention to these parts, each of them is also one whole object wafting its own nuance like "a good shaped leg.") One chair contains these factors but it is not the sum of these; the chair is one whole in itself.

Imagine that this chair is placed in a room with various things – furniture, small items and rummage. There is wallpaper and floor and curtains, too. They are individual objects each of which is a whole thing in itself, and at the same time they waft the total meaning of a whole room of which they are parts. The whole nuance of the room is influenced by each factor. Just one piece of furniture may change the atmosphere of whole room. But the room as a whole is not just the addition of each factor. This is rather multiplication because one factor is not only added but resonates with the whole room. This resonance makes the room's atmosphere one united whole. If

the atmosphere of a room was made by addition of factors, you might just stuff favorite pieces of furniture into your room to make it nice. But in fact you do not do that. Instead, you consider whether pieces match one another or if they are harmonious. If pieces of furniture don't match, the room as a whole may waft the nuance of "disharmony," even though each piece is nice.

This interaction occurs not only between a factor and the whole; things interact with and resonate with one another. We place things side by side and we can sense how they resonate their meanings in the space. When we see an apple and a knife placed together, the interpretation comes naturally, "this knife is to cut this apple." If we see an apple and a pair of chopsticks placed together, we may not understand the meaning and may feel a bit embarrassed. How on earth can I eat it? Two objects placed in same space give context to each other. They limit or enrich meaning of each other. The knife becomes the knife "to cut the apple" and the apple becomes the apple "to be cut by the knife and eaten."

Resonance of meanings occurs not only between two things. It occurs among all the things sharing the same space. All things existing in the space have meanings which resonate with each other and make up the whole constellation (arrangement of position). Furthermore, historical factors such as past events affect this resonance of meanings. This resonance of various factors makes the space lively and full of meaning, and at the same time the lively space makes this resonance possible.

The KJ method, which was created by Jiro Kawakita for the integration of miscellaneous data, shows clearly that meanings resonate with one another in their larger context. In the KJ method, you write data (such as facts collected in field study, or remarks made in meeting) briefly on cards. Then you group those cards with a common felt nuance and locate the groups of cards spatially on a table. This method is different from logical classification; in this method you classify each factor intuitively and relate them spatially. Then "miscellaneous things which were incoherent and vague begin to emerge with a clear structure of meaning, letting us feel 'I see!'" The meanings of the factors resonate and create a larger meaning of one whole.

We can clearly see in the example of the KJ method that resonance of meanings needs the expanse of space. Placing items not linearly but spatially helps us to understand the relationship of items and to look over the whole picture. Drawing is also used in psychotherapy to clarify the client's circumstances or psychology. In drawing, spatial nuance such as the subtle relative position or size of items is important because it makes a difference to the influence each item gives to the whole. It is also true in the case of the furniture and the room. To make the atmosphere of the room comfortable, it is very important how much space there is between pieces and where they are placed in the room. A harmonious room needs space, because this space is the very place where the factors resonate. From a different viewpoint, this space is the whole room itself. When one whole contains factors, this whole is the place in which the factors are placed, the context in which they are laid, or the background spreading behind them. When we pay attention to a chair, the room gives a context to the chair. The chair may change its impression when placed in another room. This is also true of the case of apple. The whole nuance of "APPLE-ness" is the background for included factors such as "red," "spherical" and "delicious." These meanings-as-factors resonate with each other in this whole

nuance. When we pay attention to the "redness" of APPLE, "APPLE" gives a context to this "redness," so it is sensed with the nuance of fragrant sweetness characteristic of APPLE, different from a red pepper or tomato. When we pay attention to the object, its nuance changes with the place, the context or the background in which the object is placed. The whole meaning is influenced by each factor, and at the same time, it influences the meaning of each factor.

Marcel Duchamp, a French artist, intended to send a ready-made urinal named "Fountain" to an exhibition (2). A urinal is very ordinary thing, but when placed in the context of an art exhibition, it wafts a nuance of strangeness. The meaning of an object often changes entirely with a new context because meaning is always in interaction with its context. Meaning can't exist independently, separated from everything around it. Meaning always interacts with its surroundings and the atmosphere of the place; this atmosphere is the "context" in which the meaning is placed. Each meaning can exist only in interaction, or to say it more exactly, *as* interaction.

Note (2): Yujiro Nakamura has referred to this ready-made art in his book, using the keyword "convention in the place."

Just as the meaning of each thing is unable to be explained in words, we can't explain with words the contextual influence on the meaning of each thing, because it also is sensed as one nuance. Of course we can verbally explain in many ways why displaying a urinal in an exhibition is strange. We can insist that it is not common to display ready-made items in an art exhibition, or that urinals don't deserve to be called "art." We may also be able to comment on the intention of Duchamp and explain the "meaning" of his work. However, although we can produce a lot of explanations, we can't express perfectly the strange feeling of a urinal displayed in that exhibition; the incongruous and shocking feeling is beyond words. It comes from the resonance between the exhibition space and the ready-made urinal.

The meaning of one object and that of the larger whole in which the object is included are always resonating with each other. Each object influences the whole nuance, while the whole space influences each object's nuance. Each meaning as factor is found through being differentiated from the meaning as a whole, while the meaning as a whole is made up of meanings as factors – although factors are always whole already. We can restate it like this; when we pay attention to something, it is always *one whole* influenced by both its factors and the larger background. This one whole is not only a gathering of factors, nor only a part of the whole, but is always one rich whole in itself.

In considering the resonating meanings, we can see that meaning has a certain spatial aspect. Expressions such as "wafting" and "constellation" imply an expanse of space. This sense of expanse is the essential feature of meaning; meaning is sensed as something essentially spatial, while the sense of space implies meaning essentially, as I argued in chapter 1.

Meaning is found by the 'I' or the subject

The meaning of an apple does not belong to apples which objectively exist before the 'I' or

the subject senses meaning to it. Meaning is realized as meaning only by the subject. To say it more exactly, meaning is the very interaction between the subject and the object; meaning exists only as the process of someone sensing meaning there.

Process is not a static thing; process is always newly occurring. So the meaning of an object or a word newly arises every time the 'I' (the subject) senses it. The meaning of an object or a word wavers in the interaction. It is not static.

I said that the meaning wavers in the process of our sensing it, but we can't change the meaning of the object intentionally because the object is, or the meaning which the object wafts is, encountered as *the other* for the subject, in other words, as what the 'I' cannot control. Meaning arises from (or we can say, meaning *is*) the interaction between the 'I' and the object. For example, when you are shopping for clothes, you can choose what you buy but you can't completely choose what you like. While the sense, "Ah, it's nice," arising between you and the article has relation to the 'I' and wavers depending on the state of the 'I', it is beyond the control of the 'I'. On the one hand, the sense is what the subject finds actively, and on the other hand it is the message the subject receives passively from the object. What we can do is not to control it but to face it sincerely and to sense the meaning wafting there. This is what we call "sensibility." To find meaning is like a dialogue with the object; in this dialogue the subject receives meaning.

Of course the meaning of the object sometimes seems static. The word "APPLE" always reminds us of that red and spherical fruit and stimulates our appetite. The comfortable ambiance of my favorite chair seems to be always same. Usually in everyday life, the meaning of things does not change. Still, the meaning always arises freshly, every time the 'I' finds it. Although it seems always static, the meaning, such as the comfort of the chair or the APPLE-ness of the word "APPLE," newly wafts "here and now."

I can compare this interaction to your old friend. On the one hand he is an individual not easily changed, on the other hand his every act and thought newly arises one by one. Meeting with this friend is the same each time but always new. His individuality seems static but the individual creates his own acts and thoughts anew in every dialogue. The existence of the old friend's individuality doesn't exist apart from these new acts and thoughts.

Meaning is something like this. Although a thing or a word has an identity as itself and doesn't change its meaning easily, the meaning of it is always new each time the subject senses it. On the one hand the object keeps being itself (keeps its identity), and the other hand the object exists "here and now" as a meaning that is always new. Where these two aspects cross, there exist both the richness of the object and the depth of existence (3).

Note (3): When the subject stops encountering the object "here and now" and squeezes the object into some static meaning, the object stops wafting new meaning and loses its richness. Rogers, the originator of Client Centered Therapy, called this being "structure bound."

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Chapter 3　Is existence an objective reality?

Prologue to chapter 3

In the previous chapter, I dealt with the "meaning" of the object as a process between the subject and the object. However, it seems that the "existence" of the object doesn't need a subject. It seems that things exist as themselves independently from our recognition.

Is that really true? I argued in chapter 1 that the "existence" of things is enabled by the Sensus Communis and things' being there can't be realized without the space in which the meaning wafts. "Subjective meaning" is not what is sensed about independent "objective things." Rather, things can "exist" only in the process of our facing them. It is the necessary condition for the "existence" of things that we integrate the world into an expanse of space and let meaning arise.

I know there is a huge gap between this idea and our daily sense. We think it is very obvious that things in our sight exist there independently from our recognition. If things can't exist without our relating to them, our view of world is shaken to its foundations. But this idea is not strange in philosophy. For modern people familiar with science, this philosophical concept may seem a speculative consideration apart from reality, but we should not abandon it immediately as nonsense. In the first place, we need to ask the question, "What is the state we usually call 'existence?'" By asking this question, we can extricate ourselves from seeing existence as mechanical and objective. Then we can open our eyes to the richness of meaning that existence naturally has.

In this chapter, I will refer a lot to physics, especially quantum theory. But the aim of this chapter is not to give a lecture on physics. The aim of this chapter is to reconsider critically, with the help of our knowledge of physics, the "objective reality" which we usually consider true. We can sense the human richness that our world essentially has by calling into question the presupposition that existence, space and time are independent from our being. If you feel bored with physics (and possibly with the beginning of chapter 4), you can read chapter 4 first; all of this chapter and the beginning of chapter 4 are a preparation for the discussion about "Aida" that is the main theme of chapter 4.

For your sake (both for those who decide to read this chapter and those who do not), I present the surprising conclusion of this chapter now: things or objects do not "exist" objectively without the human process of participating in the world. That is suggested by the fact that the behavior of elementary particles (which are the basic elements of everything) redefines our usual definition of existence. Elementary particles are nothing but interactions, and the world in which we live is made of interaction, too; objects take on their physical substance by the process of our sensing them.

"Existence" as an objective reality and the sight model

We think about existing things, but rarely about "existence" itself. What is this "existence?" When we see or hear or touch something in our daily life, we feel sure that something is there. Our intension doesn't seem to influence what our eyes find there. Our hands reach out to something real regardless of our expectations. Our image of things is changeable but the existence of a thing itself seems firmly there. So we think the situation called "something exists out there" is a truth which is independent of us.

Existence requires continuity and a sense of permanency. We think that something exists because it keeps existing, even if only for 0.00000…1 second, in other words, existence needs

duration. On the other hand, action, as a concept in physics, doesn't need duration and can be located at one point of time. We can ask the exact time at which the ball reached the goal, at what minute, at what second. In theory, we can consider the duration of an action as zero. However, it is inappropriate to ask the exact time at which a ball existed, because existence must have duration. The word "existence" implies unchanging or keeping on being itself. In other words, a thing that exists has an identity as one thing. Of course there is nothing permanent or unchanging actually, but change is often considered as a non-essential attribute of existence; we tend to look for permanent factors in things.

When we recognize an object as having continuity, the sense of sight and touch play important roles. We come to know through seeing and touching, that something continuous is there. But doesn't touch influence the object? Touching is a collision, if you like, between the body of the 'I' and the object; it gives equal pressure to each. If you want to know about the life of wild animals, you'd better not touch them because touching inevitably influences them. If you need to recognize an object without influencing it, you'd better use your sense of sight and hearing. But the sense of hearing is not good for recognizing an object as a thing with identity. Hearing gives us much information about animals in the woods but it only infers the existence of animals. The information which hearing provides is about their behavior. A sound of a breaking twig tells us that an animal is walking, or a cry tells us an animal is crying. When the animal stops moving or crying, the sound stops although the animal still exists. Although we may infer that the twig breaker or crier is there, our auditory recognition of existence is indirect and based on much supposition.

The sense of smell may be more useful in recognizing an object's existence. A smell is given from an object continuously while a sound is given only when something occurs. However, the sense of smell in human beings is not able to capture each individual clearly, while the sense of sight can. Our sense of smell senses the object chaotically; it lacks objectivity. What it captures is a kind of atmosphere. There wafts a nuance in a smell, implying what the object is like "for me" such as attraction or aversion. In other words, the sense of smell senses meaning. If the noun "objective recognition" implies the attitude of excluding "the meaning for me," or if these words imply a way of capturing an object without being influenced by the fact that the 'I' recognizes it, we can say that the sense of smell does not work objectively (1).

> Note (1): Actually it is possible to use the sense of smell objectively. A professional chemist may know an object objectively through smell alone. Objectivity is not unique to sight, nor does sight always have objectivity. All our senses were originally for recognizing meaning-for-ourselves; they contributed to survival. However, sight can easily keep a mental distance from an object, so sight has an advantage in capturing things objectively and scientifically.

Human beings tend to depend heavily on sight. This tendency has a close relationship to the human ability to recognize and study an object objectively and scientifically. Objective recognition implies capturing an object independently from the recognizing 'I'. Without considering the object as what *exists* permanently, or without considering the object as an individual clearly

distinct from others, we can't deal with the object objectively and scientifically. The sense of sight can capture the object without influencing it. Therefore the sense of sight is very suitable for objective and scientific study. Moreover, we can say that objective understanding is possible only by taking the sense of sight as its model. Although it is meaningful to hear an object or to touch it, it is usually considered outside the realm of science. We usually try to "see" the real nature of an object. It is difficult to comprehend an object which is unable to be seen. Physicists say we can never see an elementary particle, but we do want to see a sketch of it even if it is an inaccurate representation. Our desire to see is a manifestation of our intention to capture the object without influencing it.

Does the sense of sight really capture the object without influencing it? Of course, when we see a tree, the tree's state doesn't change at all. The tree still stands there calmly and never seems to mind whether it is seen or not. But let's think about it further. How do we "see" an object? We know that eyes are the organs which sense light. Our eyes sense the light that is reflected by the tree and is entering our eyes so we can see it. We can't see a tree in the dark. But, even if the sight of the tree is lost, we don't suppose that the tree has disappeared. It will appear again with the same appearance; when we supply the light, the same color (light of the same wavelength) always comes from the same place and forms same shape (comes into our eyes in the same pattern), so we judge that something constant exists there (2). All this means that we don't see the tree directly. We come to know the existence of the tree through sensing light. What we see is only light; the existence of an object is a matter of supposition.

> Note (2): Actually the color and the pattern of light do change. The color of an object in evening light is different from that in daylight. The picture of an object on our retinas changes its shape with the angle. But we recognize the object as if with constant color and shape. This is a fundamental function of human recognition, known as "perceptual constancy" in psychology. Things owe their constancy to the mechanism of human recognition.

To be precise, it is not right to say we "see" light. Just like our inability to recognize a tree directly, we are not able to "see" light moving in space. What our eyes sense is only the light which touches our retinas, and only at that moment. To be even more precise, the retinas just "react;" when we ask what our retinas react to (the existence of something causing a reaction is assumed here), we think that the existence of light is the answer to the question.

I will present an imaginary example, to show that "existence" is not objective. Imagine there is an elementary particle which is aware of what it is doing. If the particle can sense light, it can suppose the existence of an object in the direction that has emitted light. Well, how can the particle sense light? The particle can't "see" it. The particle just senses the impact; it just receives action. From this action the particle supposes there is "something" colliding with it. If it were conscious, it would name it "light." If the light always comes from one direction, the source of light is thought to be surely in that direction. In that way the particle conclude that something exists. But actually the particle only recognizes actions which it receives. The rest is all supposition.

The sense of sight is made up of such fundamental *actions*. Our optic nerves receive such

actions in enormous numbers and thus create an objective "recognition" of various objects. But the existence of something (the object or light) is still pure supposition. We can say that human beings (and other animals) have developed this system of recognition so that we can adapt to the environment most effectively. We adopted this system of recognition in which we hypothesize existence of things, because it is most practical in daily life. Yet, according to our knowledge of the mechanism of our perception, the independence of objects from our recognition is not self-evident. Now the idea that their existence depends upon our contact with the world is more convincing.

Every elemental particle is only supposed to exist. We assumed the independent existence of the particle which is aware what it is doing (we can call it "the subject"), but every particle exists only by acting upon another. No particle exists independently; rather, particles are nothing but interaction. In their world, recognizing an object without influencing it is impossible because existence is interaction.

Do you feel it's strange, if I say interaction comes first and then comes existence? Of course, what I have told so far can't rule out the possibility of independent existence. We can imagine without contradiction that each particle exists objectively and that interaction occurs between independent particles. Such an explanation seems the simplest way to understand the world, because we are familiar with this way of thinking. However, in fact, to think of a world of pure action is much simpler than to assume an existence behind the actions. Our usual way of thinking does not always hold good outside the usual range of our lives. When we look back on the history of modern science, we can see that common knowledge is often invalid outside the range of human life.

We human beings tend to interpret the interaction between a subject and object as an attribute of an objective thing. Take the case of temperature. When we touch something that is "hot" or "cold," we speak of the heat or cold as an attribute of the thing when in fact it is an interaction between outer world and the 'I'. This can be easily proved. For example, our feeling of the temperature in the air depends on whether we come from a hot place or a cold place. Whoever comes from a hot place will feel the room to be cool, while whoever comes from a cold place will feel the room to be warm. Here is another experiment. Soak your right forefinger in cold water and your left forefinger in hot water, and then place them in tepid water. The right forefinger will feel hot and your left forefinger will feel cold. These experiments show that heat and cold are not objective attributes of things but rather an interaction between an object and the 'I'. Not only the sense of heat but every sense is an interaction, although we accept it as the attribute of outer world [(3)].

Note (3): Since the sense of heat is caused by the transference of heat from the object to you, you may say that heat itself is an objective attribute, belonging in the above cases to both the human body and the object. In physics it is clear that heat is a vibration of molecules. This implies that both the human body and the object have their own vibrations that is, temperature. But the concept of heat or temperature has been abstracted from our bodily sense of hotness or coolness. Scientists have conceptualized temperature not as an interaction but as an attribute of each object, when in fact, thermal energy can be perceived only through transfer of thermal energy. Not only thermal but every kind of energy can be known only through

interactions. While it is possible to figure out the particular energy of an object theoretically, it is in fact only a description of what transference of energy will occur or has occurred when the object touches others.

The existence of elementary particles

Physics has proven that the most micro unit of material is something quite different from what we imagine. Now I will refer to what modern physics shows to be the nature of an elementary particle. This will help us ask the question, "What is existence?" more radically.

For example, the photon, a particle of light (4), is a major elementary particle. In the past, light was considered to be like waves. Waves do not exist in themselves but represent the traveling of energy like ripples on water. Waves can be added together; it is a feature of waves. When two waves are added together, they either increase or decrease each other. This phenomenon is called interference.

Note (4): In this text I use the word "light" to include all electromagnetic waves, not just the visible ones but including infrared rays, ultraviolet rays, X-rays etc.

"Light as a wave" does not explain some phenomena, like cavity radiation and photoelectric effect (5). These phenomena can be explained, however, by the idea of light as particles. In fact, it is now accepted in physics that light IS ALSO particles, or in other words, countable units. Energy of light changes discontinuously. Imagine that here is energy of one particle, and when you want to increase the energy, you add one more particle to it. So energy of 1.5 particles is impossible. If less than one, the energy of light must be zero. If light were a simple wave, its energy would change continuously, like the volume dial on a stereo; although it can be very weak, its influence spreads widely. In our usual good sense, waves and particles are quite different.

(Note 5): In the phenomenon called "cavity radiation," the gross energy of light in a limited cave becomes, in theory, infinite. Of course energy can't actually be infinite so this means the theory of light as wave is flawed. Planck introduced the "quantum of action" hypothesis to solve this problem. This is the idea that the energy value of light changes discontinuously by a certain unit.

In 1905, Einstein developed Planck's idea and suggested the "light quantum hypothesis," considering light as particles. He thought the reason why light takes a discontinuous value is because light consists of particles. His hypothesis explained a phenomenon called the photoelectric effect, which is the phenomenon whereby electrons are ejected from lighted metal.

Is light a wave, or is it a mass of particles? We have never seen something that is at the same time a wave and a particle. How can we understand this duality of light? Physicists have made many experiments, but the nature of light has not become clear. Rather, it has become more mysterious.

The "slit experiment" illustrates this mysterious duality. When you set a light behind a

wall with a narrow slit, the light spreads concentrically from the slit like waves of water. If there are two slits and you place a screen ahead, there appears a pattern of light made by interference, called "interference fringes." Now you decrease the volume of light. Since light has the nature of particles, you can finally shoot particles of light (photons) one by one. What happens when we shoot photons one by one toward two slits? Photons are the indivisible minimum units of light, so with our usual good sense we think that each photon will pass through only one of two slits and that interference won't occur. And in fact, photons that pass through the slits arrive on the screen; nothing mysterious here. Well, let's do the experiment again and again, a dozen or hundreds of times, and record where the photon is found each time. When we see the data as a whole, to our surprise, the mass of data makes interference fringes. Although each particle of light was shot one by one, *it also interfered*. If photons were simple particles, the area where photons arrive would make two simple lines on the screen, but this is not the case. On the screen, we see a striped pattern of many lines which shows the frequency distribution of photons' arrival, precisely the same as a pattern made in the interference of waves.

In thinking photons are under interference, the photons must be influenced by both the courses (two slits) through which they could possibly pass. But photons go one by one, so they can't pass through two courses at once. Is the assumption wrong, that a photon can't be divided? Does each photon split in two when it passes the slits? This time, to check which slit a photon passes, a sensor is set up in the slits. Whereupon we can confirm that each photon doesn't split and it passes only one of two slits. Now we can surely say that each photon is a minimum unit of light and there cannot be a half photon. However, when the slit through which each photon passes is identified, the interference fringes don't appear. What does appear on the screen are two lines. The observation influenced the behavior of photons and changed the result of the experiment! When we make it clear which slit each photon passes, it behaves only as a particle and its nature as a wave disappears. When we let it be unknown, photons show their nature as waves and interfere as if they had passed through both slits.

We are accustomed to an objective sight model so we tend to think that the reason the result is influenced by observation is due to some failure in our observation. We think we can find a better way to observe which slit the photons pass, without changing their natural behavior, like observing animals without being noticed. However, it is impossible to observe this small object without influencing it. We need to take into consideration that observation is essentially interaction and the existence of this object is known only through that interaction.

The striped pattern of photons represents the probability distribution of where photons tend to arrive. This probability distribution can be precisely described mathematically. That is, theory can calculate practically enough where a photon coming from a certain point is going to be found. But *we can't ask what course an individual photon will actually go through* [6]. It is not only unknown; no distinction exists between the case of "this course" and "that course." Elementary particles have no course; they pass through nowhere! In order to describe the behavior of photons precisely in a mathematical way, we must abandon the image of the *existence* of individual particles. This strange nature of having no course is common to other elementary particles such as electrons.

Note (6): Feynman suggested a method to calculate the probability distribution of photons by considering EVERY course a photon could possibly go through. Of course we can't know which course a photon will actually go through. When a photon moves from point A to point B, there are actually an infinite number of courses. The experiment of the two slits is a special case with only two courses. This method of calculation, called "path integral quantization," is the one by which Feynman explains various phenomena such as light that seems to be going straight, light that is focused by a lens, or oil on water which looks like a rainbow.

Additionally, elementary particles have another strange feature. *They have no identities*; it is impossible to identify a single elementary particle. We may think that we could specify two particles even if they have same appearance, like "this particle A was here, and that particle B was there." However, we can't apply this to elementary particles. In the case of elementary particles, the question "Which is which?" is not only unknowable but meaningless. When I say elementary particles have no identities, I mean that *they have no distinction in their nature*. Tomonaga(1949a) says that when we know a particle disappeared and the next moment it re-appeared, we can't ask if the two particles are the same. To recapitulate, we have seen two features of elementary particles. First, they don't go through any specific course. One is observed at point A and then found at point B – strictly speaking, it *acts* at point A and then *acts* at point B, without passing any specific course. Second, elementary particles have no identities, so we can't ask whether the particle observed at A is same one we found at B. Now I will ask following question again; *do elementary particles exist as themselves independently, or in fact, are they essentially actions from which their existence is supposed?*

Borges, a novelist in Argentine, described a fictional world called Tlön in a short story titled "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius." In Tlön, the world is understood not as a concurrence of objects in space, but as a heterogeneous series of independent acts. For the people in Tlön, the idea of an existence with identity is quite absurd, and "in order to facilitate the comprehension of this inconceivable thesis, a heresiarch of the eleventh century devised the sophism of the nine copper coins:"

"*On Tuesday, X crosses a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On Thursday, Y finds in the road four coins, somewhat rusted by Wednesday's rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins in the road. On Friday morning, X finds two coins in the corridor of his house.* The heresiarch would deduce from this story the reality – i.e., the continuity – of the nine coins which were recovered. *It is absurd* (he affirmed) *to imagine that four of the coins have not existed between Tuesday and Thursday, three between Tuesday and Friday afternoon, two between Tuesday and Friday morning. It is logical to think that they have existed – at least in some secret way, hidden from the comprehension of men – at every moment of those three periods*."

In our world, it is a common understanding that lost coins exist continuously until they are

found. We think things still exist even if they get out of sight. But most people in Tlön did not understand this idea. The defenders of common sense in Tlön "repeated that it was a verbal fallacy, based on the rash application of two neologisms not authorized by usage and alien to all rigorous thought: the verbs 'find' and 'lose,' which beg the question, because they presuppose the identity of the first and of the last nine coins. They recalled that all nouns (man, coin, Thursday, Wednesday, rain) have only a metaphorical value." They explained "that *equality* is one thing and *identity* another." The heresiarch "at times negated plurality and at other times did not," but "if equality implies identity, one would also have to admit that the nine coins are one," they argued.

The "common sense" of this fictional world is quite different from ours, but the logic in the world of elementary particles without identities is like this "common sense" in Tlön, which is to see the world as a series of actions, not as a medley of existences. The defenders of common sense in Tlön presented the hypothetical case of nine men who on nine nights suffered a severe pain. They questioned, "Would it not be ridiculous to pretend that this pain is one and the same?" If we think of a pain as an existing thing, it makes sense to say that yesterday's pain and today's pain are identical. But if we think of a pain as something that occurs, it is nonsense to ask if "pains yesterday" and "pains today" are identical. Similarly, if we think of objects as actions that occur, it is nonsense to ask if yesterday's coins and today's coins are identical, because a question of identity makes sense only on the foundation of the idea of the existence of things.

We tend to see physical laws with our idea of "existence," the common understanding of our world. We may say a photon "moves" from point A to B, but since a photon doesn't have identity, this expression is incorrect. If a photon is one object with identity, it makes sense to say a photon left point A and moved to point B through a certain course. But it is nonsense to ask if the photon that left point A and the one found at point B are identical. In the first place the expression "a photon that left point A" is not correct. No one has ever seen photons flying in space. What we perceive are only actions of photons. What really occurs is that an action is located at one point in space-time and then, with a certain probability, another action is located at another point. These two points have a mathematical relationship, but it is impossible to know what occurs *between* the points. *Photons can't exist between them*. We tend to think the relation of two time-space points as a movement of a photon (as if it were an existing thing,) but it is only because of our tendency to base our ideas on the sight model (7). Since the word "exist" implies continuity, it is inconsistent to say that something without identity exists because if the object doesn't have identity, we cannot sense afterward, the selfsame object that we sensed before.

> Note (7): It is only an intentional distinction in the theory of physics, to ask which of two actions, on point A and point B, is the cause and which is the result, because the mathematical expression of the behavior of photons or electrons doesn't imply any causal connection. It doesn't imply any time order either.

Things have many attributes which we know are not the things themselves. We understand that things are not composed of attributes. Attributes such as feel, color, hardness, etc. are actions which certain things give to our sensory organs, but these actions are not the existence

of things themselves. Attributes accompany existence. The substance of existence is felt to be present, but not as a collection of attributes. A thing has identity and can move in space-time because it has substance. The mystery or profundity of existence of a thing can't be attributed to attributes. However, the mystery of the "existence" of elementary particles is their simplicity. Elementary particles seem to be describable as a set of attributes. Mathematical theories can describe their behavior with great precision. I think that the fact that an elementary particle can be described by its attributes indicates that it has no substance and is only a set of laws governing how it behaves. The behavior of elementary particles does not fit into an image of the world as an aggregate of existing substances.

Yet all things that we know are made of elementary particles. Our knowledge about elementary particles shakes our understanding of the world. If elementary particles can't *exist* in the way we have usually assumed, where is this substance of existence, letting us feel there is something real out there? I have already presented the answer to this question at the beginning of this chapter. Things can "exist" only in the process of our facing them. A necessary condition for the "existence" of things is that we integrate our senses (actions) into the expanse of space and let meaning arise. What we think exists objectively has to do with its meeting the 'I'. Things take on rich human meanings and their profound substance of existence in this encounter. Then, what does this mean, "things take on their substance of existence?" This is the very theme of next chapter. (8)

Note (8): In this chapter I present my argument with the help of my knowledge of quantum theory, which contains more strange phenomena than I have mentioned here. The mathematical laws are clear, but how to interpret these phenomena in quantum physics is a subject of debate, although it seems not the central theme in physics today.

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Chapter 4 Aida, the principle of being

The world of mathematics

With regard to five-dimensional geometry, a German mathematician Hermann Weyl wrote: "We have five parallel horizontal bars upon each of which a small bead slides. A definite condition of this primitive 'adding-machine' is defined if the position of each of the five beads upon its respective rod is known. Let us call such a condition a 'point' and every simultaneous displacement of the five beads a 'vector,' then all of our axioms are satisfied for the dimensional number n = 5." Five-dimensional geometry can be expressed by the positions of the five beads (or five numerical values) independently from one another. That is to say, we don't have to imagine the expanse of five-dimensional space to deal with five-dimensional geometry. We can deal with it by handling five values mathematically.

Furthermore, Wyle pointed out that "it is evident from these arguments that the whole of affine geometry merely teaches us that space is a region of three dimensions in linear quantities… it must on the other hand be emphasized that this demonstrates very clearly with what little right mathematics may claim to expose the intuitional nature of space. Geometry contains no trace of that which makes the space of intuition what it is in virtue of its own entirely distinctive qualities which are not shared by 'states of addition-machines' … It is left to meta-physics to make this 'comprehensible' or indeed to show why and in what sense it is incomprehensible. We as mathematicians have reason to be proud of the wonderful insight into the knowledge of space which we gain, but, at the same time, we must recognize with humility that our conceptual theories enable us to grasp only one aspect of the nature of space, that which, more over, is most formal and superficial."

We were taught in school that space is represented by a set of three number lines. But in fact this set of lines doesn't contain attributes such as expanse or depth because it is only a set of three variables like the three beads. The set of lines can represent expanse of space, but only when we sense the expanse of space as the meaning of it.

A set of three values or coordinates can represent one point in space when provided with an origin, a zero point. The three values depend on the origin; the position of the point is decided only in relation to it. Additionally, each value needs a coordinate axis to represent the point; along the coordinate axis, the distance between the origin and the point is resolved into three components. These components are expressed as a ratio to a unit, so the axes need graduations. The intervals of graduations can be any length provided that they are standardized. The three values are expressed as a ratio to this standardized interval. It is a general principle in mathematics, that any numerical value (length, area, volume…) must be in relation to (in other words, a ratio of) the standard unit value – the value defined as "1". In mathematics, no value has an independent existence. The world of mathematics is the world of pure relation without any independent or substantial factor. This is an important characteristic or advantage of mathematics, because it enables us to deal with pure relation without being involved in substances.

Physics keeps describing the world very well with mathematics. The physical world

corresponds very exactly to its mathematical expression. This may make us expect mathematics to be able to fully describe this world. Physics seems to have no difficulty, even though a set of numbers doesn't contain the expanse of space nor can it express substance.

We human beings learn to count things, like "one, two, three…," in our early days. In primary school, we have arithmetic classes in which we learn how to deal with numbers systematically. But such numbers don't belong to the world of pure number. They belong to the world of concrete existence. When we are asked "one apple and two oranges, how many are they in total?" we can count them, "one, two," and answer "three." It is clear what the sentence "there is *one* apple" means. We see an apple and recognize intuitively that it is *one* thing. It is a *substantial* unit able to be counted as *one*. When an apple is cut into four pieces, we don't have a mathematical idea of "one-fourth" at first but intuitively recognize "one piece" of apple. Such an object recognized as "one" is called "gestalt" in psychology. In our daily life, the word "one" implies this gestalt as a substantial unit.

We grow up and come to know the world of abstract numbers, mathematics rather than arithmetic. In mathematics a number is relative to a standard value which is a non-substantial unit such as a graduation on a scale. In mathematics, the number "3" means three times the standard value, not "three things." Numbers are a comparative expression here. The standard value can be defined arbitrarily and the numerical expression changes variously with it, but the meaning of the expression doesn't change, provided the ratio of numbers is consistent. "1" in mathematics is only a value defined as "1". It expresses no substantial thing. This contrasts with the intuitive "one" in our daily life which has substantial gestalt.

I will give you an example. We know roughly and intuitively how long one meter is. Our eye measurement is inaccurate, but approximately right; our rough and intuitive meter will probably not be shorter than 10 centimeters or longer than 10 meters. We usually don't refer to the standard, but we say, "One meter is *about* this long." Of course our intuitive measurement involves comparison with our own bodies, but we also sense the length of one meter as one substance. Well, how about the mathematical meter? The length of one meter was once decided as one-ten millionth of the meridian of the distance from earth's equator to the North Pole. Now it is defined as the distance light goes in 1/299792458 second. The unit of length is defined as a ratio to a length which is at present believed to be constant. The speed of light is 299792458 meters per second, that comes with the definition of one meter. Provided the speed of light is "1", a meter is 1/299792458, and provided a meter is "1", the speed of light is 299792458. This number "299792458" only expresses the relation between 1 meter and the speed of light. It has nothing to do with 1 meter as a substantial length we sense, nor with the substance of the speed of light. The mathematical meter doesn't represent the *existence* of *one segment* (in other words, a one-dimensional expanse). It only indicates the mathematical relation (or ratio) between a point at which light starts and another at which light arrives after 1/299792458 second. A numerical value can express a segment only when we sense the one-dimensional expanse as the meaning of it. A segment which we sense exists *between* points, but mathematics cannot express this "between" or, in Japanese, "Aida" (see chapter 1).

Aida

There is a famous paradox devised by Zeno, a philosopher in ancient Greece. When something – for example, an airplane – moves from point A to B it must pass through point C, the mid point between A and B, before arriving at B. And when it moves to point C it must pass through point D, the mid point between A and C. Thinking further in same way, it is concluded that the airplane must pass through infinite points. But it is impossible to pass through infinite points in finite time, therefore the airplane cannot move – this is called "the dichotomy paradox." In fact airplanes can move (or seem to move), so the reality contradicts the logic of considering a segment as consisting of infinite points.

However, Zeno's paradox is not paradox in the world of elementary particles. A photon is observed at point A, and then, in a certain probability, observed at point B at a certain time. A photon doesn't "move" in the usual way between these points. It does not pass through point C, midway between A and B, either (We might observe it at point C, but a photon doesn't move between point A and C or between C and B). The "between" do not exist in the "move" of a photon. This fact in physics corresponds to a characteristic of mathematics – lack of any substantial "between." The world of mathematics or elementary particles is discrete and made of points which are not continuous with each other. In this discrete world, there is not even a blank between two points.

The world of living things is continuous, containing "between" or "Aida." We intuitively sense a length between points. Actually a length is constructed only of Aida; it needs no point. Aida is not a mere gap between factors or among things; Aida is the *continuity itself* of space and time (or lively space). Mathematics doesn't include Aida nor is there any Aida for elementary particles; Aida belongs only to the world of living things. The strangeness that we feel in Zeno's paradox is due to the fact that his logic doesn't take Aida into consideration. We do not see the movement of an airplane as being made of points. We see one substantial length in space and feel the flow of time, neither of which can be resolved into points. An airplane seems to fly smoothly and continuously. Its movement is essentially *one* for our recognition.

We human beings have a tendency to construct Aida actively. When some figures are drawn separately, we are often able to put them together into one gestalt. This is not only in the case of spatial proximity. Also with time we unify factors. An animated cartoon is a good example of this. A cartoon is made up of many separated pictures but we see lively movement in it. Is it because our sight recognition cannot catch up with the speed of pictures? No, rather we actively construct the continuous movement. Even if the intervals of passing pictures are widened and shown frame-by-frame, our recognition fuses them together as continuously as possible. We fill in the gap between pictures with Aida, create continuous time and give movement to the objects. Kimura pointed out that patients with depersonalization disorder lose this ability to create Aida and become unable to sense continuous time. In this disorder, not only the expanse of space and the sense of meaning, but also the flow of time are lost and become discrete. We may say that the depersonalization disorder is the dysfunction of Aida.

Kimura mentions that this world of Aida is also the world of "Koto." In Japan, what occurs or happens (namely, a process) is called "Koto" while a thing that exists is called "Mono." Aida is not made of Monos (existing things) like points; there is lively dynamism of Koto in Aida. When the 'I', the subject ("Shutai" in Japanese (1)), has a positive and attentive relationship to the object, we can feel Koto and sense Aida. When you read a book, the plot of the story penetrates through all the words as a flow of meaning, but when you aren't concentrating, the meaning may be unclear. When the subject has an active involvement with an object, new connections and new meanings may be found, even behind seemingly unconnected things. A finding in science is one example. It is a very impressive moment when things which have been considered unconnected now appear as a unified whole. This is an "aha!" moment. Ability to seize the whole meaning is closely related to our ability to feel the world as lively. "The whole" is Aida – the space between – into which factors are placed, and where meaning exists. Meaning always resides in Aida, and Aida always has meaning. Meaning and Aida are not different things; they are two different ways of expressing the principle that enables *one* object to exist.

Note (1): "The subject" is translated as "Shukan" or "Shutai" in Japanese. The word "Shukan" implies passiveness, being subject to the object (it sometimes implies distorting the meaning of the object subjectively, too). However, the word "Shutai" implies autonomy and activeness. "Shutai" refers to the doer of action. So the sentence "Shutai recognizes something" implies that the subject's recognition is an autonomic action of constructing meaning, not the passive receiving of it (According to the Iwanami encyclopedia of philosophy and thought, the meaning of the German word "subjekt" has changed due to the philosophy of German idealism, and the Japanese word "Shutai" is fitting for this new meaning). In this thesis, I use the word "subject" as the English equivalent of "Shutai," the active constructor of meanings.

When I use the word 'I' with single quotation marks, I mean "Shutai" too, the subject with autonomy and activeness (In chapter 7, I use this word also to mean *the self*). When I use this word 'I' I don't intend to speak about a subject seen from an objective viewpoint, but I intend to let you sense meaning from the first person viewpoint.

To review, the world of mathematics and physics is made of separate and discrete points, but our recognition includes substantial Aida which enlivens our world. Space with expanse and time with flow are not a set of points but Aida which belongs to all living things. The world of physics may include some attributes that correspond to space and time, but they are mathematical relationships without expanse and flow. In other words, space-time in physics is a set of four values like four beads tied by mathematical law. They are the necessary conditions for space rather than space itself (2). Only the living process of living things generates a rich expanse and flow.

Note (2): Greene, a modern physicist in the United States, in writing about time and space introduces the possibility that space-time is not the fundamental factor in physics; space and time emerge from a more fundamental factor which is not yet clear. According to him, space and time must be constructed out of

something else which is not something *in* space or time. With our reflections so far, we may think that space and time emerge from a mass of actions with mathematical relationships. Greene also mentions an interesting fact in super-string theory; super-string theory has five different versions which can be translated into one another by mathematical manipulations. Although these versions are different in expression, they are mathematically equivalent and all correct. However, different versions contain different geometries. For example, when a circle in a certain version is smaller, a circle in another version becomes larger, and shapes of figures in different versions are sometimes different (The geometry of super-string theory is on an 11-dimensional space-time, or in other words, time and 10-dimensional space).

Since they are equivalent, it is nonsense to question what size or shape the figure is *in fact*. All of them are correct and can be translated into the others. This fact seems to imply that geometrical attributes of space (we may also call them *existential attributes*) are secondary in physics, as previously thought.

So we see that when we meet *one* object – not the mathematical "1" but the substantial *one* – it fills a certain expanse in space; its existence is made of Aida. Just as a segment is constructed with one-dimensional Aida (or one-dimensional expanse), the object in three-dimensions is constructed with three-dimensional Aida (or three-dimensional expanse). Aida is not a mass of points or a blank between points, but is a rich expanse itself. We cannot explain *one*, substantial thing as a set of factors. If we explain the whole as a set of factors, it leads us to a paradox like Zeno's which resolves one factor into smaller factors infinitely. As I have said, one object is *one whole* with one meaning. We recognize this whole, existing *one* with identity. If the whole is divided into parts, the meaning that the whole has as a whole will be lost. For example, although a human facial expression is made of parts such as eyes, nose and mouth, we don't get the meaning of a facial expression through a medley of parts. The nuance (or meaning) of a facial expression is lost if the parts are separated. A facial expression is always a whole which has a certain spatial extent. It emerges in Aida which fills the extent which includes the parts.

One unit in life

Although we naturally recognize one unit, it is not easy to decide what "one unit" is in the case of inanimate things in nature. The border of one unit is not important for inanimate things. Rocks can be counted but one rock may be broken into two. One-ness is not necessary for the rock; it is separated or not separated from others by chance (3). However, in the world of life one unit has essential importance. One cell can't be simply separated into two. For one cell to be two, a complicated process of reproduction is needed. One cell clearly distinguishes itself (its "self") from others (the field of "non-self") with a border called a cell membrane. The cell membrane is the limit of the "one-ness" of the cell.

Note (3): Today it is known that the physical world is constructed of indissolvable units, or quantum. However, the unit called quantum is totally different from the idea of gestalt. A quantum is like a point

without expanse; it is unsubstantial.

The border which life forms is not a static wall, but rather a process. To define its realm and to be one living unit, one life must actively replace its material substance and reform its border at all times. With this process, called metabolism, one life keeps its identity. Maturana and Varela, biologists in Chile, suggested that such dynamism – forming its own border and creating its self – characterizes life. This dynamism is seen not only at the cellular level but also at more complex levels of life. Living things form one whole on many levels, for instance, a multicellular organism, a group of individuals, a species, or an ecological system. Life keeps forming identities but it is not static or unchanging. The identity always interacts with the environment to replace its factors and keep forming its border.

Let me give an example of identity at a club. Every year some members join to the club and some leave it. Although all members of the club change through the years, the identity of the club is retained. While the culture of the club influences the members, the culture is also influenced by the members, yet it keeps its own historical continuity without becoming a different thing. Where does this "club" exist? We might say that what really exists is just each member and that the continuous club is an abstract idea only in people's minds. But if so, we may have to agree that each individual person (or the 'I') is also only an abstract idea, and that what really exists is just each cell. Of course cells exist, but there also exists not only cells but a person – not only people but a club. The club is a kind of member-containing field; it exists as Aida among members, forming its border continually against outer world. This "Aida" connects members not linearly but spatially. The club has such a forming process and also its own dynamism as one life (4), just as with a person. Although the materials constructing the person, or the 'I', change metabolically, the 'I' still keeps being the 'I'. One person is a kind of *field* and it keeps its own identity with the working of Aida.

Note (4): Dictyostelium discoideum, a kind of fungus, is a dramatic example of a group behaving as one whole. Each dictyostelium discoideum is usually separated and behaves as a monad, but when lacking food they gather and make a multi-cellular slug which moves as one whole. It seems entirely one individual in its appearance. It even is transformed into a fruiting body with stalk and spores.

In an analytical approach, a whole is usually explained by its factors. Is understanding the cells the best way to understand a person, since a person is made of cells? No, we don't understand the whole person through merely understanding factors such as cells, because the behavior of a person is more than that. As we have seen, a UNIT is not the sum of its FACTORS. We can't see the dynamism of a swarm of ants by observing each ant. The behavior of the whole unit is understood by noticing the process between factors and the dynamism in the field. That doesn't mean that each individual factor exists primarily and then they interact secondarily in some causal connection. The process between factors is not a mechanical relation of factors; mechanical relations may come later, but the lively process of Aida comes first.

In this context of relationships each individual exists as an individual or functions as an

individual, only through being a factor of the whole. Just as in the saying, "You cannot see the forest for the trees." The forest is one whole unit, just as a tree is one rich individual. The forest consists of many living things, but the richness of the forest can't be deduced from each living thing. Understanding one tree may enrich our understanding of the whole forest, and at same time, understanding the forest enriches our understanding of one tree. Here is a richly resonating relationship, not a simplistic one in which one object is merely deduced from another.

We sometimes think that we pay regard to individuals, but is it true? We modern people sometimes understand an individual as a replaceable unit that is just one of factors of the society. Of course we know an individual is unique one, but we analyze the uniqueness into factors. We may in fact disregard individuals, since we tend not to sense the richness of presence of "one," or the whole that is not the sum of factors. If we intend to understand a unit of life only by considering it a factor of something or by dissecting it into factors, we may fail to find something essential. Life is not the mere sum of factors but is filled with the dynamism of Aida. At every level the working of Aida fills each unit with rich substance. If we want to understand life, we must sense the rich substance of existence.

When you understand a person, understanding each factor (such as tendency, ability, emotion, will or past) deepens the understanding of one person only when our understanding of each factor resonates with the understanding of the whole person. What we call "individuality" is such a matter. Individuality in essence is not a matter of how a person is different from others or what attributes the person has. Individuality is just a matter of a person's being an individual *one*.

Of course, a person has many attributes and characteristics, or many contents such as thoughts or feelings or cares, each of which is a part of the person and at the same time one rich whole in itself. In psychotherapy, the client and the therapist work together on such a thing. At first it doesn't clearly appear as one "thing" to work on. It slowly gains outline and takes on substance, such as "this problem" or "that feeling" or "something stuck in my mind." What we work on together is the experience as one whole. The value of psychotherapy is not in analyzing or explaining the client's inner experience but in helping the client get in touch with the whole matter, or this substance of *one-ness*. Analyzing and explaining have a certain value only when they resonate with the whole. Sometimes just pointing out this substance of one-ness, like "we are not sure what it is, but something is there in your feeling" is more effective in deepening the client's understanding than analyzing or explaining the client's experience.

Existence and meaning

While Aida makes life one unit, it also makes everything exist because what exists is always one object with a certain expanse. The existing object is one whole that we recognize as one gestalt. When we recognize "one apple" or "one stone," we sense one field of existence. Even when we recognize an obscure object like a cloud, we distinguish one unit field from another. We sense existence always as one unit field distinguished from background space. In psychology, the unit field perceived as one object is called "figure" and the background space is called "ground." Even when we try to imagine a geometric point, we actually picture a small figure with a certain expanse.

A geometric point with no expanse can be expressed only mathematically. Something without expanse can never be a figure as itself because everything exists as a field with expanse. Nothing can "exist" without expanse. Even abstract or imaginary things that don't exist in the real world are also placed in space such as "in one's head" or in the imaginary world spreading in front of oneself, although it may be shared with nobody. We are even imagining numerical formulas as objects with identity. We can sense the richness that one existing object has when we consider one individual not just as the sum of factors but as a substance with spatial (and time) continuity. The existence of one apple will be sensed as one rich meaning, not as a mathematical "1".

As we have seen, life makes itself one unit in a dynamic process, so that life can be counted like "one, two, three." However, we also count inanimate objects, although they are not fit for the same individualization. These objects don't have one-ness or individuality unless human beings or animals encounter it (of course, they are not even "objects" yet). The one-ness of inanimate objects can be considered as a kind of projection of life, that is, a kind of animism (5). This is evidenced by the fact that the inanimate object takes on its own individuality when we face it with concentration. For instance, we may feel a pen we have used for a long time is like as a good old friend, or we may feel a new piece of furniture is a newcomer. The object, felt as one, always has unique meaning. Identity implies uniqueness as its essence. But when the object's one-ness is denied or called a mere factor in the whole, or if it is considered as equal to other many things such as in mass production, then the object loses its uniqueness. We often forget the one-ness of an object and consider it identical to a concept, like seeing one apple as a "mere APPLE." In such a way we think that uniqueness is not essential for the object, but it is not true. When the 'I' faces something, it takes on a unique individuality; uniqueness is the nature of "one thing."

> Note (5): "Animism" is to imagine inanimate objects as living things, as when a small child draws the sun with a face. Small children have animistic sensibilities, in that they sense life and intention in inanimate things. Such sensibility is natural when one senses the unique presence of an object.

No uniqueness exists without the subject's recognition, nor exists any object without it. Even if we suppose there is the objective world of "existence" apart from the subject, it may be a mass of physical actions or of mathematical laws. It has no Aida, no expanse in space, no time and no identity; it is several discrete points of action. It is quite different from the "existence" that we picture because it lacks *something* which exists. Existing things emerge when we integrate such discrete actions into Sensus Communis or a spatial expanse; by this means we understand the world. In this integration Aida works in a lively fashion, and we sense something as fully present. The word "exist" is not a term for physics. Existence is always what we sense – or, precisely speaking, existence IS a sense.

As we have seen, existence is replete with meaning. Meaning is not a kind of impurity that is difficult to remove from existence. Meaning is the essence of existence or, to be precise, it is existence itself (existence of "it" is the nuance of "it-ness" itself). Even when we encounter something unfamiliar and indescribable, there may already waft some nuance such as "something

strange" or "I want nothing to do with it." First of all, the recognition of existence already implies the sense that "it exists." We sense a certain expanse of space replete with "existence" in front of us; "existence" is implied as a meaning of it. Existence is something spatial, but that does not only mean that things occupy a certain area or that things are placed in space as a kind of receptacle. Existence is a certain way of being of space itself. *Existence is the space replete with the sense of "being there."* In other words, existence is a certain area in space that has identity as *one* object.

Existence doesn't need to be filled up with material. When the 'I' notices a hole on a wooden plate, what exists for the 'I' is not the plate but the hole. Sometimes we may say "there is an empty space" or even "an emptiness in my heart." In psychotherapy, the client sometimes finds a lack of something in himself (or herself) and senses the lack as one substantial object. When we sense a lack as one gestalt, the area of "something is lacking" takes on the nuance of existence and its own identity. On the other hand, it can happen that we can't feel "it is there" although it is materially there, like in the case of the depersonalization disorder with which the object doesn't have the nuance of one substantial existence. For another example, we sometimes feel that a person is "absent," or we may feel lightness of our own being which makes us unable to sense our full presence (In Chapter 7, I will take up the theme of presence of a person).

Of course, the distinction between existence and non-existence does not depend on our intention. We cannot decide intentionally whether a certain area takes on the nuance of "existence" or not. We *encounter* things; we don't concoct existence. "To exist" is not an illusion invented inside the 'I', nor is it a static truth having no relation to the subject. It is a process, or Koto, which occurs between the 'I' and the object.

While the existing object has its own individuality, space without the nuance of existence lacks individuality. Space without individuality provides a rich expanse as a background field behind meaning. In this space, new meanings form and resonate with each other. It is the matrix in which existence arises, or it is the "ground" spreading behind the existing "figure." This space is necessary for things to be formed and to relate to each other, but it is something like air which cannot be clearly noticed (6).

> Note (6): Of course, when we notice it as "something like air" it has already taken on an outline and identity as "the figure," and space as "ground" is left unnoticed behind it. The "ground" is not "something" or "Mono" but is the pure flow of "Koto" which is essential to the existence of the object.

Existence is like a solidified meaning or a density of value. For a little child facing something, this density of meaning is obvious. Children stretch their hands to many things and ask with interest, "What is this?" In childhood, all of us probably experienced existing objects as having intense meaning. We only later come to understand the object conceptually and see it flatly such as "a mere pen" or "a mere apple." Many of us lose interest in the wonder of existence, and so we live among "common" things whose meanings are frozen by concepts. That may be the reason why many grownups look bored (7).

Note (7): While children are open to a lively meaning of things, children also tend to understand the world much more rigidly than grownups. Grownups can think flexibly, but children sometimes consider such flexibility as inconsistency or dishonesty. They tend to understand the world with strict law. Children may be learning the skill of solidifying their experiences into static understanding; this is necessary skill for human beings.

The way children relate to the world is linear, not spatial. Children don't sense rich space between the object and themselves. They stand very close to the object both psychologically and physically. The meaning of the object is more intense than rich for them. To experience the object richly, is like having a dialogue with the object in rich space; for this maturity of the subject is needed. Grownups sometimes remember their childhoods as beautiful memories, but it may be less because their childhoods were happy, than because their memories of childhood eagerness are placed in their mature rich space.

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Chapter 5　Flow and solidification

The past is constructed in the present

We have reconsidered whether existence is unchanging reality apart from our recognition. We have seen that one existing object is formed in the space in which the 'I' encounters the object. We should not assume that existence of objects comes first; rather, it arises as one meaning from the space of the encounter. This rich expanse of space is always there behind existence and meaning. This space is the pure flow of occurring; when we recognize an existing object, space always flows as the background or context in which the object is related to the larger whole. To keep a rich relation to the world we need to be open to this unsolidified flow, or Koto.

However, human beings have a strong tendency to solidify the world into unchanging things or Mono. Not only do we solidify each object, but we also abstract and solidify its formless attributes such as movement or its relationship with other objects into laws. With today's development of science it is clear that solidification is a very effective way to understand the world. But when such a tendency is taken to extremes, the world is felt to be mechanical, made up of factors and laws, not a whole process filled with meaning.

For example, we like to preserve records of various occasions, that is a manifestation of our tendency to solidify things. We make documents on our job and take pictures in our private travel. We also preserve experiences by holding them in our memory. Of course preserving is useful. If you preserve experiences carefully you may be able to make good use of your past experiences in your present life. But if you become too tenacious, you may fear to lose anything and begin preserving or memorizing for its own sake. It can be said that this is an attempt to keep the present in the unchanging "past." We think that if a record is kept somewhere, we can take it out and see it any time we like (although quite a few records are never seen). We may be afraid that the present will be lost forever. If the records are in hand, we may feel relieved and believe that the past is under our control. However, records which are preserved and never read make no sense. The value of records exists not in being preserved but in being read by someone who senses the meaning in them. Is there any sense in a book kept unread in a library? Meaning only arises when someone opens the book and finds meaning in its sentences. Meaning is not something static kept locked away. Meaning arises as something always new; it exists in the dialogue between the subject and the object. To live with rich meaning, what is important is not the possession of things in an unchanging state. What is needed is to be open to the meaning wafting in the "here and now."

Not only the preserved documents but the past itself takes on meaning only when the subject faces it. We notice traces of the past on various things – bones which prove that dinosaurs have existed, foot prints on the snow which tell that someone has passed by, scratches on the floor which remind you of your earlier times … In fact, everything has traces of the past, but only when people living in the present see some meaning in it do they reconstruct it as the past. The past always emerges as a meaning that we see on the object. For examples, we may recall a person who has passed away when we see an article left by him, or we may see an old house and say "ah, this is famous Mr. So-and-so's birthplace." When the 'I' senses the past there is always a context around it,

and the past is found as one whole meaning in the context, such as one episode, one era, or a history of one matter. The past can't be separated from meaning. We find the past as *one* meaning, that is, one object.

Of course it is also true of our memory, which is the past we preserve in our heads (or in our hearts). When we recall a past event, we reconstruct it as one meaning from the viewpoint of the present. We may think that memories (especially our own) preserve the past accurately and unchangingly, but it is not true because the past wafts new meaning every time the subject recalls it.

We solidify the past out of the whole meaning of the object (or the memory) and recognize it as the past. The subject faces the object or the memory in the present moment, so the past exists always in the space of "here and now." You may feel this is strange logic, because we usually assume that the past has passed so it can't exist in the present time. But if the past is lost, we would be not able to think about the past "now." When we recall the past, we don't stand at the past point on the time line. The past exists here, in this rich space in which we are facing it. We relate to the whole meaning in the present and we differentiate the past from it.

The past changes its implications subtly or clearly every time we reconstruct it. The past is not static, but changing. Many people think that the past never changes; they think that what changes is the meaning we give to the past. If the past didn't change, it would be an eternal truth. But truth must be something changing in the present time unless it is something like pure mathematical relationships without any meaning. There is no static and unchanging meaning. Even if it seems unchanging it is actually not, because meaning is always found freshly in the space where we live now. Sometimes the past seems unrecoverable, but where the "unrecoverable" nuance wafts is in the present. The whole meaning may change at any moment: For instance, we may notice that hope has always been there and we have been feeling it every time although we haven't previously noticed it, or some past event may be put in quite a different context and we may think, "Ah, I see the truth, I realize it now."(1) We get in touch with the nuance of meaning arising as the past in the present space, and we dialogue with it in the present. The past appears in front of us as a waft. But you may still insist that the past must keep its rigid immutability. You may think that the past is the objective reality independent of the subject's recognition, and the subjective meaning given to the past (or the traces of it) is not same as the past itself, as if the past in its past state is preserved somewhere in the abstract space called "time." When you insist that, you are at the standpoint from which you overlook all of time at once. In this standpoint you can put the past, the present and the future side by side in space, but actually such standpoint is impossible.

Note (1): In psychotherapy, the therapist knows that the client's conviction that things will never be better can change, but, significantly, the therapist stays on the negative nuance and shares it with the client without denying the client's desperation in the present because the present felt meaning "I will never be better" exists as a "truth" now. What is important for the client is to face the meaning which is felt in the present.

There is another approach, which is putting a linear time onto the client's sense of desperation

(e.g. "what do you think your life will be like, one year from now?") in order to have the client evaluate the present situation objectively. When the client is able to change his (or her) viewpoint, this approach is effective and can change the meaning of the future in the present.

Static understanding of time, like putting the past, present and future on a numerical line, can create paradoxes. The past has been already lost, the future has not come yet, so what exists is seemingly only the present, but the present is only a point with no duration, so it is hard to say it exists either. With the numerical-lined time model, time seems to be impossible. This paradox of time includes the same problem as Zeno's paradox. When thinking of time as a numerical line and the present as a point moving along the line, time and movement are both incomprehensible. Because, in fact, the flow of time is not made of an infinite number of points or moments but is filled with Aida (the space between). Human time is not a series of points but something experienced with a certain expanse. To think of time as a line is to solidify time as an unchanging object or abstract space, but time is not something unchanging in essence. Human time cannot be converted to a geometrical dimension (2).

Note (2): Contrarily, time in physics can be expressed geometrically. I think this is an astounding fact, although we usually take it as a matter of course. Time can be expressed mathematically, but it doesn't include the present time as a special moment, nor does it have a forward direction from the past toward the future.

Present space and the solidification of an object

For human beings, essential, real time must be the present time which is not a point but a flow with a expanse. The past and the future are contained in the present. However, we can't *know* present time itself. When we try to capture time, what we capture is always the past or the future. The present time can't be recognized; it can only be *lived in*. If the 'I' wants to know about time as an object, it must be solidified into one static thing. The past and the future are born in such a way. The past and the future are solidified time that is objectified in the flow of the present and recognized. So the present time is a quite different kind of time from the past (or the future); the present and the past belong to quite different spheres. The present time is the matrix which flows and spreads richly, containing both the past and the 'I' who is facing the past. So to speak, present time is the *space* in which we live and are alive; another word for it is *the present space*.

This present space is the pure Koto that can never be recognized statically as itself. Actually, words such as "pure Koto" or "the present space" are not suitable for it. The moment we call it "Koto," it has been already solidified and has become a kind of Mono (that which exists), not pure Koto itself. We will never find any word to express it directly. This flow of Koto is something beyond our direct recognition because it contains both the object and the 'I' undifferentiated, therefore it is something that the 'I' can't face. Without solidifying Mono out of this pure flow of Koto, the 'I' cannot relate to anything. Although the pure flow of Koto is rich Aida which can be considered as the flow of life itself, it cannot *exist*. It never becomes the "figure" itself, but remains the

primordial "ground" from which figures arise. This "ground" or a background field in which the 'I' meets something, always surrounds the experiences of the 'I', containing both the subject and the object. If we are in this primordial flow without any solidification, we "lose ourselves" – our own "I-ness." (3)

Note (3): This concept of "pure Koto" may seem to have a point in common with the concept of "action," since they both contrast with "Mono," which expresses something which objectively exists. However, in this article, "action" as a concept in physics is almost the opposite of Koto. An action in physics is a point without expanse; it is separated from any life. On the other hand, Koto is the rich expanse of life itself, before any static Mono is differentiated.

When we solidify an object as a thing with identity, the object is placed in front of the subject as *the other* to be faced by the subject. Only through this solidifying process, the dialogue of the subject and the object becomes possible. Of course, behind this one object there is rich flow of Koto which gives rich nuance to the object and places it in a larger context, but without facing Mono or solidifying the object out of the flow of Koto, we could never find any object at all. We live the present, being the 'I', through facing Monos (or meanings).

Psychotherapy and meaning

We relate to an object through solidifying it, so we feel that it is hard to deal with something enigmatic, something unnamed, or something without a face or outline like a ghost. We don't know how to deal with an object without shape. If we do deal with a kind of ghost, we may not feel scared if we can identify it and imagine it as an obvious object. When we are able to solidify the object as unchanging Mono, we feel easy, as we may feel that we hold the reins of the object. Modern people have succeeded in solidifying and objectifying the world through science, and they are thereby able to control the world to a high degree. This may be the reason why we feel afraid of losing control of the object, or ourselves (4).

Note (4): Seemingly we modern people always want change and are bored with an unchanging situation. But the changes which modern people want sometimes mean unchanging security, unchanging prosperity or unchanging happiness. Or, should I say, although modern people always demand development, they don't realize that development is change. For instance, people tend to shut their eyes to the environmental disruption that comes after development. Or they may want to believe that this situation of development will last forever.

But if our desire for control over an object or ourselves becomes too much, we will be obsessed with doing things rigidly and will lose a sense of freedom. This state of mind is called "obsession" in psychopathology. Strongly obsessed people pay too much attention to order and try to do every job precisely and perfectly in every detail. When this tendency goes to extreme, the anxiety over uncertainty increases, and they may use obsessive behavior such as washing their hands for

hours or having to check again and again that the door of the home is locked. Thus they attempt to exclude uncontrollable factors thoroughly in order to make absolute both external order and inner conviction. If they hear that meaning is not a static truth, it may make them anxious. They want the world to be made of unchanging truths and to be controllable. For the obsessive mind, certainty is more important than richness of experience.

Not a few clients in psychotherapy have a strong obsessive tendency. Others have a wish to gain certain truths. People often understand things in a static frame or deal with things in a static pattern; this provides common anxiety relief. But in modern therapy, therapists usually don't attempt to give clients a specific way of coping with problems, much less teach clients an absolute truth. Modern therapy is concerned with the lively process of the creation of meaning. The essence of therapy is this process in which clients face something in the present and find meanings freshly in their dialogue with it.

The idea that meaning is not static but always created, is essentially related to the idea that the relationship between subject and object (or between people) is very important, because they are both based on the process, not on each separate thing. The relationship between the therapist and the client has been considered important ever since psychoanalysis discovered the phenomenon called transference (5). But in early psychoanalysis, relational problems that occur between the therapist and the client are considered as an expression of problems on the client's side. In other words, the meaning of happenings in psychotherapy was considered to be inside the client statically. In modern psychoanalysis, the object which the therapist deals with is not something static inside the client but something created always freshly in the field of the client-therapist relationship. What is important is not to find the truth as Mono. Rather, it is to be open to the process in which something new is created.

Note (5): In psychotherapy, clients sometimes set their affection on the therapist or feel hate for the therapist. Such feelings of the client for the therapist are called transference. In early psychoanalysis, this phenomenon of transference was explained as follows; the client saw his (her) past relations with others in the present relationship and this distorted his (her) understanding of the therapist. Now all of what the client sees in the therapist is called transference. One of the reasons for this may be that they have come to think that everything which occurs between the client and therapist has to do with the process of psychotherapy and that no clear border can be drawn between objective and distorted understanding.

In contrast to transference, feelings the therapist has for the client are called counter-transference. In modern psychoanalysis, transference and counter-transference are not considered independent phenomena. They are considered as one whole phenomenon, i.e. the relationship between two people.

Bion's psychoanalysis

Wilfred R. Bion is a psychoanalyst who has developed the idea of meaning in psychoanalysis. Bion used the symbol "O" to indicate psychic reality or truth, but the truth is not what we can *know*; it is what we can *become* – "becoming O." In other words, Bion thought that

truth is not something static which can be objectified but a process which we live. Bion(1967) proposed that analysts must conduct their sessions with the attitude of having "no memory, no desire." Bion suggested that analysts should not remember what the client said in past sessions, nor must they have any hope to cure the client.

In developing his thought about the formation of meaning, Bion introduced symbols such as PS↔D and ♀♂ to avoid having his words take on any specific meaning too early. Words inevitably have images or shades of meaning. By using symbols, Bion tried to describe a certain process involved in thought in a way comparatively unrestricted by images and meanings, because he was trying to describe the very process of creating images and meanings. In part, the abstruseness of Bion's writing comes from the peculiarity of his theory, which was thought about thought itself.

What the symbol ♀♂ represents is something like "container and contained" ("container and contained" is *a model* for the function of ♀♂). It is also expressions of the relationship between a mother and baby, and it also expresses the relationship between words and meaning. According to Bion(1962), "the infant projects a part of its psyche, namely its bad feelings, into a good breast. Thence in due course they are removed and re-introjected. During their sojourn in the good breast they are felt to have been modified in such a way that the object that is re-introjected has become tolerable to the infant's psyche."(6) An infant becomes overwhelmed by its own feelings and can't hold the feelings inside itself. So the mother becomes the container for the experience of the infant; she gives meaning to it and makes it tolerable for the infant. For example, an infant crying in the absence of its mother can't understand the situation. The infant is left in nameless fears. This situation is not tolerable, as it is nameless and therefore not understandable. In other words, the situation has no meaning that can be indicated by words. When the mother appears and senses the feeling of the infant, saying "oh, you felt lonely, as mama was not beside you," the experience is held in the space with the mother and becomes tolerable, since it has been held (contained) inside the mother (or in the space with the mother) and given meaning.

Note (6): Influence of the condition inside the 'I' on our recognition of the outer world, or considering our subjective feelings as attributes of an object, is called "projection." For example, someone who envies another's social success may murmur, "He thinks he's really something." This person doesn't take on the unpleasant feeling as one's own, but considers that the problem is the other person's. Such projection can be seen behind many so-called "objective judgments." But the projection in the sense that Bion mentions here is not only a matter of recognition on the subject's side, but an interactive process that actually influences the other person; it is a kind of communication. The process of the infant's mind stuffing inner feelings into the mother's breast is not only a fantasy but also influences the mother's being. Such projection as a communication is called "projective identification."

Bion used the expression "the good breast" (as Melanie Klein did) when describing the baby's relation with the mother, because infants don't recognize the mother as an individual person, nor can they integrate good experiences and bad experiences into the existence of one person. Possibly early infants cannot even recognize a breast as something with a definite identity because they may experience the world at the

level nearer Koto than Mono.

The symbol PS↔D expresses the shift from formless chaos to a state with separated units, or the fluctuation between these two states. PS↔D is the function of constructing a gestalt in the world; it makes an object appear. Bion(1963) said that the outline of the "whole-object" depends on PS↔D (we can say that PS↔D has to do with the *identity* of the object) and the meaning of the whole-object depends on ♀♂. ♀♂ and PS↔D are closely related. We cannot recognize formless experience as an object (7), but when a unit appears in the experience, we can name it, such as "lonely." At same time we can say that the word "lonely" makes a unit of experience appear. In my thought, the object takes on its meaning just at the moment it gains its outline; PS↔D and ♀♂ occur at same moment (8). Bion(1963) himself suggests that PS↔D and ♀♂ have a close relation and it is not possible to determine whether PS↔D or ♀♂ precedes. In my thought, an infant's feeling before the mother gives it meaning is like a formless experience which is not solidified. It is intolerable to the infant, because it can't be indicated or referred to as "this." The mother makes a definable object appear in the infant's experience, and at the same time, gives meaning to that experience.

Note (7): In this article, I usually use the word "experience" to express an interactive process with the object differentiated out of the flow of Koto, but with the expression "formless experience" I intend undifferentiated Koto itself. Gendlin (I will introduce his thought later in this chapter) uses the word "experiencing" to express this pure flow of Koto. The flow of Koto in itself actually can't be named, because once it is named it is already objectified. To make a distinction between terms for the flow of Koto itself and for the interactive process in which an object is differentiated is a delicate problem.

Note (8): As I will discuss later in chapter 6, I think that a certain biological process in which the object appears as one unit precedes the meaning of the object. In this sense, we can say that PS↔D precedes ♀♂. However, that is the stage before the 'I' becomes conscious of the unit of the object, so it is essentially different from the process of consciousness. In thinking of the active process of thought we should say that PS↔D and ♀♂ occur simultaneously, because when we are conscious of the unit of the object (this is the moment the subject activates), the object has already began to take on meaning. Actually, whether to think the object *exists* before we are conscious of it or not, is a matter that can be asked only from outside, or afterwards.

Gradually the mother's function that makes the object appear out of formless chaos is introjected into (taken in by) the infant and becomes an inner process. Mature people understand what they are experiencing inside themselves, like "I am feeling lonely because she is not here," and can hold the experience in their inner space. The experience is differentiated as one object which can be described and thought of. On the other hand, describing it helps the object to be differentiated as one definable thing; when we solidify our loneliness into an object by the word "lonely," we can face it. Formless experience before it is described (♂) cannot be an object that we

can face or think of until being it is outlined with words as container (♀). The container does not outline the contained one-sidedly, but the container itself changes with the influence of the contained. Bion (1963) described that ♀♂ "is a representation of an element that could be called a dynamic relationship between container and contained." The relationship between container and contained, or between words and meaning, is not linear or one-way. It is a process that is always interacting.

Gendlin's thought

Eugene Gendlin is one of the thinkers who value Koto and Aida (or process and space), rather than Mono (seemingly self-evident existence). Although a philosopher, Gendlin has worked in the world of psychotherapy; he was a coworker of Carl Rogers, the originator of client-centered therapy. However, Gendlin's writings are not limited to psychotherapy in the narrow sense. He is known for having discovered *Focusing,* which is a method of dialogue with oneself, but Focusing is not psychotherapy, although Gendlin considered it to be the principle at the base of general psychotherapy and suggested doing psychotherapy with this principle. In other words, he didn't establish an independent school of psychotherapy. Rather, Gendlin attempts to go beyond the traditional form of psychotherapy in which professionals provide clients with therapy. He attempts to place Focusing widely in various social activities. His practice is deeply related to his own thought as a philosopher; Focusing is also a philosophy of experience.

Although the word "Focusing" has become well known among people who are interested in psychotherapy, there seems to be some misunderstanding. Many people consider Focusing only as a method of inner sensing or, a mere tool. This is only one aspect of Focusing. The name "Focusing" also means the natural process in which experience is faced and meaning is created. Of course both meanings of "Focusing" are related, since Focusing as a tool is the way to deepen Focusing, the process.

Focusing as a tool begins with paying attention to the inside of your body. Then you wait for some kind of sense, some concerns or feelings, or other vague waft of nuance to arise as one object in your body. Senses, feelings or wafts of nuance are not different in essence. "Feeling" implies a kind of inner sense, and "sensing" always implies a waft of nuance (if the subject wants to sense it). Gendlin called this inner sensing with a waft of nuance the "felt-sense." We sense a felt-sense as an existing object inside the 'I'. It is *one* object that can be indicated as "it;" it has substance as one inner reality. This object wafts rich meaning, although at first still vague.

As you objectify a felt-sense and try to relate to it, describing it is an important part of the process. The felt-sense is one object solidified out of the flow of Koto (out of *experiencing*, in Gendin's term); words (or images) help this process. As you describe it, you dialogue with the felt-sense; you find words which resonate with it and use them repeatedly. In this dialogue the felt-sense is "carried forward" and may change, while your words become rich and accurate. This process of Focusing in which the felt-sense and the words interact and change together is, I think, essentially what Bion discussed with the symbols.

This process of inner resonance between sense and words naturally occurs in our everyday

experience. However, because we often neglect to resonate words with our inner sensing, Focusing is a useful tool. We often tend to consider meaning only as something static, and when we want static truths (which actually exist only as verbal descriptions), we separate words from the rich waft in which they were created, and this separation makes us lose our lively sensibility so that we become unable to have a rich dialogue with objects, people or ourselves. Focusing as a tool helps us relate to objects, people or ourselves with rich meaning.

Gendlin has attached much importance to the process and has given much thought not to things, but to the interaction itself. In his work "A Process Model," Gendlin attempt to reconstruct concepts not from each object or state of mind but from the interactive process. In Gendlin's thought, each object does not exist from the beginning as a static thing, but arises in this interactive process. This is also true of the 'I'. The 'I' is not a static thing but arises in interaction with its environment. Sometimes Focusing (as a tool) is criticized for slighting our relation with the real environment, as Focusing encourages treating inner feelings with respect. But Gendlin is really saying the opposite. We can only be ourselves in relation to the environment. Our interaction with the environment keeps creating the 'I'.

Facing the object

Although meaning doesn't exist statically but always changes in interaction, it doesn't mean that our world essentially has no meaning. In modern thought some people think that there is no reliable meaning in this world, and that we are only playing with meaning superficially (9). This idea is quite different from the thoughts of Bion and Gendlin. It may indeed be true that there is no unchanging meaning that precedes our interaction with the world, but it doesn't mean that the world lacks meaning. The world takes on meaning in the way the subject faces the world. Meaning belongs to this process of our encountering an object; meaning is always created freshly when the subject faces the object.

> Note (9): Jacques Derrida is a representative thinker of this kind, but Seiji Takeda has presented an interesting commentary on the thought of Derrida. He says that the important point of Derrida's theory of text is that the essence of language is not the function of "make copies of the world," but is material for relationships. From the viewpoint of Takeda, the important point of Derrida's thought is not that the world has no meaning, but that words make relationships and meanings in the world.
>
> Takeda questions people's use of Derrida's concepts, not Derrida's thought itself. We sometimes solidify the meaning of someone's thought and think we understand it sufficiently, but such a fixed understanding often deprives this thought of its life.

The thoughts of Bion and Gendlin give a foundation to present-day psychotherapy. Psychotherapy is not to search for static truth in the client and to make the client aware of it. Psychotherapy should be a place in which clients discover something in the world, or inside themselves, and then face it. Sometimes what is found there is very important for the client, and sometimes it is only an ordinary little fact. In any case, what is the most important is the process by

which the client faces it. Even if the client's insight is ordinary, it is always new and fresh every time he or she finds it – it is present with rich substance which can be indicated as "it." For the client, it is less important to know its content, than to get in touch with it, face it and unfold the process of dialogue with it. The secure place of psychotherapy and the presence of the therapist who pays positive regard to what is found make space for the dialogue between the client and "something." The therapist's words are spoken to indicate the presence of one object, rather than to make the client know something.

In this space, the 'I' (or the subject) finds one object or meaning and faces it. This occurrence contains factors such as the 'I', space, meaning or object. However, it is not true that these factors existed previously as separated things and now, secondarily, relate to one another. Rather, they (the 'I', meaning as object, space as context…) are differentiated just at the moment that "'I' am facing something here and now." We relate to the world in such a way; in fact, only in such a way. To live is not to exist as a previously static self among previously static things. To live is to encounter objects always newly, as a process in which everything keeps being continuously re-differentiated and re-solidified. When 'I' am facing something in the present space, not only the "something" but also the 'I' is always being re-created.

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Chapter 6　Language: concept and understanding

Language weaves the world

Solidifying and facing the object is deeply connected with the process of describing it in words. Language makes the object appear as a definite identity. Language also enables us to face an absent object or past events. Moreover, language makes it possible to know about things we haven't seen or places we haven't been, even occurrences before we were born. The abstract object without any shape (or sound, scent, taste or touch) is solidified with language so that we can talk about it. With language, we can meet objects outside of our sensations. It dramatically broadens our world.

Language also enables us to *think* about the object. We cannot think anything without language because thought is made of language. If there is a thought without language, it is something quite different from what we are imaging as "thought." We live in language like in air, so we can hardly imagine thought without language. Our life is influenced by language that deeply.

It is well known now that language influences ways of looking at the world. This is called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or theory of linguistic relativity. While we use language as a tool for expression, our viewpoints and thoughts are ruled by it. When we look upon the process of describing from the viewpoint of static Mono, something must be there to be described; words only express it after. But that is not the viewpoint which places Koto as the basis of the world. From Koto's view, Mono can exist only through being differentiated and solidified out of Koto; something to be described is created in the process of being described. This means that the frame in which words express things (and thoughts) influences the way things and thoughts actually exist. Language influences the encounter of the 'I' and the world, and the world in front of us can be changed by it.

Words divide the world and allow objects to exist. Your way to describe the world and divide it into things is not the only one; many languages on earth divide the world in different ways. For example, for the word "brother" in English, Japanese has two words, "ani" and "otoh-to" which mean senior brother and junior brother. When you want to say "this is my brother" in Japanese, you have to think whether he is older or younger than you. When speaking Japanese, you are usually directed to care about the exact relationship between you and another, while you don't need to care about it when you are speaking English. The difference between the two languages may create the distinction in these two cultures, but at the same time the difference between two languages may be created by the difference in these two cultures. "Brother" and "ani" (or "otoh-to") are different objects; the objects that these words create are different.

Words also influence our perceptions. For example, barks of dogs are "bow-wow" in English but are expressed by "wan-wan" in Japanese. This is not only a difference of transcription. English-speaking people actually hear the dog say "bow-wow" while the ears of the Japanese people hear "wan-wan." Whoever knows the names of many kinds of grasses may find various characteristic grasses in weeds. Whoever knows many words to express feelings may sense someone's inner feelings delicately and pay much attention to them. People who have only two words, "good" and "bad," to express feelings, may not able to notice intricate feelings inside others or

even themselves. These examples show that words influence our way of experiencing. Words don't only explain experiences, but words allow us to get in touch with experiences and resonate with them. To be accurate, experience may be this very process of resonating with language. So if we use words richly, the world and our experience of it becomes richer.

Words give identity to the object

We can find and face an object with words; words unify meaning into one identity. Words as containers of meaning divide the world into various existences (condensed meanings) and make each object clearly arise in the world. Does this mean that we can divide the world arbitrarily with words? Or that we can define objects freely and give the object any name we like? No, it is not so simple. The object expressed by words, or words expressing the object, is not completely under our control. It is *the other* that we encounter.

We cannot freely determine a unit of a thing (a phenomenon) to be named because when we think, "what is it, what shall I call it?" we have already encountered "it." We don't decide the range of "it" intentionally. I will give you an example of the word "kindness." We identify a homogeneous group of feelings (or behaviors), distinguishing it and defining it with the word "kindness." In this way "kindness" is given existence. Existence of "kindness" is not a mere illusion made by words. Of course, this "kindness" we have found owes its existence to the subject's action of solidifying it into a kind of Mono; "kindness" doesn't exist statically and independently from the subject which recognizes it. However, the solidification of "kindness" by words does not depend on arbitrariness of the 'I'. The 'I' *finds something* to be named "kindness." The "kindness" is sensed with its own identity; it is sensed as being present inside someone (or as a behavior of someone). This encounter with the object is outside the subject's control.

But on the other hand, it is questionable whether "kindness" can exist as something definite without being named. Words give a definite identity to the object and make it one unit of meaning. Especially abstract things (and therefore invisible objects) can't take on any outline unless they have been named. In this identity, the object to be named and the word for naming it are unified into one inseparable unit. This inseparable unit is called a *concept*. We can say nothing about which comes first, the object or the word, because they arise together as one concept, one inseparable unit.

Animals without language also capture *one* object and act in relation to the unified object, so we are not able to say that the world without language is empty. But for most animals, objects appear differently than for human beings. As I will discuss in chapter 7, most animals don't face the object as an 'I' or as "Shutai" (an active subject), so it is questionable whether we can say that "animals *recognize existence* of *things*." At least, the relationship animals have with *one* object doesn't contain many of the implications or nuances that we sense in our expression, "recognizing existence of things," although we human beings have no way of knowing it. In my thought, the function of forming a unit precedes language, but it is like when you absently see something on the table, or you react reflexively to something rushing towards you. Afterward, you remember your seeing it, saying "ah," and thinking, "what is that?" after you have got out its way. In that moment

language has already been activated. The word “ah” (or it may be only a subtle motion) already contains the attitude of facing the object and finding meaning in dialoguing with it. Objects before such an attitude are too primitive to be called existence – they may not be suitable even for the word “object.” The object with identity that can be faced by the ‘I’ is found after such an “ah.” In the case of abstract objects that cannot be captured through any sensory organ, unities of objects are formed only through this “ah.”

Imagine a scholar who is creating a new concept, as an example. When the scholar senses some relationship in a large amount of miscellaneous data, he do so with an “ah” feeling (which can be called inspiration). There is *something* there but it has not been expressed by any word; it can be sensed only slightly. This *something* is quite unclear, so it will disperse if not expressed by some word or other. It seems to have been found before being expressed, but on the other hand it seems to begin existing at the very moment the subject becomes aware of it with his “ah” feeling, and to keep existing only through some word such as “it” or “something.” Such words function as tentative containers that give some outline to the unnamed object. These containers help the subject to keep in touch with the whole nuance. The subject indicates the object and pays attention to it with words such as “this is something like…,” “it feels like…” or “what is it?…” so that the sense will not disperse.

This *something* needs to be expressed by a more suitable word in order to exist more clearly. The scholar tries to describe this unclear sense somehow or other; or, should I say, this unclear sense wants to be expressed somehow or other. The scholar may not feel at ease, because he is not sure that he has found something until he finds an accurate expression. Several expressions may fit, but not just any expression. Although the subject participates in this process and the nuance of the concept varies according to the words which describe it, the subject cannot forge the concept freely or invent the expression arbitrarily. Rather, the subject *looks for* the best expression. What occurs here is a dialogue between the object-as-one-meaning and the subject (1).

Note(1): A dialogue with meaning is sometimes had in a non-verbal way such as with gestures, art or music. Although non-verbal dialogue and verbal dialogue are very different, they share an essential point; they are all the process of giving some shape to an object (solidifying the object).

Words function as containers of meaning or a kind of gravitational field that give cohesion to the waft of meaning. Words create an object in this way. However, the meanings unified by words are not static contents because words always change their nuances with their contents sometimes renewed (2). But at the same time, words as a whole keep their consistent identities. This can be compared to living things that keep their identities and at the same time always renew their factors.

Note(2): You may think that if each person changes the meaning of words, then people will no longer be able to communicate. This doesn’t happen because the meaning is not changed by the intention of the ‘I’, nor is it arbitrarily added; meaning is only changed in our encounters with concepts that occur in the

space shared with others or in the context in which the 'I' and others resonate with one another. Between two groups that are separated and not resonating with each other, meanings of words will gradually become different. However, when space is shared by two people from these separated cultures for a certain period, some meanings will become shared once again.

Names and concepts

When we indicate a specific individual with a word, the word is called a *name*. A name implies the unique *one-ness* of the object. Imagine that a child is given a toy bear. The child names it "Teddy." The toy bear has been mass produced but "Teddy" is a unique individual and is the only one in the world. The subject meets the unique object with identity through its name. The name gathers many experiences into one; it carries with it a history of the interaction between the subject and the object. Teddy is the child's dearest friend who has slept with him, played with him, been at his side when he was scolded. If someday the child loses Teddy, he may feel sad and cry. The parents may think that another one is the same and promise to give him a new toy bear. They have not interacted with Teddy as a unique bear, but for the child Teddy is the one and only. He will not consider the new toy bear to be Teddy (3).

Note(3): Concepts such as soul, spirit or lineage give a unifying history or identity to individuals who are materially separated. In this sense, a new toy can be considered as Teddy, or Teddy the Second.

Children often become interested in a new object easily and forget old objects. This may be because children have not yet developed a rich space so they don't give any weight to the past (which, as I have shown, is sensed in space). For children, the object has intensive uniqueness in the present, but the time continuity of the object is vague.

While we name an object that we sense to be unique, the object increases its uniqueness by being named; we can even say that the uniqueness arises only when called by name. That is, while a name is given to the identified object, it is also the container to unify many experiences into one. For example, a baby experiences sucking the breast, having its diaper changed or being stopped from doing mischief. When the baby solidifies one object with identity among these experiences, it can be named "Mama." At the same time, this sequence of sounds, "Mama," unifies these experiences into one object. At this point the word "Mama" is not yet the concept of a general mother but a name for one person.

While a name is related to the recognition of one existence (the recognition of sameness), a *concept* is possible when we recognize many objects each of which has its own identity (the recognition of different identities) and at same time that they share some similar meaning (the recognition of similarities); a concept unifies many things into one kind. To name an individual thing and to recognize a group of things with a concept are both based on essentially the same function. It is the function of Aida, the function that gives unity to factors and constructs one whole (4). Just as a name creates Aida which contains many experiences or factors and enables one individual object, so a concept brings the identity of a larger whole into existence; Aida creates a

whole, that is, a *one*.

Note(4): The function of Aida is to unify different factors into one unit. With this function many experiences are sensed as part of the same thing and are unified into one existence, and many existences are sensed as the same kind and unified into one concept. However, the meaning of this word "same" is quite difficult to define, although it is intuitively understandable. If we try to define "same," the definition may not be able to avoid being a tautology.

Why concepts are possible is one of the mysteries in philosophy. We can replace this question with another question, why do we find *sameness* in different objects? (in this sense, another mystery is how individual things with identities are possible.) This question may relate to the essence of all living things, living in the world of Aida. The recognition of sameness (or the function of unification or generalization) and the recognition of difference (or the function of discrimination) are essential attributes of human recognition. They are characteristic to organic bodies and difficult to explain perfectly logically.

Computers can judge sameness, but this has become possible by removing uniqueness of factors and equalizing them. The world of computer is made up of 0 and 1 homogeneously; the rules are simple (0 and 0 are equal, 1 and 1 are equal, 0 and 1 are not equal). This is like the world of elementary particles in a sense, and it is quite different from the world of "sameness" and "difference" in which each object has unique meaning and at same time belongs to the "same" unit. I think that the sameness in life (the function of Aida) is essentially different from the digital principle (the principle explaining the whole as an aggregate of uniform factors), but I am not sure because lately the development of computers is so remarkable that data processing imitating human recognition is becoming possible.

Although individual things and concepts seem quite different, there is no definite border between them. Each of them is met by the subject as one whole meaning which contains factors and at the same time has its own identity. An individual thing, or to say exactly, an inseparable unit of an individual thing and its name, can be considered a concept at the most concrete level. We usually think that concepts are our frames of recognition to understand an object, so we distinguish them from the individual thing that we think exists objectively. But each concept can be considered as existing as one object like an individual thing, just as a forest can contain many trees; while each tree has its own identity, the forest, made of many trees, also has its own identity and substance. A concept is something like that; the concept of APPLE has its own identity as the universal APPLE, which is distinct from the identity of each individual apple.

While few people question the reality of a forest, concepts are usually not considered to exist in the same sense as objects. Concepts gain identities due to the commonness in meaning among factors, and cannot be located in space as a forest can. Concepts don't depend on spatial coherence so they are not placed in a certain area in space like a forest, that is why they hardly waft the nuance of "reality."

Another reason why we hardly recognize the reality of concepts is that we often think the term "concept" is not *the inseparable unit* of the identity but only *a word* (such as the word

"APPLE") to indicate the identity. In the case of an individual thing and its name, although we know that a name is "only a word," we accept the existence of the real thing which the name indicates. If we think a certain concept is only a word, why can't we also think that there is something real which the concept indicates? Actually a certain word and the identity it indicates are inseparable, so we should consider the term "concept" as the term for the inseparable unit. If we think that a concept is a frame for recognition, existing only inside the subject and abstracted from real things, an individual thing can be considered as a frame of recognition abstracted from our experiences, too. But provided that "existence" is a unit of meaning that we sense, we should consider a concept to exist as a "real" object like a "real" thing. In fact, we can sense the conceptual object as one meaning in the present space, so we can face an abstract concept and sense meaning wafting there.

Although a concept is the object we face, it is of course not a physical or objective reality separated from us. The identity of a concept arises in the history of our experience, just like the identity of an individual thing. The concept of "APPLE" is not a sign for objective apples, but the history of our experiences such as "seeing" the apple, "touching" the apple, "smelling" or "eating" the apple, etc. The history of these experiences is given an outline and defined as one unit by the word "APPLE," and it gains an identity as one concept; in other words, it is defined as one gestalt. This is quite the same process as realizing the identity of an individual thing. A concept is sensed as one meaning in space as Sensus Communis, although it cannot be seen and we can't perceive its outline with any sensory organ. When we speak of "APPLE," there wafts an image or nuance of the universal APPLE. It is present there as an object which we can investigate and in which we can find new meaning. The concept of APPLE is this nuance which has gained an outline of meaning with the word "APPLE" as a container. The concept of "APPLE" itself has individuality and uniqueness that is different from BANANA or ORANGE, although the uniqueness of each apple is cut out of the concept. Like individual things, concepts have unique one-ness, but as a larger whole.

Many concepts get put together to make a more abstract concept, or a larger identity. The concept "FRUIT" is such a concept, for example. While FRUIT contains APPLE, BANANA, ORANGE etc., it has an identity as a more abstract concept. Moreover, we can think of "FOOD" that is one object as a larger whole than FRUIT. The more abstract a concept is, the further it is from sensory images and the nearer to pure meaning. FRUIT is difficult to imagine in sensory images in comparison to APPLE because it contains miscellaneous factors, such as APPLE, BANANA, ORANGE, MELON…(5) Still, the concept of FRUIT wafts its characteristic nuance as one unique whole, different from VEGETABLE or MEAT.

Note(5): It may seem possible to imagine the concept of APPLE in sensory images, but actually that is not true. We can only imagine an individual apple as an example of the concept of APPLE. This is clearer when we reflect on how we imagine the concept of TRIANGLE. There are various triangles such as acute, obtuse or right triangle. We can imagine TRIANGLE concretely, but in fact what we picture is one specific example chosen from various triangles. A universal TRIANGLE can't be seized through any sensory organ. However, we can sense the meaning of a universal TRIANGLE. To speak precisely, even a

concrete object (e.g. the very apple that I ate) is experienced differently according to the conditions (e.g. angle of viewing, color or volume of light), so any recalled visual image of the object is just one example out of many, too. In fact, we don't need to have any picture or image when we recall something. What emerges is the meaning of the object or the experience, and it sometimes contains visual nuance.

Resonance of concepts

There can be a hierarchy of concepts, but it is neither logically strict nor static. A static and orderly hierarchy of inclusion is that in which each apple is contained in universal APPLE which is contained in FRUIT which is contained in FOOD… This strict hierarchy may be necessary for logical thought such as a syllogism, but in actual language use it is rather exceptional. The network of concepts is actually intricate; it is more like an organism. When we speak words in a lively manner in our daily life, the relationships of the concepts are usually inaccurate but richer than strict logical expression, because the meaning of words comes from their resonance, not from logic. Poetry is an attempt to draw the most effect from this lively resonance; metaphors also. When we speak about an impressive picture or music, we often use a poetic or metaphorical expression because it has a more subtle resonance of meaning than logic, and is what is needed to access the subtle nuance.

When we are trying to know what an object is, we allow other concepts to resonate with the object. An individual thing is experienced in resonance with a concept ("*this* is an APPLE") and a concept is experienced in resonance with another concept (possibly including individual things), a larger whole or even a smaller factor ("FRUIT is FOOD, such as APPLEs, BANANAs…"). When something strange is placed in front of us, we may naturally ask, "What is this?" If we see an unfamiliar concept, we will tilt our head, and say, "What is the meaning of this?" We are seeking other concepts to resonate with the object (or concept) to which we are paying attention. The object exists in front of us as an undifferentiated whole meaning; we can't help but describe it with other concepts because that is the way we face an object and relate to it.

Imagine that an apple is placed in front of you. You look at this apple, a real thing with uniqueness. At the same time you are aware that it is generally called "APPLE." At this time, the individual object (a real apple) with its whole meaning in the lower level and this concept (universal APPLE) with its whole meaning in the higher level, resonate with one another and enrich each other's meaning. The subject allows the concept APPLE to resonate with the real apple, so that the subject may feel that it "looks delicious" or know its variety, quality or state; the history of the subject's experience of APPLE enables this. On the other hand, the concept APPLE has its nuance enriched in resonance with our experiences of real apples. We can't understand any object without resonance with another, no matter whether we are talking about an individual, concrete thing or a conceptual object. We understand a real apple in resonance with the concept APPLE, and the concept APPLE takes on meaning only in resonance with a real apple.

This resonance of concepts occurs in many levels in the hierarchy of inclusion. The concept of APPLE resonates not only with each apple but also with the higher concept, FRUIT. If an APPLE is classified as a VEGETABLE not a FRUIT, the nuance of the concept APPLE will change. We may

be confused about this change of classification but may try to make these two concepts, VEGETABLE and APPLE, resonate with one another in order to get used to the image of an APPLE as a VEGETABLE. Once we are accustomed to seeing an APPLE as a VEGETABLE, the nuance of both the concept APPLE, and the concept VEGETABLE, will have changed.

To face the object sincerely

Sometimes we pay attention to a real apple in front of us, and sometimes we think about APPLEs in general or FRUIT in general. The object we face is not always an individual thing that can be sensed with our five senses; a concept also can be the "object" that we face. Sometimes we look upon an individual thing as identical to a concept without being aware of that. Our attention passes beyond the individual thing when we look upon one apple as "a mere ordinary APPLE."

When the same attitude is had toward a person and we look upon one person as identical with a concept, we are seeing the person not as a unique whole but through preconception. To relate to a person in such a way is to slight the individual even if that is done with good intentions. For example, if a man sees a person with a handicap and automatically thinks, "Handicapped people need help," the man is looking at the person through the concept, "handicapped people" that has nuance of "needing help." If this preconception continues, with the attitude of not facing the person as one unique individual but of considering the person just one of many handicapped people, he may deserve to be called impolite. Of course, we can't be thoroughly free from preconceptions or bias toward other people (or things), nor do we have to cease conceptual understanding. The problem is whether we can also have the attitude of facing one unique individual. When we have this attitude, conceptual knowledge is useful to understanding the whole individual, and our knowledge about handicaps helps us sense what the person is troubled with.

Also in psychotherapy, it happens that the therapist considers the client identical to some theory. Some therapists may think, "This child is in such and such a state, so it must be this problem in the family," or "This has such and such a diagnosis, so there must be such and such a mechanism in the unconscious." Applying concepts or generalities to a person cannot substitute for understanding the person as a unique whole. Concepts and generalities are necessary to understanding the object, but not for being identified with the object. Concepts and generalities help our understanding of the object only when we recognize its uniqueness and allow concepts or generalities to *resonate* with it. The value of concepts and theories in psychotherapy is to enrich the understanding of the client as one unique individual. If the therapist doesn't want to meet the client as one unique individual but only identifies the client by means of concepts and theories, these concepts and theories will become obstacles to understanding.

You may have noticed that when the meanings of concepts (or things) resonate with one another, we cannot pay equal attention to all. We can face only one object or concept at a time [(6)]. When the subject sincerely pays attention to one individual thing, concepts which resonate with it are just tools to enrich understanding. If the subject is attentive to an abstract concept, individual things are dealt with as samples to enrich the concept. In psychotherapy, a therapist cannot face both at once: the client whom the therapist is meeting and the theory which explains the client. The

therapist can't think over theories at the same moment he or she is sincerely facing the client. Of course, as I have said, "facing" doesn't mean only facing a concrete individual. Facing abstract concepts or theories is also valuable. But therapy sessions are timed, so contemplation of a theory is best left for outside the session. However, in practice the therapist usually shifts quickly between the client and the theory, while resonating meanings. This is the reason why, even when we are listening earnestly to someone, we sometimes find ourselves thinking about something else.

Note(6): Sometimes the subject pays attention to the relationship between two or more things (an individual thing and a concept, or two concepts) but this doesn't mean that two objects are faced at once, because what the subject attempts to understand is this: *the relationship* between the two. This relationship is the one whole that contains two or more things.

Understanding and language

When the 'I' faces an object sincerely, the object becomes something to be *understood* by the 'I'. In this facing, the 'I' poses a question to the object and seeks for an answer. Understanding is this process of posing a question and seeking for an answer. Posing a question implies placing the object in a specific context; the 'I' attempts to describe the object, and tries to sense the meaning that arises in the light of the question. Understanding comes to the subject in such a dialogue with the object, as something like, "Ah, I see, this is such and such." (7)

Note(7): Although we have a dialogue with the object by questioning and sensing the answers, the most creative process in understanding or thinking exists before questioning or answering; it is the process of waiting for a question to arise. When we are confined to limited questions and concentrate solely on the defined problem, we don't have a truly creative understanding. Creativity contains such moments of passiveness, which include the process of waiting for the object to arise by itself out of space.

This passiveness is an advanced kind of positiveness. Freud(1912) suggested that analysts (therapists) must float their attention freely and must not be caught in one subject matter. Bion(1967) encouraged analysts to take the attitude of "no memory, no desire," (as we saw in chapter 5) and later added "no understanding."(1970) These authorities in psychoanalysis made much of keeping the attention free and warned analysts not to be bound by limited problems. In this diffused attention the outlines of objects melt and we relate to them without acute consciousness, so that the objects resonate richly. Sensing "something" – the new object or new unit of meaning – in this unclear waft of meaning and developing it into a creative question become possible when the subject lets his (or her) attention float flexibly out of a static viewpoint into uncertainty.

"What is this?" may be the simplest question we put toward an object. This question has to do with the hierarchy of concepts – although the object itself is one whole, it is both a part of a higher concept and also has its factors. In other words, understanding "what it is" is related to knowing "what factors are contained in it" and "in what it is contained." We understand the concept APPLE with factors such as Golden Delicious, Jonagold, Fuji… or "made of skin, flesh, seeds and

core," and we also understand it as "a kind of fruit." Of course, understanding is not limited to the hierarchy of inclusion. We can pose various questions and describe the object in many contexts. Descriptions such as "It is red," "It is from northern country" or "It is a charming shape" are understandings of the concept APPLE under various contexts. We can't arrange them in a hierarchy; in these descriptions, various meanings resonate with the concept APPLE in various ways. We dialogue with the object using a lot of questions such as "what is this (what does it contain and what is it contained in)," "how does it look," "where does it come from" or "how do I feel about it" etc. These questions are directed to the same object, so the answers are not a disordered list but make *one* solid understanding that gives depth to the object's identity. In such a way, our understanding of one object is created and deepened through our questions and answers.

We can describe the object by weaving various concepts intricately into sentences, not just by putting them side by side; a constellation of concepts makes a sentence. Concepts function as factors in a sentence, such as the subject and its doing (verb), the object of the doing, the attributes of each factor (modifiers); they are integrated into one sentence which expresses a theme with a delicate nuance. Or, we can consider that a sentence is made when these factors are differentiated from one whole meaning; the sentence "he ate a delicious apple" expresses one whole occurrence through factors such as "he," "ate," "delicious," "apple" which are things with identities and their doings or attributes. A sentence expresses not just the whole occurrence but an understanding of it from a specific viewpoint.

Just as concepts are woven into a sentence, sentences are woven into an article with its own theme as a whole. Sometimes articles are placed into a book as chapters, and a set of books can construct a system of thought. These constructions, woven from language, are not an aggregate of words combined by logical rules of construction. Of course descriptions can have some logic, but the linear and mechanical structure of logic cannot construct meaning by itself. If you can't discover the purpose of an article, you may scratch your head and wonder what the author is attempting to say, although the sentences are logically clear and the relationships of sentences are perfectly understandable by logic. The feeling of grasping the meaning ("Ah, I see, this article is saying that…") does not arise with only a logical connection of words. To understand a sentence or an article, we must find a consistent flow of meaning, or a rich waft of nuance. This flow of meaning arises from the resonance among the concepts or sentences. In the resonant space between the lines, lies the essence of language. Through this resonance, a sentence or an article becomes one object where we sense one whole meaning, not a mere aggregate of factors.

Although logic is important for human thought, we don't construct our thought with a logical connection of concepts at first. On thinking over something, we find a new whole meaning between meanings, or we differentiate new meanings from one whole meaning. This is the lively development of meaning, not a logical operation of concepts. Logic examines the meanings, puts them in order and inspects them in their context; logic takes the role of solidifying them into more universal facts. Logic is made of language, so any static, logical truth exists in language, and in language only, but logic is not an essential feature of language [8]. Language itself does not need to be universal; language does not come from logic or universal truths, nor does it always solidify an

object into a universal truth. If we consider language as a static structure completed in itself, we will lose sight of uniqueness and richness of meaning, so that we will be confined to a hollow language that is an aggregate of symbols. If the sentence "this is an APPLE" is separated from the rich substance of "*this*" or the rich expanse of the concept APPLE, and if the sentence is used statically to indicate unchanging symbolic inclusion (expressed as "this ⊂ APPLE"), the meaning of the sentence becomes flat and loses its rich implications. We cannot understand anything about an object with such a flat language.

> Note(8): Mathematics is probably the most logical language human beings have created. Mathematics seems to have unchanging meaning and seems able to deduce new meaning through pure logical operation. But in fact, meaning exists only through being found by the subject. Mathematics doesn't create any new meanings but expresses itself in a form in which we human beings are likely to find other meanings. If the word "truth" implies that it has some meaning, truth does not belong to a mathematical formula; it belongs to the dialogue between the mathematical formula and the person who reads it.

With lively language, we can interact richly with the unique "this" in front of us, like saying "this is an APPLE." Language is not the expression of static truths, nor does it define the object arbitrarily in some frame of recognition. *Language is the process of interacting with the object*. We may solidify the object with words, but that is because solidification is the way we interact with the object. If words don't resonate with the object, words are empty even if they express universal truths. Living words may not live forever as universal truths, but they resonate with rich meaning at the moment, in this present space.

Thus we see that understanding is essentially related to the rich resonance of meanings, not to the logical forms of language. Impressions such as "ah, I see" arise in the process of dialogue with the object in the present space, the process in which we pose questions and seek answers. This process is always new and present, so the object appears in a new way every time we newly understand it. No understanding is thorough or perfect; we do not even get close to a perfect understanding, because to understand is not to ingest static truths but to encounter the object as *the current other*. Understanding always happens in the present space. Of course, it doesn't mean that past understandings disappear the next moment. Each understanding adds depth to the object's whole meaning. Its whole meaning implies a history of relationship between the 'I' and the object. As a person matures, so understanding increases in depth, but it doesn't converge on only one "right answer." When we think we have understood the object thoroughly and stop sensing the object freshly, we have turned our back on the object and on any depth of meaning. Understanding the object is possible only as a process.

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Chapter 7　About what we call 'I'

Part I: The subject

Questions about the 'I'

As we have seen, an object presents itself as one thing with meaning in the dialogue with the 'I'. The object's existence as a thing (as Mono) can occur only when the 'I' faces it. Well then, what is this thing we call the 'I', that faces the object and finds meaning in it? What does it mean when we say "I am here"? Descartes rejected any ideas that could be doubted and claimed that the existence of the thinking 'I' is undeniable truth, so he set the existence of the 'I' as a firm foundation for thinking with certainty. In fact, every time we pay attention to ourselves we find the 'I' existing there, so it may seem absolutely right that the 'I' exists. But is it really a solid truth?

In psychotherapy, some clients complain of a lack of the 'I'. This complaint is hard to understand for people who feel that they do undoubtedly exist; they may say that it is a matter of fact that "you," who complain of the lack of the 'I', are present here. However, the existence of the 'I' cannot be looked upon like the existence of apples or trees because what we call 'I' is both *the object* we face and also *the subject* facing the object.

What are people complaining of a lack of the 'I' really saying? When we listen to their words carefully, we can see that there are several kinds of complaints. Some people feel that they have difficulty telling their opinions or feelings to others. (This tendency can often be seen in Japanese culture, where it is expressed, "one doesn't have oneself.") Although these people can sense the presence of themselves, they don't know what to say when they are asked "what do you think?" or they can't express their opinions in the face of other people's opposition, even if they have some opinion. In these cases they are usually able to discover their opinions and feelings when they take the time to sense inside in a secure place, like in psychotherapy. But there are other people who can't sense inside. They can't find any inside of them to sense, even when a secure place is provided and the therapist instructs them to pay attention inside. For these people, the "lack of the 'I'" means that they can't sense any substantial presence that can be called 'I', although the therapist usually can feel the presence of "this person." In other cases the therapist has difficulty even in finding "this person" who is there and complaining; the therapist can't sense that the client is present. Such difficulty implies that the client's 'I' facing the object is not there in any lively manner. Of course the client has come to psychotherapy because he (she) has faced some trouble, so the client's 'I' must exist, but it is vague like mist. The therapist sometimes feels the person as having rapport, but the next moment the therapist loses sight of his (or her) presence.

As we see, the word 'I' indicates several aspects of the existence of the 'I'. Sometimes we say 'I' to indicate the *contents* of our mind or thoughts; we think that our values, taste, habits, way of feeling etc. are the 'I' (We sometimes use the word "personality" for this 'I'). Sometimes we sense that the 'I' is present as *a substantial body*. It is not a mere materialistic body without mind. This sensed body lives richly, holding a flow of various thoughts and feelings inside. This body is a rich process, sensed as one substantial whole. On the other hand, the 'I' which looks at something (or

oneself) is also the 'I'; I call this 'I' *the subject*.

We usually think that both the 'I' as the subject and the 'I' as the object (the physical body, its contents, or both) are the same 'I'. No doubt they are related closely, but it is also true that the 'I' as the subject distances itself from the 'I' as the object. There is distance between them. If there were no distance, the 'I' could not dialogue with the 'I'. In fact, the 'I' as the subject IS this very process of facing something and having dialogue with it. On the other hand, the 'I' as the object can be called *the self*.

The 'I' as the subject: the process of objectification

When the 'I' notices something, the 'I' takes a look at it. Sometimes what the 'I' looks at is the "self," but it cannot take a look at *the subject* because the subject is *the look* itself. Just as nobody can face a look of his own, the subject cannot objectify or face the subject itself. The 'I' as the subject can be present only in its encounter with the object.

The 'I' as the subject does not only sense the object through its senses, but it also reacts to the object; namely the subject is not only the recognizer but also the doer. Animals also recognize the outside world and react to it, but the recognition of animals is subordinate to their behavior; the two are inseparable in their case. In the case of human beings, recognition is separated from behavior to some degree and takes an important role in itself. This independency of recognition enables the 'I' to "face" the object in a way characteristic of human beings. The 'I' places the object as one existing thing with identity (Mono) over against the 'I'. To face the object is to objectify it and recognize it as an independent thing from the 'I'.

Most animals, except human beings, do not place an object as objectively existing over against the 'I'; perhaps some animals do, but that is not an animal-like way. For an animal, an encounter with an object is characterized by a lack of room for discretion, so that the subject of an animal – even if we call it "the subject" – instinctively behaves according to the meaning of the object. An object for an animal has intense meaning such as food or danger, but it is not a thing (Mono); it just occurs as Koto involving the subject. Most animals recognize an object as inseparably tied with their behavior such as eating or running away. For animals, a "meaningless" object that has no relation to their instinctive behavior is out of the realm of recognition; any object without meaning virtually doesn't exist [(1)]. By contrast, an object related to their instinctive behavior may be recognized overwhelmingly. Meaning for animals is inevitably tied with instinct, so animals cannot defy or ignore it; animals cannot face meaning independently from their behavior.

Note (1): Uexküll, a biologist, thought that no animal lives in an objective "environment" but in an "umwelt" (self-centered world) that is constructed solely of its meaningful stimuli. For example, when ticks fall on a warm-blooded animal and suck its blood, they depend on only three senses – smell of butyric acid, heat and touch. This means that the "umwelt" of ticks is constructed of butyric acid, warmth and hair. Anything not included in the umwelt of the tick doesn't exist for it, even if it exists in the objective environment.

What we call the objective environment is the world we human beings have constructed in our

own umwelt. Due to our scientific knowledge, human beings can recognize imperceptible objects, such as supersonic waves. But this doesn't mean that we are specially gifted in recognizing the objective world. Rather, we should think that what we call an objective environment is nothing but the human umwelt, extended by scientific knowledge.

As for human beings, it is no different from animals, that every object has meaning which influences the behavior. However, human beings are comparatively free from the power of the object in stimulating our behavior. That is because we are able to recognize an object as existing objectively and independently from the 'I'. At the same time, we have the ability to face the object's objective existence because we are comparatively free from its meaning. Actually these two features that I have mentioned – recognition of the object as having an objective existence and comparative freedom from the object's meaning – are the same feature viewed from two different standpoints. It can be said that we sense the rich expanse of space. This space creates the separation between the 'I' and the object, so that the 'I' can face the object objectively. In this human way of being, the object's meaning doesn't force the subject's behavior but takes on its own expanse and depth. In other words, rich space creates a creative relationship between the subject and object, in which meaning arises freshly. While space separates the 'I' and the object, it also relates them richly; the 'I' is contained in the space and open to it, so the 'I' can face the object and relate to it.

Human beings have free will because of this richness of space. If this richness of space becomes lost and our outlook is "narrowed," it means that space is narrowed and our freedom of mind is lost. In such a condition we can't see things objectively, so we are influenced by the object's meaning imprudently, and we lose our sensibility and ability to find new meaning freshly; namely, we lose the 'I'.

The 'I' in science

Being narrow-minded or losing our objectivity seems different from the attitude previously mentioned, of considering an object's existence as a mere objective and physical reality without uniqueness. Yet these two states of mind are similar in that the 'I' is not *facing* the object. In other words, in both these states we lose sight of an object's richness of meaning, although there is the difference between being overwhelmed by an object and being separated from it.

When I say, "the attitude of considering an object's existence as a *mere* objective and physical reality," you may think of the scientific attitude, but in fact it is not the scientific attitude. Of course the scientific attitude includes the search for universality, and for laws that are true "anytime, anywhere, to anyone." That is the reason why a viewpoint particular to the 'I' is usually excluded from the scientific descriptions. But if you think that science has no room for the 'I' that is not true, nor do scientists always consider an object to be "a mere objective and physical" thing. If scientists always saw an object as "a mere objective and physical" thing and didn't face its unique meaning, no scientific discovery could happen.

Creative scientists meet the object sensing its rich meaning, not slighting it as "a mere thing." They have an intent look inquiring toward the object. There are many anecdotes of scientists

at the moment when new meaning arose, for example, Archimedes was said to be so excited by his discovery that he shouted, "Eureka!" and took the streets naked, and Newton was said to have been inspired to formulate his theory of gravitation by watching the fall of an apple from a tree. We don't know whether these anecdotes are true, but rich moments like these do sometimes occur. They are not exceptions which only gifted scientists experience. Any student of science may have experienced a moment of being so touched by science that they have become totally absorbed. Without such an encounter between the 'I' and object, science would be dead. Laws in science may be universal, but their lively meaning lies in the encounter between them and the 'I'. Scientists who don't face the object freshly cannot deal with an object in any rich scientific manner, although they may be able to make habitual use of science.

But, you may say, science must be objective. Is this consistent with the existence of the 'I', which is all about subjectivity? If the word "objectivity" means knowing the object as if the 'I' doesn't exist, then the object must be considered as "a mere thing." But such objectivity is impossible because the object without the 'I' cannot even *exist*. If the 'I' persists in excluding the 'I' itself, they will lose sight of the object's meaning. Lacking a viewpoint, they will be confined to a dead, congealed meaning. But if the word "objectivity" means the attitude of placing the object over against the 'I' and facing it sincerely, being objective exactly means being the 'I', the subject. That is what we do when we relate to something sincerely, and actually that is what is needed in science, too.

The 'I' in psychotherapy

In psychotherapy, what is the client's subject, or the 'I'? The client may turn his (or her) eyes to himself, but the object of introspection is not the 'I' as *the subject* but *the self*. Actually, although thinking about the self is a matter of great importance in psychotherapy, it is not critical. The matter of *the subject* is more essential than the matter of the self, because we cannot face the matter of the self if *the subject* is not working.

The most important matter in psychotherapy is how attentively the 'I' faces the object, no matter whether the object is the self or some other thing. When facing the object and dialoguing with it attentively, the 'I' is present. Attentive dialogue includes respect for the object; the 'I' senses its unique identity. Moreover, the attitude of facing the object attentively includes the sense of responsibility.

We take an attitude of facing the object attentively in various degrees. We can spend time in a fixed pattern like routine work, which demands the least attentiveness; we spend a lot of time in such a way. But in psychotherapy much attentiveness is needed. The client faces various objects attentively; the client faces others, faces his (or her) own life, or faces his (her) own inside places. The client can be richly present as the 'I' only through facing the object, because the 'I' as the subject is (like the truth for Bion) not something to *know* but only to *be* – it can exist only as a process that "I am facing."

However, there are people who hardly face anything. Some clients have a poor 'I'; they have not developed attentiveness and responsibility. When we meet such a person, we hardly sense their

presence; we cannot feel that "this person is here now." In some cases, the person is afraid to face something or to be responsible for themselves so they avoid doing so intentionally. To face the object attentively means, not only to take responsibility, but also to be separated from the sense of being united with others. Of course, the wish to be united is natural, perhaps necessary for us. But if we persist in it, we will be not able to face things as the 'I' or to live with the responsibility of being the 'I'.

Addiction, the state of morbid dependency on some substance such as alcohol, has to do with the attitude of not-facing, or the abandonment of responsibility. A person may able to forget his (or her) responsibilities and be lost in a vague sense of unity temporarily, but he will sooner or later lose the benefit of what he depends on and be made aware of whatever he or she was not able to face; then the alcoholic has another drink to avert his eyes from reality. Addiction essentially includes the tendency to avoid facing something, which is what makes it difficult to recover from.

The 'I' is found by the other, and the 'I' finds the other

Can we *meet the person* who seems to lack a responsible 'I'? Can we find the 'I' of someone who hardly faces anything? How does the 'I' come to exist – does it exist in a person from the first moment they were born, or is it made through interaction with environment?

Gendlin said "there is always a person in there" – *a person* who watches us when we turn our eyes toward someone. Undoubtedly, to turn our eyes toward *the person in there* is the proper attitude when we meet someone attentively. We can't find *the person in there* if we don't turn our eyes to *the person*. In this sense Gendlin's words are right – we must believe that "there is always a person in there" in order to find *the person*. But we also can say that *a person* begins to exist only when being paid attention to by someone who believes "there is a person in there"!

We are capable of seeing a unique individuality even on a lifeless thing, but in an infant we have a firmer conviction that we will find a unique *person* there. In casual movements or expressions of a newborn infant, we sense what he (or she) feels and intends. We wonder what the infant thinks about; we smile at the infant's smile, saying, "ah, you're happy!" According to developmental psychology, the movements of newborn infants are almost reflexive, not intentional. But we don't consider an infant as a pack of reflexive movements; we treat an infant as a unique person with individuality – in other words, we recognize the infant's 'I' – and we foster a relationship with *the person* in the infant. In response to our concerns, the infant gradually develops the 'I', the subject. Human beings are born with great potential to respond to others. However, if the people around the infant treat it only as "a mere infant" without individuality, or if they treat as part of them but don't meet the individuality of it, the 'I' in the infant will not able to develop (2). If the nurturers have no concern for a child's 'I', the child may be not able to be present enough.

Note (2): Autism is characterized by the difficulty of the potential to respond to others. It is known that this difficulty is not due to problems of environment but is innate.

Not only infants and children, but also any person who is paid attention to, is encouraged to be responsible and to face things intently. This may be the reason why people who avoid being intent and responsible avoid another person who faces them attentively. When the other person faces the 'I', the 'I' is awakened and takes on responsibility for being the 'I' (3). This is a very important factor in psychotherapy. The client's 'I' can face things more responsibly and intently when the therapist's 'I' is present to pay attention to the client. Sometimes the client's 'I' begins to exist only when the therapist tries to find *the person* in the client. However, if the therapist considers the client as a set of attributions or psychic contents but doesn't meet the client as a unique *one*, or if the therapist attempts to make clients behave in some predictable manner, the client cannot develop an 'I' or *a person* inside. To develop the 'I' inside, the client need to be met as a unique individual by the therapist who himself (or herself) is responsible for being the 'I'. Usually in order to make psychotherapy meaningful, the therapist needs to find the client's 'I' and meet it attentively; the therapist can help the client to face his (or her) own problem responsibly and attentively only when the therapist is present and faces the presence of the client responsibly and attentively.

Note (3): Some people may think that one can get more a sense of oneself when alone. It is true that when other people ignore your 'I', you probably feel isolated more than when you are alone. There are many stories in which a solitary person is relieved when he (or she) meets someone innocent like a child. A child often has the sensibility to meet a unique object freshly, not to see the object in the frame of static concepts.

The presence of a person is not a physical matter. If your 'I' is not active in the present space, other people may not feel that you, one unique person, are present. You are present in the here and now just at the moment when you are open to the space in which you meet or pay attention to another person or thing. Here is the peculiarity of our existence; a person cannot exist as a mere static thing (Mono), but can only exist with the lively process (Koto) of facing something. (4)

Note (4): I am describing the process of finding another person from the viewpoint of the finder, but in philosophical thinking, we cannot suppose that this description is applicable to the birth of the 'I' as the first person unconditionally, because this supposition ignores the fact that the 'I' for the 'I' itself is one and only and not replaceable by another; in this supposition we leave the absolute standpoint of the 'I' and view the 'I' and the other from the outside. The experience of finding the other and the experience of being found by the other are quite different experiences for the 'I', so the birth of the 'I' is still quite a mystery for the 'I'. However, for the 'I' to *know* the 'I' itself, it must place the 'I' itself in the position of the other. When we think about the beginning of the 'I' or look back to its past, the beginning to be thought of or the past to be looked back upon is always faced as the other by the present 'I'.

When the 'I' faces and understands another person, it is necessary that the 'I' reflect on the experience of the other by putting itself in the other's place (or taking in the experience as if it is

experienced by itself). The possibility of such a resonance between the self and the other depends on the fact that the 'I' and the other (or the other's 'I') share a kind of place or process at the base of the 'I' (Kimura(2003) called this shared place which enables the existence of both the 'I' and the other, "meta-noesis"). To understand the other attentively may be possible only where the two conditions cross: facing the absolute otherness of the other, and meeting the other who shares a one-ness with the 'I' in the deep place.

Putting oneself in the other's place is not same as looking at the self and the other from outside. Rather, in the base of looking at the other, there is a relation of our lives in ground level. Kimura(1988) called it the "general ground of life" (he also calls it a "ground relation (Grundverhältnis)" quoting Viktor von Weizsäcker) and wrote that it is impossible to recognize it objectively. This "general ground of life" that is the base of understanding the other is not something to be known; it is something to be lived. I think that what is called "empathic understanding" in psychotherapy may be based on a connection on this level.

Part II: The self

The subject and the self

While the subject is the 'I' who faces something, the self is the 'I' that is faced by the subject. But can we distinguish these two kinds of 'I' so clearly? Can the subject exist purely, excluding the self?

If we suppose there is a pure subject, it is something that is without identity and cannot be objectified by the 'I'; namely, it is not what exists, but some process or pure Koto. Assuming animals don't recognize their "selves," there exists no 'I' for animals, although we human beings can observe animals from the outside and solidify the subjects of animals. Well then, what does it mean that "a person is faced by the other and develops the 'I'," in other words, that *a person* begins to exist? Does *a person* exist only when seen from an outer viewpoint? No, when a person is found by the other and is awakened as the subject, the person also becomes aware of the *existence* of the 'I'.

When a mother points to a flower and says "Look, a flower!" to her child, the child finds an object in the direction his mother pointed and knows that it is what is called "a flower." Here the mother and child (two people) share attention to the same object; such shared attention is called *joint attention* in psychology. Here is the triad relationship of the mother, child and object. When examining another situation of joint attention, that a mother calls her child's name, here is again the triad relationship: another person (the mother), the subject (the child), and the self (the child being called). That is to say, to be paid attention to and called by another person is not only to be awakened as the subject but also to share attention to the 'I' and become aware of the existence of the 'I'. The child notices that something the mother called exists; it cannot be seen by the child, but it is here on *this side*, and is the source of a look or the attention – and it must be the child itself (its self).

The 'I' is addressed by another person and realizes its existence with continuity and extension, namely the identity of the 'I'. The human beings' ability to face the object is enabled by this realization of the self. The self, the 'I' that has identity, provides the base for the subject, so the subject can gain its richness and free will. The object is realized clearly by the 'I' based on identity. The world without the 'I' and its identity may be something close to pure Koto in which no identified object has yet arisen. Without identity, *the subject is the whole world itself*. But the subject based on the self functions between two differentiated identities: the object over against the self, and the subject (or the self) facing the object – the other and the 'I'. Of course, the whole process is not lost by this differentiation; the object and the self always exist in this process which is, in other words, space or context. But now we can talk about the process from two aspects – the *objective* aspect and the *subjective* aspect. In the objective aspect, we think that the attributes of the object is such and such, or that the influence the 'I' gave to the object is such and such. In the subjective aspect, we think that the frame of recognition of the 'I' is such and such, or that the influence the object gave to the 'I' is such and such [(5)]. Now the subject can go back and forth between these two aspects, in the way of facing. The pure subject without the self can't face the object in either aspect, because the differentiation between the objective and subjective aspect takes place only when the realization of

self comes about.

Note (5): Although the subjective and objective aspects are differentiated from the present space, the subjective aspect can be the object that is placed over against the 'I' and faced by the 'I'. For example, when the 'I' sees a picture, while the 'I' senses its attributes such as beauty or a dark tone, the 'I' also can inwardly sense feeling that can be differentiated into "I like it" or "I feel shocked" (of course these objective attributes and subjective feelings are originally one whole occurrence). But when the 'I' pays attention to the subjective feeling, it becomes one object for the 'I' (the feeling of liking, or the feeling of shocked). Then, again, as a subjective feeling of the 'I' *toward the inner object* arises; the 'I' becomes able to evaluate it, such as the sense of incongruity about the self who likes it or the sense of being shaken by the fact the 'I' felt shocked.

As we see above, the subject and the self are closely related, but it is useful to distinguish them. For example, in psychotherapy the problem of the client's subject and the problem of the client's self are quite different. The problem of the subject has to do with the essence of the client's present state of being. On the other hand, when the client pays attention to the self, the client's 'I' can gain inner depth and historical continuity that are the identity of the 'I' (6).

Note (6): Toshiharu Takeuchi suggested that to pay attention to one's own body (or the self) is necessary as a mid stage but we should not keep our attention on the self. According to Takeuchi, it is necessary to go to the next stage in which we work straightforwardly toward the object. Gendlin advocated Focusing and encouraged people to pay attention to the self, but now he emphasizes that it is important to act, not just stay in Focusing. Takeuchi and Gendlin share some prospects; they both believe that when the self matures and the subject becomes active, they are integrated as one lively 'I' living in the present space.

The self – the space of the 'I'

You may not accept that the subject that can be called "a look of the 'I'" cannot be objectified or looked at directly; it seems possible to be aware of one's own eyes looking toward an object. The 'I' can meet its own eyes or take a look at itself when the 'I' is standing in front of a mirror, or the 'I' as the subject can be conscious of itself when the 'I' reflects on how it paid attention to an object.

But there is a gap here; when the 'I' is conscious of looking at itself, the look of the 'I' has shifted from the 'I' and is placed over against the 'I'. The 'I' in a mirror is seen in a spatial gap, and the 'I' that is recollected is seen in a time gap. The subject can objectify itself only with such a gap or reflection. In other words, the subject meets itself only by solidifying it into something other – something apart from the 'I'. In such a way, the subject of the 'I' congeals and becomes the object of thinking; the self comes to exist. Of course, the 'I' as the subject remains an unseen process.

When the 'I' reflects on how the 'I' paid attention and how the 'I' behaved, the subject is solidified from the present flow into the past, so that the subject is crystallized into the existing continuous self. This reflection implies that the 'I' has a continuity of existence, and at same time the reflection creates the continuity. The subject in the past and the future is recognized as *one* with

continuous identity in time. This continuity is, so to speak, the history of the subject. If the 'I' didn't have historical continuity, the 'I' could not accept responsibility for its past deeds nor could the 'I' promise any future actions. Small children are not yet good at recognizing the time continuity of the self, so they can't picture the 'I' in the distant past or the far future; it doesn't seem continuous with the present 'I'. Of course children can picture the distant past and the far future in their minds, but time continuity hardly flows. The more the children develop, the richer the time continuity of the 'I' becomes and the more conscious they become of themselves (their selves) as historical continuities (7).

Note (7): In the depersonalization disorder, although patients remember past events, the time flow between the past and the present can't be felt so the passage of time is felt to be empty. This shows that what makes the self possess its history is not only past events but also Aida that creates a flow between the past and the present.

Although the growth of time continuity is an important matter in the development of the 'I', the self is not only the subject's history. If the self was made only of its history, people couldn't face their *present* feeling inside them *now*. The self as a history of the subject doesn't have *an inside*. The self grows not only as the historic subject but also as its rich space with breadth and depth. In this space the 'I' can face now what the 'I' senses now. This space is the object the 'I' senses as "the present 'I'," the self that exists "here and now."

Where is this space of "the present 'I'"? Of course, it is *inside* the 'I'. We usually consider our inner worlds as an unreal space different from the outer world, but I don't think so. Although the inside of us is a special field that is the 'I', it also occupies a certain expanse in the real world. It wafts inside the 'I', carrying rich meaning *just like the outer world*. Our inside space – in other words, our mind – is sensed as a substantial body that exists here and now.

The inside of the 'I' is usually pictured as the space inside the skin that is our biological boundary. However, skin is not always the boundary that separates our inner space from the outside. The boundary is not static but is created in our process of differentiation between the inside and outside. When you get together with others and call you "we," a boundary is created between the inside of "us" and the outside of "us." And when you examine your hand closely, your hand is placed out of the boundary of the 'I' (8).

Note (8): Arms and legs are often placed outside of the boundary of the 'I'. Arms and legs may be possessed by the 'I', but are often not considered as the 'I' itself. You may not think that "this is myself" when you look at your hand, although your arms and legs are organs that often function as the subject and carry out the subject's will (of course, your whole body actually functions as the subject when your action is oriented toward the object).

The parts of the body that are sensed as inside the 'I' are often the head and trunk which contain room for such contents as thoughts and emotions. We hardly ever sense space inside our

arms or legs, but we can sense space “in the head” or “in our chest” (9). The head and trunk carry the sense of being inside the ‘I’.

Note (9): There is the expression “in hand”, but this expression implies the space covered with one’s hand, not the space inside the skin. Hands and arms have the specific function of holding the “other” and receiving it into the space of the ‘I’. Thus the function of hands and arms implies the separation between the ‘I’ and the object; people sometimes “cling” to something or someone, as if they are aware of the separation and afraid of it.

The contents of the space inside the head are different qualitatively from those of the trunk. While what is pictured inside the head is mainly thought, what is placed in trunk is mainly emotion or feeling. Modern people usually attach greater importance to the head than to the trunk, partly because of our knowledge of the importance of the brain. We often think our mind is in our head – that may be one of the reasons that modern people esteem logic highly but dismiss feelings. However human beings are unbalanced when they are head-centered. No doubt, thought is important factor for our lives, but overemphasizing thought and ignoring feeling (stuffing knowledge into our heads and feeling little inside our trunks) may cause mental disorders. Moreover, thought without feeling causes difficulties in living in harmony with others. The head has a tendency to be confined in its own thoughts, but the trunk keeps the connection with others; a problem that is a headache for you is your personal trouble, but a heartache is proof that you are relating to others. To live in balance, we need more than thoughts; we need to be related to our feelings sensed inside our trunk.

A person whose self (the base of the subject) is mainly in his head can see an object as “a mere thing” but can hardly sense its rich meaning. Although thought itself has a kind of creativity and can deal with an object creatively, there seems to be a qualitative difference in the attitude toward things, between people who feel inside their trunk and people who cannot. It may be the difference between thoughtfulness and cleverness. A person who is clever but not thoughtful usually deals with the object as a convenient tool. On the other hand, a person who is clever and thoughtful has regard for others behind his cleverness. While the head is often compared to a computer, the trunk can be compared to a container used for ripening. The rich space inside the trunk holds something inside and takes time to ripen or deepen it. That is the function of space; the expanse of space incubates meaning creatively. Our rich relationship with the other is developed in this expanse.

This expanse of space enables rich presence. The subject itself is characterized by single-mindedness toward the object like a vector, and this vector is naked and defenseless. Don’t the eyes of children have an unguarded straightforwardness? We may feel worried when a small child begins to run toward something that interests him. Children gaze straight at the goal but don’t pay attention to the space around them or to themselves. That is why the vector of the subjects of small children must be guarded by the mature space of grownups. Mature space carries calmness and richness. In human development, the maturity of the inside space is very important, as it gives depth to the ‘I’ and enables the ‘I’ to hold feelings and thoughts inside.

The self and the contents of the self

The space inside the 'I' is where feelings and thoughts exist. Although feelings or thoughts (memories too) are originally *a process* between the 'I' and the object, they are crystallized and become able to be held inside the self when the field of the self is differentiated from the present space and gains identity. In other words, the process itself solidifies into one object inside the body of the 'I'. The 'I' as the subject pays attention to the inside space in order to sense its own feeling. We can sense our feelings inside our trunk concretely, like "my heart is bursting." Or we can feel our thoughts placed in the space inside our heads when we point at our heads and say, "Here are my ideas."

Actually, feelings imply thoughts and thoughts are colored with feelings, so feelings and thoughts can't be strictly distinguished. In fact, we can find senses that are not yet feelings or thoughts but the origins of feelings and thoughts. So we may call such objects inside the 'I' *inner meanings* (10). Gendlin calls them *felt-senses*. We can also call them *images* or *internal objects*. These inner objects are not static, nor do they exist independently from one another. Some writers who practice psychoanalysis (especially object relations theory), Jungian psychology or Focusing-oriented psychotherapy have described the internal world as where inner meanings are interacting, each with its own intentions and feelings; inner meanings have their own dynamism.

Note (10): We should say that intense emotion is not yet inner meaning, because it is not held in the space inside nor does the subject face it.

The 'I' may find many inner meanings inside the 'I', but they are not the self, although they are parts of the self. The self is the rich expanse inside, that holds meanings as its contents. Or we can say that the self is a larger whole that contains these contents as its parts. The existence of the 'I' fills with rich expanse, containing many inner objects. Insofar as this expanse is sensed as one identity, the 'I' will not lose sight of the 'I' even if its contents such as feelings or intentions are changed. Provided there is rich space inside the 'I', the 'I' will not act thoughtlessly because of inner meanings that are overwhelming. In this inside space, the 'I' as the subject can face inner meanings and dialogue with them.

To hold meanings inside

People who can't express their opinions or feelings are those who can't protect inner meanings from an outer threat or inner critic; their own opinions and feelings are easily threatened by an uneasy situation or harsh self-criticism, so these inner meanings go into hiding. What is needed is security and peace, both inner and outer, to allow these feelings to stay, provided that such an inner space exists. Some people have not developed enough inside space. These people have difficulty in keeping the right distance from their own feelings, or they can't even have and keep inner feelings (or inner objects) *inside* them.

That is true of children. Small children can't hold their experiences inside, nor can they nurse their inner feelings. Small children immediately express them; they cry or get angry, or they

express joy with whole body. Their expression of emotions is intense but not accompanied by inner depth. For them, to feel is not to hold inside but to react outside; children don't have enough space inside to contain their feelings. Even grownups are sometimes not able to hold their feelings inside when the experience is tremendous. They may be not able to help showing their indignation or hold back their tears, or they may jump for joy in spite of themselves. They can't help speaking a secret when the secret is so astounding that they can't keep it inside. But whoever has rich space inside doesn't need to "get it off his (or her) chest;" the inside space is like a chest or a container that makes it possible to keep our feelings to ourselves.

To hold our feelings inside means we are able to accept them as our own. We also can show them to others openly, but we don't have to. But when we cannot accept some feelings as our own, they can be annoying so we may repress them. To hold feelings is not same as to repress feelings. To repress feelings is to shut them inside of ourselves without feeling them, like putting a lid on them and leaving them alone. The space full of "bad" feelings becomes an abandoned place, and we are unable to sense it. People whose inner space has been abandoned cannot feel their own feelings directly, so they may be confused when asked how they feel, or they may think rather than feel. (They may say "I am sad of course, that is natural when a person dies.") Shutting out feelings without facing them increases internal pressure and the feelings may come out in a disordered way, such as with impulsive acts or physical symptoms.

One of the reasons we repress our feelings is our belief that we have power to control our feelings with our will. We sometimes think that we should not be angry, but can we really extinguish our anger with intention alone? The existence of anger inside us may be beyond our intention, like the existence of an apple placed in front of us. If we want it not to exist, we can only ignore it or hide it. Of course it is usually possible to decide of our own free will how we express our anger. That is why we can take responsibility for our behavior. But that is different from controlling the existence of anger itself.

An apple and a feeling are not the same of course. An apple hardly changes, but meanings inside the 'I' change continuously. Anger doesn't always stay being angry. But it probably doesn't change if we repress it. To carry forward the change process, we must give space to inner meanings. Although we cannot control them with our will, we can give space to them and let them behave freely. Just as when we hold an infant, we give them a comfortable space and pay proper attention to it, so that they can behave spontaneously. To hold inner meanings is to recognize their existence and to pay attention to them. The meanings held and given space will resonate with each other and carry their own process forward.

This is the process that occurs inside the 'I', but it is an open process. The inside meanings resonate with space outside and is influenced by it, and on the other hand, the space around the 'I' and the objects found there are also influenced by resonance with the 'I' along with various nuances [(11)]. The inside and outside always influence one another.

Note (11): The argument here relates to a concept in psychology, called *projection* (see note (6) in chapter 5); I mean that, in a manner of speaking, projection is an essential factor of recognition (or of existence).

This doesn't mean that the subject precedes the objective world and causes it. Rather, the inside and outside are shaped at the same time in a resonating process.

C. G. Jung said that projection is a general psychological mechanism containing such experiences as colors or sounds. Because in physics colors are nothing but wavelengths of light, "colors" are our subjective experiences projected onto objective things. Or, to be precise, colors or sounds are what occur somewhere between the inside and the outside.

Differentiation of the self

Such resonance between the inside and outside also influences human relationship. The space of the 'I' wafts out into the space the 'I' shares with others, and the space of the 'I' resonates with that shared space, so a bad-tempered person creates a bad atmosphere and a calm person can calm the atmosphere. That is why a child feels the sense of security with the presence of its mother.

Small children are not yet able to hold their feelings inside, but they experience holding their feelings in such shared space between the 'I' and another person. For example, a child crying because of sadness may be not able to hold his (or her) own feeling of sadness alone. But when the mother comes and speaks to the child, saying "You seem very sad," the child becomes able to hold and face the sadness in their shared space. Even a grown-up can sometimes only face his (her) difficult feelings when someone is with him. Even a feeling one can't hold alone will be accepted as one's own if someone listens and pays attention to it. The space shared with the other can hold bigger feelings than the space of one person alone, provided that the other is really present, and not absent-minded.

The field of the self (or the inside space that can hold feelings alone) is developed through experiences of holding feelings in a space shared with the other. D. Winnicott, psychoanalyst, expressed this as "to be alone in the presence of someone else." The alone field of the 'I' is nursed in this presence and differentiated from the shared space; it develops as the inside of the 'I'.

For children, the space of the self is protected by the space with the other. If the secure space with the mother's presence is lost, the child's inside space will easily disappear and the child will be uneasily looking for the mother. One cannot hold feelings alone until the self has matured enough – or perhaps we should say, no one ever holds feelings inside alone. One senses the presence of others in the world around oneself, even when one can't see them. Even in the space in which a person is alone, one may implicitly know that there are other people in the world surrounding the alone space. If the person is convinced that there is nobody except himself – no living thing, no god, no spirit – can the person hold his own feelings inside? Maybe not, and in such a situation the 'I' may be going out of its mind (or even hallucinating in an attempt to create others), or the 'I' may lose any feeling at all in the emptiness.

Part III: The 'I' and the other

When thinking about the 'I', our thoughts necessarily come to the matter of the existence of the other; the 'I' is the process of facing the other, which is awakened through being found by the other, and the 'I' matures its inside space, being nursed by the space with the other.

The occurrence of "now, in this space, 'I' am facing something" is more essential than the existence of the individual 'I' or individual "others." The 'I' begins to exist in the space with the other and always interacts with the other; thus the identity of the 'I' is made. So the nature of the 'I' is influenced by the relationship with the other. If we don't meet the other as something possessing rich uniqueness but consider it as a mere thing, we cannot be the 'I' richly. To look upon other people in a manner of slighting their uniqueness means immediately to be inhumane.

"Others" are not necessarily human beings; all that we face, even lifeless things, are "others." Of course, there is a difference between lifeless things and human beings. However, when we face an object attentively, we find individuality or a kind of subjectivity even on a lifeless thing, just as we sometimes get angry at a stone that tripped us, or we talk to a thing as if it were a friend. When we don't attempt to deal with an object as a mere thing that can be controlled, but face the presence of the object as something beyond our intentions or understanding, we are sensing the object as a unique "other."

As Levinas (a French philosopher) said, the "other" is not something the 'I' can comprehend or control. I think this is true, not only of other people, but of all things we face in the world. Wanting to control the object instead of meeting it as the other, which is the attitude modern people often take, is evidence of a lack of faith, since faith is to face an object that is beyond the recognition or control of the 'I'. If we really feel nature to be a threat (or a blessing) that is unknowable and uncontrollable, we may find the "other" in nature; in this respect, there is no difference between the modern people and the uncivilized people who used to worship nature. The reason why the modern people often don't face the rich otherness of nature (or of the world) is that they think they can subdue it with their recognition and place it under their control. So we can consider the question of the "other" as a matter of spirituality, because to face the other attentively is to exercise one's faith. Faith or spirituality in this sense is essential for us. We don't talk or listen to what we think we can control as we like. But if we face the other attentively, it will waft meaning freshly in response to our attention and we can sense a lively meaning.

A self-centered person wants to possess and control the object. The essence of self-centeredness is not that a person pays too much attention to oneself, but that a person doesn't really meet or face the other. Even when a person serves another person devotedly, if the person doesn't face the other attentively, it is an egoistic devotion. What seems to be love is not love when regard for the other is absent.

According to Levinas, ethics is "this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other." Ethics and responsibility are awakened through encounters with the other, as an object which cannot be comprehended by recognition or controlled by the 'I'. The 'I' is awakened in the encounter and takes responsibility for being the 'I'; to face the object implies such ethics and

responsibility. If you want to be ethical, you must meet the other who cannot be thoroughly understood or controlled, not merely persist in what you think ethical. This is also the attitude therapists should take in psychotherapy.

The other talks to the 'I' from its rich presence, and the 'I' faces the meaning of the object with the dignity of being the 'I'. While the meaning of the object always arises freshly in this process, the 'I' arises in this process, too. Space as a field of undifferentiated meaning enables this process of arising – or rather, space is the *arising* itself, as the richness that is the essence of space belongs to this process.

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Epilogue: living in the present space

In the modern view of the world, the 'I' is separated from the world. We deal with the world as if we can control it as we like. Such an attitude places us outside the world, so there is no room for our 'I' in it. Such a viewpoint makes us feel deeply isolated. In this view, the relationship between the 'I' and the world is broken and meaning for the 'I' is lost. In the days when culture gave people certain values, an individual may have believed in the values and lived them. The 'I' may have been contained in the values and the world may have therefore had clear meaning. But that is not true of the modern world; today it is difficult to have a connection with the world through a *truth* that we can believe absolutely. We are presented with all sorts of values, to evaluate from the outside. No doubt it is great progress to be able to view one's own culture in a relative way or to be open to various values. But if the progress deprives us of meaning and makes individuals feel isolated, the modern world is not an enjoyable place.

The term "modern society" is shadowed by this nuance of coldness and isolation. Modern society seems to have no room for rich meaning but to slight the dignity of the presence of *one*. We sometimes imagine that modern society is in sync with numerical values such as rationality, efficiency and economy, so it almost seems that humanity is a kind of illusion. But in reality, our daily life is not always in coldness or isolation. The sun shines on us and gives us warm light, people exchange smiles and kindnesses with each other, and we live our lives valuing not only rationality and efficiency but also humanity.

You may not believe that you think only about rationality or efficiency or economy. But when you see people whom you don't know, you sometimes give them a cold look. We tend to project a vague ghost called "modern society" onto strangers, and as a result we ourselves act as the embodiment of cold "modern society." However, when we meet one person attentively and find there *a person* with unique individuality, we usually can sense their humanity. A mass of anonymous others is not felt as human, but if you face someone's unique one-ness, you can meet the person as a human being.

The important point is whether you can meet the person in front of you as a unique individual. Even if the person always thinks about rationality or efficiency, or even if the person is a villain, what is most important is that now you are facing him or her, and are in their presence; now the person is a unique individual characterized by "thinking about rationality and efficiency" or "being a villain." If we can attentively meet *the person* that exists beyond those initial perceived characteristics, it is possible that the heart of *the person* will develop.

Of course I don't mean that people become simply good when we believe in their goodness; nobody can make people good if they don't want to be so. What is important is that you face *the other*. In this facing, we can overcome any coldness of the society in which we live. This is not something so unusual. We may sometimes be treated as just a thing with no individuality – sometimes we imagine other people to be such – but at same time we behave as a unique individual in our daily life; the 'I' exists in this rich space. People have been present richly in the space of "here and now" in all times and ages, even in a time of hardship. No society can encroach on this small

but rich space.

To find meaning in our lives, we need to be in the present space spreading in front of us with an open mind, sensing its richness. To emphasize the here and now is quite different from the idea of living only for the moment. People who live only for the moment are busy consuming pleasures one after another, but they don't stay in the present – there is no rich Aida there. To be in the present is not to consume objects but to meet the object as *the other*. Of course it is valuable to spend time now investing in the future, but it is the present 'I' who faces the future *now*. A life which has been spent only for the future may result only in emptiness at the end. Richness exists when the 'I' is itself here and now; the past and the future are implied richly in the present. There may be richness in remembering the past, now, or in making efforts for the future, now, if we remain open to the present time and space.

To be present in the present and to face the other (including the self as the other) is the first step in living richly. To face the other is not to try to understand the other thoroughly but to keep on understanding the other, or in other words, to keep on sensing the presence of *one* who cannot be understood thoroughly. We may spend a lot of time in routine matters, but we are free to come back to this present place of attentiveness at any time. I believe that such an attitude of presence not only enriches our own lives but also sheds light on a small corner of this world.

Japanese has a history of making much of the present space. For example, there is an expression "ichigo ichie" in the Japanese tea ceremony that expresses an attitude of valuing the present occasion which comes to us only once in the lifetime. That is a different sense of values than the attitude of efficiency. In the Japanese tea ceremony, one is required to concentrate on one's every move. The formula of behavior in the ceremony is said to be rational, but its essence is not its rationality. What is important is being "present," such as concentrating on picking something up when one picks something up, concentrating on putting something down when one puts something down, concentrating on bowing when one bows, or concentrating on closing the door when one closes door.

This sense of valuing the present time is deeply influenced by Zen. Daisetsu Suzuki wrote that the nature that had matured in Japan came out at the opportunity of the importation of Zen, although Zen itself was originally imported from China, and then developed in an individual Japanese way. The influence of Zen is most clearly seen in the tea ceremony (sado), swordsmanship (kendo) or calligraphy (shodo), but the influence of Zen is actually wider, and is felt over the whole of Japanese culture.

Zen represents another way of being in the present space that is different from facing the object as an independent 'I'. To face the object is like lighting the object with the light coming from the absolute center called 'I'; in this model, a definite center exists and the focused object arises clearly. But the consciousness of Zen is, according to Toshihiko Izutsu, the consciousness of *no thing*; it is consciousness with no subject and no object. Such a consciousness is not a light that makes each object emerge; here the light is the world itself, and consciousness is the emerging of the world from inside itself. The subject in Zen is not the 'I' facing the object – the subject is the present space,

the process that we call “the world.”

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