

What First and Third Person Processes Really Are

Abstract: *'Implicit understanding' is much wider than what we can attend to at one time, and it is in some respects more precise. Examples are examined. What is implicit functions in certain characteristic ways. Some of these are defined. They explain how new concepts come to us in a bodily process that goes beyond previous logic but takes implicit account of it, without new logical steps.*

All concepts can be considered 'explications' of implicit body-environment interaction. 'Explication' provides an overall model within which the objectivity of logical concepts can be explained and preserved.

Section III concerns new kinds of operational research. Section IV shows how a theory of logically connected terms can always be formulated from something known implicitly. Section V shows how the explication model affects the theory of language.

Keywords

Body, body knowledge, implicit, consciousness, space, motion, theory construction, concept formation, proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, focusing.

I. Implicit Understanding

This article will present a different view of 'first person process', not what most of its proponents and objectors think it is. The new view will also enable us to understand the third person perspective differently.

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First person process involves something I call 'implicit understanding' (IU). Among many roles, implicit understanding functions in the coming of new concepts. How new concepts come will show us a lot about first person process.

I begin with the question: How do we generate new concepts? How do they come? Scientists and philosophers don't say much about how their concepts came. We are told why the new concept is better, but hardly ever how it came. Someone might say, 'It came to me in the shower'.

The concepts of science change every few years and become more numerous and complex. It is well known that the new ones are not logically deducible from the old ones. But the existing concepts can only explain what follows logically from them. Novelty cannot

be denied but it seems inexplicable. We have no logical account across the changing concepts of science.

To study the role played by *implicit understanding* in the coming of new concepts will not undermine the concepts we already have. Those concepts work *explicitly*, with logical implications. Logic is *their own* power for precise consequences. To use their power we must let them work as if they were alone, without us. Logical inference requires that we don't let anything upset the concepts. For example, while calculating our bank account we don't double one deposit because it came from a special source. All our technology depends on logical inference. Seven billion of us couldn't all live on the planet without it. To undermine logic and explicit concepts is not sensible.

Of course we know that we operate the concepts. How they work 'alone' is something we let them do. This isn't very puzzling. Whatever else concepts are, they are tools. For example, a screwdriver must be allowed to keep its own narrow head, and to engage the screw with it. We are holding it, of course, but the screwdriver's own pattern turns the screw. Obviously, more complex machines produce their own results. Concepts similarly have *their own* logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts.

We keep the system of existing concepts inviolate and separate. Then we can also have a second system in which we study how something implicit works in the coming of new concepts. We will be concerned throughout with the necessary separation, contrast, and relationship between the system of explicitly formed concepts and our second system about how something functions implicitly. Far from being in conflict, this article will show that if the two systems stay separate, they expand each other reciprocally.

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Let me cite some examples of 'implicit understanding' (IU):

- From just a few words we can grasp a complex situation. Someone reports: 'Jim said no'. The single statement of a single fact brings a new understanding of the whole situation. The single occurrence is not just itself; it is also the change in our implicit understanding.
- In the opening scene of Ibsen's *Hedda Gabler* a man comes to deliver a telegram. From how she treats him we suddenly understand the kind of person she is.
- The coming of a new thought can also reorganize a situation. 'Oh, he's afraid of George!' we think, and immediately a great deal has changed. We would like to understand how such a new thought can come. Right here I am only pointing out the relationship between the occurring *one* and the implicit *many*.
- One sensation can also change our understanding of the whole situation, for example one smell: ('Oh! . . .'). Laid out in words it might be 'Oh! That's the sauce burning! I left it on the stove when I went to answer the phone, and I don't have more stuff to make the sauce again, and there isn't time to go to the store, and. . .'. Only the 'Oh! . . .' has actually occurred, but the '. . .' includes much more: who is invited for dinner,

and why, and what sort of reactions they are likely to have, and many past events with them, and what could still be cooked, and much else. All of that is implicit and understood in one ‘Oh! . . .’. How can so much be implicit in one syllable?

What is implicitly understood is much more than we could separate out one by one. We saw that one event can change the implicit many. Now I add: the changed many will change the next event, what we actually say or do next. So the one–many relation is really a one–many–one relation. The one occurring event can change what functions implicitly, and that can change the next event — which again changes the many. It is a ‘process’: *implying–occurring–implying*.

The many are not thought separately. They change implicitly without ever having formed. Changing without ever forming is a hallmark of implicit functioning, as we will see.

We can always say some of the many, if we are asked. This is already being studied and can reveal a lot to the researcher about what was actually happening at any one moment. The ‘describing’ is itself a behaviour with many observable variances. Brief references to IU enable one to say more and more. There is hardly an end to what can

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be said just to ‘describe’ one moment. About an hour's worth is typical (see Petitmengin, 2009, this volume).

But usually we move on. The implicit understanding (IU) implies the next saying or doing, the occurring of which will change the implicit understanding so that it implies a further next saying or doing. We can study that process as well.

Usually we move on smoothly, but sometimes we cannot say what the IU implies. Then we have a problem; it might be practical or theoretical. It might be obvious (‘How can I make a good dinner without a sauce?’) or subtle (‘This tastes a little funny. What does it need?’). A theoretical problem may also be obvious (‘How do new concepts come?’) or subtle (‘I don't know what is wrong with this explanation, but something is’.).

Let us observe what we do when we try to solve a problem. We use not only statements. *We think with something implicit as well*. We state a problem in words as far as we can. Many things feed into the problem. We can repeat some of what we know, but we are just stuck if we have nothing but statements and an empty blank. To think further, we must attend to something implicit. We refer to it in shorthand by calling it ‘this’ or ‘this but also that. . .’. We hold on to the spot where we sense the problem: The spot is ‘this, but also ‘that’ and the dots. The ‘. . .’ is where we can hope for new thoughts, where they could come.

A great gamut of things functions implicitly at such an *edge*: much common knowledge, our own special knowledge, everything we have read, heard, why we think it's important, and much else. We refer directly to ‘all that’. It is an implicit understanding (IU). When there is a problem, we also ‘understand’ that we don't understand some of it, although it is all one situation. It is important and remarkable that we sense this ‘edge’ of our IU where further thoughts are implied.

If we look for the sensed quality of the edge, it can become something bodily-sensed and palpable, a ‘this’ or an ‘it’ that we ‘have a hold of’. I call that a ‘*felt sense*’. Or, we can refer to the IU just in passing. But most of the time we don't refer to our IU at all. We go from

event to event, from concept to concept, from what we can say to what we can say, or from one action to the next.

This is a range of very different kinds of talking and thinking. There are observable marks and many well-replicated studies of this range: palpable direct reference to IU, touching IU only in passing, no direct contact with IU. There are many correlations with the differences it makes (see Hendicks, 2009, this volume). Implicit functioning is quite open to research.

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There is always IU, although there is no 'it' when we don't refer to it. What we do is always implicitly determined by IU. We understand implicitly what we are doing, and what is happening. If the ever-present IU disappeared, we would not understand our surroundings; suddenly we would not know what we are doing and how we came to this moment. The IU is always there, but direct reference changes it. Then the next events and the ensuing process come differently.

If we refer directly so that a palpable 'it' comes, and if we refer to it again and again for a minute or two, some new aspects may emerge, for example: 'Oh, it has something to do with how it relates to that other thing.' That small step is felt as a distinct advance, and can lead to a further step, for example: 'Oh, it's not so much that other thing, it's more this third thing.' The contents may contradict, but the change made by each step enables the coming of the next. Direct reference changes the implicit many, and then each step changes them further. So these hard-won new statements differ from the many which we can always easily say (for example, the many that were implicit in 'Oh! . . .').

The aspects we state from IU were not separate units before we separated them out. We could never separate them all, even if there were a finite 'all'. But there cannot be. In implicit understanding there is no all. The implicit many are not a finite number. They have no separate identity.

Let us examine 'separate identity':

What has identity is 'self-identical'

Once we separate something out, it has its own identity. It becomes self-identical. It is a unit. I say it functions 'as itself'. But it was not like that before being separated out. When the many are only implicit, they are not units located each in its own position in time.

The contrast is sharp: Something self-identical has identity conditions and occurs in its own time location. It is a unit. But before we separate some of them out, they don't exist separately. Below we will see how they do function.

Existence includes the implicit

With so much happening implicitly, of course we cannot deny that the implicit exists. Existence includes not just single events and self-identical units, but also what functions implicitly.

It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identicals have space and time locations, it was assumed that only

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what fills space and time can exist. I will argue that what exists is not only in the kind of space and time in which things are self-identical units. There are other kinds of space and time.¹ The model of self-identical units is not an all-encompassing way to understand everything.

To exclude the implicit from existence and from science has been a gigantic omission. Currently this is already being remedied.²

Implicit understanding is a crossing

The usual concepts bring the unit model. They make everything seem to consist of self-identical units. With the usual concepts we can only say how the implicit does *not* function. Then it seems that the implicit cannot be studied.

In my larger work I have formulated many characteristics of implicit functioning, more than I can take up in an article. Here I am only trying to show that we can have an explication system about concept-making and implicit functioning. But I must discuss two characteristics:

We saw that we understand many together. Each thing which we could separate is already affected by the others that are already affected by it. This is an odd pattern, more intricate than the usual kind of ‘many’. It is also more intricate than the usual kind of ‘one’. Let us allow this more intricate pattern to stand. I name it ‘a crossing’. Rather than being side by side, each is a modification of the already-modified others. They are one understanding (IU) because of the crossing. Implicit understanding is a crossing. That is how they are able to

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imply *one* actual next event. Because they are a crossing, they can change all at once, and without forming separately.³

¹ Time can be viewed as within happening, and generated by it. Happening need not be within pre-given time locations. I will discuss this further below. For a full treatment see *A Process Model*, chap. I-B (Gendlin, 1981/1997).

² Gallagher (2006) establishes a term (‘prenoetic’) that refers to the implicit. He writes: ‘The *prenoetic* function of the body schema . . . [is] *ordered according to* the intention of the actor rather than in terms of muscles or neuronal signals. . . (p. 38) ‘When in the context of a game I jump to catch a ball, that action cannot be fully explained by the physiological activity of my body. The pragmatic concern of playing the game . . . even the rules of the game . . . may define how I jump. . .’ (pp. 142-143). ‘[T]he schematic adjustments . . . do *not appear as explicit parts* of the perceptual meaning, although *implicitly* they help to structure such meaning. (p. 141) ‘[This] is not itself a perception of . . . an object; for if it were, it would require . . . a spatial frame of reference . . . [It is a] non-perspectival awareness’ (pp. 137-8) [my emphasis]

With just one term that refers to implicit functioning (‘prenoetic’), Gallagher has empowered something everyone has always known to become a source for new concepts.

³Philosophy’s ‘one’ was always known to include the many, but those were its ‘particular’ instances. However, we now see a ‘one’ which includes a very different ‘many’ which function implicitly. Their implying of one next event is a future in the present. Implying is part of every occurring and has no separate time-position. This is a more intricate model of time (see *A Process Model*, chapter IV-B.)

‘Crossing’ (or something that functions like crossing) is a necessary concept for understanding the implicit, as we will further see.

Now a second all-important characteristic of implicit functioning: the IU retains the single events (perceptions, cognitions) after they have occurred. They don't just disappear. Their effects are included in the IU from then on. Cognitions bring their logical implications along with them when they become implicit in the IU. When they become implicit they actually have more effects than when they were self-identical. Now their inferences cross with everything else we understand implicitly, and participate in a much larger result. In a crossing, if more inferences participate, *more* novelty can result, because the inference from each generates precise new effects in the many others.

We often observe this bodily novelty. Dreyfus (1992) points out that computers cannot recognize new language formations (for example, new metaphors). People come up with new phrases. People can understand them but they stymie the computers. Computers use only the already-existing forms.

Dreyfus cites research showing that chess masters make superior new moves without deliberating, even when playing against quite good players. Many other examples can be cited. For example, musical improvisation is often better and more intricate than what one can deliberately construct. Our bodies can implicitly employ our knowledge in new formations that don't consist only of already-existing forms.

With our characteristics of implicit functioning we can now understand how the body does this. The many old moves that the master knows function implicitly in the coming of a new move. Their implicit functioning includes the inferences from each possible move, as well as the logical consequences many steps ahead for both players. Thinking ahead to the consequences of each move takes the average chess player so much time to deliberate. For the master, implicit functioning is inference-inclusive. In the coming of the new move, the many moves and their inferences are ‘taken account of’ without ever occurring separately. Therefore the chess master doesn't deliberate.

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The coming of a new move is not logical, but it is certainly not *not-logical* either, since it takes account of the logical implications. It consists *neither* of the same moves *nor* is it something simply different.⁴ Our familiar concepts can say this only as two denials. Let us take this more intricate pattern itself with us. I say that all the implications are ‘carried forward’ in the new occurring.

From the master's implicit understanding of the situation, the stupid moves don't come to mind for consideration. A few possible moves might come, but not the many possible ones. Similarly, Churchill said about Marlboro that a great military commander understands a complex situation immediately, while others understand it only after the battle.

At any stage of knowledge there are many stupid things that would never occur to any of us. We don't deliberate about sitting down on a wet bench, or about taking a picture into the sun. The ever-present IU is the bodily knowing. In much of life, especially our own fields, we

⁴ Implicit functioning goes beyond the ancient pair: ‘the same and the different’.

may be confident of handling the next situation. We know that if there is a problem, the new moves will come.

But what if nothing comes? What if our bodily knowledge is enough so no stupid moves come, but nothing else comes either? Then we need direct reference to the IU. I say more about direct reference below.

Since the body implies the next move, the word 'body' changes its meaning

What functions implicitly is the body. We were taught that we understand things just with the brain, but brains only work through the whole body. In *A Process Model* (1981/1997) I have written at length about this. Organisms encounter the environment not only with brains and perception. *All living organisms concretely are environmental interactions* (an odd phrase). Their very stuff is environmental, and they imply their next moves in the environment long before some organisms develop perception and brains.

Since we understand and think with the body, the meaning of the word 'body' is changing. No longer does 'body' mean just the chemicals that are left when we die. The body is not only what is defined in physiology (or what used to be so defined). Now 'the body' means the living body that functions implicitly, and behaves with perception and IU.

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The body's functioning seems much wider than IU. For example, toenail growth does not seem part of IU. But there is not one distinct line between the body's implicit functioning and implicit understanding.⁵

The word 'consciousness' is also changing

IU is an implicit consciousness. We live always in implicit consciousness. The word 'consciousness' has long been considered merely as the content of attention. But attention is very narrow. *Consciousness is vastly wider than attention*. We could never attend to each thing of which we are implicitly conscious.

Consciousness is not a separate 'reflection'. We humans can, of course, 'reflect' on behaviour and perception after they happen, but consciousness is not that kind of separate reflection. *Consciousness arises in behaviour formation and is present in all animals*.⁶

We are definitely not unconscious of our IU. If it suddenly disappeared we would be horribly disoriented. We would suddenly not know what we're doing or how we came here. So the word 'consciousness' greatly expands its meaning here.⁷

⁵ Once we separate a process (and specify it with our instruments and concepts), it may seem not to be in IU. But *in the body* the processes are not simply separate. They occur separately in some ways during some phases, and are one interaffecting process in other ways during other phases. There is not one line. Psychosomatic medicine also shows that behaviour and thought involve one implicitly multiple body process.

⁶ Behaviour-formation is felt; it is inherently conscious. Perception and the bodily feel of the perception is part of how behaviour forms. Behaviour elicits and consists of environmental carrying forward of the body process. Animals feel their doings. Rather than saying that we are 'conscious of' behaviour, we should say that the formation of behaviour is what generates consciousness.

Our two systems are clear. We use our existing concepts with their explicit logic, and we also develop an explication system in which we study the process of implying–occurring–implying, how all concepts are explications from implicit functioning, and how it is possible to generate something new, including new concepts.

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II. Deriving the ‘External’ World

I will now try to show that the distinction between external and internal is not a given. I will derive it. This will also show how third and first person originate.

First I will give some examples of direct reference and carrying forward. Then I will argue that bodily knowledge is environmental interaction, and that this is prior to the distinction between external and internal.

As we saw in the chess example, the IU is the reason why the many stupid thoughts don't come. So the IU functions in the ‘nothing comes’. The fact that nothing comes is an achievement. But if nothing comes, we need direct reference to get a palpable sense of the problem. Once we have that sense, then small steps of carrying forward come from it, and eventually a large step. The palpable sense (the ‘felt sense’, a ‘direct referent’) comes a few seconds or a minute *after* we refer to it while it is still not there. This is an odd kind of referring, but it is easy when we become familiar with it.

There are occasions when everyone has a felt sense. For example, when someone did not understand what we said, we rephrase it. We do that by referring directly to what we meant (‘Let me see, what was I trying to say?’). We separate ‘it’ from the words we have just used. From separating, alternative words come. Let us notice that they come from the separation. We will see this again as we proceed. The separation is the effect of referring directly to the implicit as such.

Another such occasion is when we have forgotten what we were about to say. That can happen, for example, when we wait while others are speaking. By the time they stop and turn to us, we may find that we have ‘lost hold of’ what we were going to say. The readiness to say it was a cluster of implicit statements that had never actually formed. We never had it in words. Now we search for ‘it,’ to get it back. (‘What was I going to say?’) We refer directly to our bodily sense of it, so that it can return, and words can come from it.

7 Other words also change: The IU is often called the ‘background,’ so named from the visual experience of ‘a figure and the background around it’. Even my term ‘edge’ invokes that notion. But ‘background’ has meant something undifferentiated, lacking in figures. The implicit understanding contains a great many ‘figures’. The IU is very precise and governs what we say and do next. When we speak, the implicit is what we centrally mean. (For example, we centrally mean the sauce burning and all that this involves; we don't centrally mean just ‘Oh!’) Now the word ‘background’ changes to mean something precise, and central.

The words ‘proprioceptive’ or ‘kinaesthetic’ also change. ‘Proprioceptive’ has meant sensing one's muscles; ‘kinaesthetic’ meant sensing one's motion. The bodily way in which we can find our IU is similar to how we find our muscles and movements. Therefore both words have been confusingly used to name the IU, since there was no word for IU. It seems hard to believe that there has not been a word for it!

Sometimes something palpable comes of its own accord. For example: suppose you have an oddly gnawing feeling. Then you realize it's something that you were supposed to do today—it's now Monday afternoon—what was it. . .? You don't know, but what it was *is* there, in that gnawing body-tension. You think of many things you ought to have done today, perhaps very necessary things, but no. None of them are 'it'. *How do you know that they are not what you forgot?* The gnawing knows. It won't release. You burrow into this gnawing. Then suddenly -- you remember: Yes, someone was waiting for you for

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lunch. Too late now! *This might make you quite tense. But what about the gnawing? That particular tension has eased.* Now the '. . .' no longer hangs there. Why not? Because the one next thing which the gnawing implied has now occurred (not the original lunch, of course, but this remembering, now). This occurring has carried your whole body forward. You can tell that this now is what you were going to do, and not those other necessary things.⁸

The same kind of carrying forward process can come with quite new things, not only with things we had and lost. When we have the sense of a problem, we can tell when seemingly right and relevant thoughts fail to carry it forward, whereas some little minor step does (for example: 'Oh, it's more like that other thing').

How is it possible for the body to 'know' what we cannot yet think? Why does the '. . .' hang there until we get it right, as if it knows what we don't know. *What is bodily knowledge?*

The concrete body is environmental interaction

The body, also behaviour, and then also cognition, *is* body-environment interaction. The whole body consists of environmental events. And every cell *is* an interaction with its local environment in the body and in the whole body's environment. The body is environmental interaction through and through.

Body process is a carrying forward by the environment, and it always implies further environmental events. So the body is concretely ongoing 'knowledge' of the environment, not first as representation but first as interaction. The meaning of the word 'knowledge' changes to include concretely ongoing (bodily-implicit) knowledge.

All organisms *are* environmental interactions, but animals *are and have a sense-of* the environment. The body process which *is* always environment interaction develops a field of *objects* (and behaviour possibilities with objects).⁹

The body implies behaviour space

Animal bodies perceive objects with which they have behaviour possibilities (what Gibson [1996] called 'affordances'). *The objects are spread out side by side, but the possible*

⁸ There may always be still further steps: You may suddenly realize you forgot that the person cancelled the appointment last week. Remembering is always a present process which we can study, not only the repetition of something recorded. I am pointing to the pattern I call 'carrying forward' which characterizes all process.

⁹ See *A Process Model*, chapter VI, where the 'of objects' is derived.

behaviours are not spread out side by side. Rather, any one behaviour changes how a great many

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other possibilities can be enacted. For example, if we throw an object to the other side of the room, we can no longer take it there and lay it down. If we are already taking it, we can stop and throw it, but it will be a shorter throw. If we turn and go to the telephone, we will be too far to throw it at all. Each possible behaviour is implicitly also the changes it would make in the other possibilities. This crossing of implicit (not occurring) sequences has the characteristics of implicit functioning which we saw above.

A crossed cluster of behaviour possibilities is implicitly part of every object and every single behaviour. *Behaviour possibilities constitute the 'space' we perceive, and into which we behave.* The perception of behaviour possibilities does not consist of separate colors, separate sounds and smells ('sense data'). The sense-modalities are not yet separated, as I will show.

Humans have behaviour space as all animals do, but humans can also do more: In a further and different development, the human body implies not only behaviour but also cognitions. Speaking and thinking is a kind of body-environment interaction.

Human bodies imply patterns as patterns

Humans have the capacity to perceive patterns not as things but *just as patterns*. For example, speech consists of just sound patterns. We can see visual patterns as just visual, apart from what we hear or touch. We can perceive a pictured cat and also perceive that it is only a visual pattern on a piece of cardboard. Dogs cannot do both; they will either push the cardboard around, or growl at the cat. The dog sees patterns but not as patterns, only as the thing with which it behaves.

Animal perception is only 'of' objects. The human perception *of* separable patterns *of* objects involves a doubled 'of', an essentially human development.¹⁰

What we can do with patterns (including speech) becomes part of the human behaviour context. But the body implies its objects in all five unseparated senses. The analysis in terms of separate organs must not make us miss the fact that objects are implied by the body in all its sense-modalities. We see the cat on the chair as a cat we could pet, not as a picture. The analysis only in terms of sense-data is mistaken.

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Sense-intakes are incorporated into the five-sense objects which the body already implies.¹¹

¹⁰ See *A Process Model*, chapter VII-A for the derivation of the doubled 'of' in human pattern responding.

¹¹ See *A Process Model*, where this has been carefully derived. Although we can prove that purely visual geometric triangles excite butterflies more than the irregular triangles of a sexual partner, the butterfly's body does not imply visual triangles, only another butterfly — in all five senses. Even if only visual perceptions are coming in at the moment, the body implies behaviour possibilities *with the thing*. Behaviours are bodily implied, and can form even if just one sense is now coming in. Then, if another sense becomes active, its input joins the ongoing behaviour formation. This further explains the 'intermodality' Gallagher (2006) has very rightly presented.

The priority of behaviour space

The bodily-implied space of behaviour possibilities is clearly always prior in animals and humans. Why do we tend to assume that the divided sense-modalities are prior? It is because of the explanation in terms of separate organs. Should we not accept the explanation? Of course we accept it. But we can find a way to consider it within a wider model, rather than assuming it as the only view. This wider model will also explain a lot that the analysis in terms of separate senses doesn't explain.

For example, considered in the wider system we see not just colors but the chairs and our friend's typed papers stacked on one of them. And not just the chairs and the papers, rather we see that we can't sit down in this chair unless we first remove the papers (which might disturb them, and where would we put them?) whereas we could sit down in the other chair if we first turn it to face into the room. We always perceive the situation into which our behaviour forms. The perception of a situation cannot possibly be constructed only out of colors and sounds.

If we assume that we see and hear only separate sensations, then the meaning of 'perception' becomes narrow. Environmental interaction seems to be just the organ-intake. The behaviour possibilities are considered 'interpretations' added to the organ-intakes. The essential interactive contribution by living organisms — the implying and carrying forward — seems merely subjective, merely added on, not perceived. We seem not to perceive the space of possibilities in which we act.

For example, consider an animal running away from a predator. If it has gotten far enough away, the current view holds that the predator behind it is not perceived. So we have to say that the predator is now being 'imagined,' or 'remembered,' something internal because not perceived by a sense organ. But I argue that isolating the organ-intake introduces a secondary (although valid) distinction. *The predator is*

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obviously still in the perceived space of behaviour possibilities. The animal would not, but could, turn and go toward the predator. It runs away from something in the perceived space in which its behaviour forms. While the animal runs, every tree whizzing by is perceived as distancing the predator. The trees and the running occur in the perceived space of behaviour possibilities which includes the predator.

Similarly, it is assumed that we don't perceive the space behind us when there is no organ-intake from the rear. But I argue that what is behind us is part of the *presently perceived* behaviour space in which we act. We perceive where we could now turn around. We would be quite startled if we suddenly perceived an absence back there, an abyss of nothingness. *The space behind us is always part of our perceived space, the space into which our behaviour forms.*

We need to understand more clearly why the concept of 'perception' has been narrowed so that the space of behaviour possibilities seems unperceived. What would be involved in claiming that perception of behaviour space is and always remains prior and more encompassing? Why does it seem to disappear? The analysis in terms of organs and parts denies behaviour space and replaces it with the ordinary space we are accustomed to assume. That 'space' doesn't contain behaviour possibilities; it is empty except where things fill it.

How does that empty space arise? The answer to this question will let us assign the proper role to both spaces.

The space of behaviour possibilities is perceived in first person process. The third person perspective is analysis in empty space. If we can trace the empty space to its source, we will be able to determine the priority.

Moving patterns generate empty space

Humans can move just a pattern from one thing to another and another. We take a pattern from a thing that has it, and move it to cardboard, wood or steel. Human making is moving patterns. This is how we make our wonderful machines. We make new things by moving patterns. We are *homo faber*.

When a pattern is moved from one thing onto another, the pattern ignores all the characteristics of the thing that had the pattern, as well as all the characteristics of the thing onto which we moved it. It is the *same* pattern in both places, regardless of what else the things may be. When a pattern is moved, nothing changes but its location. *Moving patterns generate a space of locations (points). As far as the moving*

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patterns are concerned, space is empty. Things seem to be located in an emptiness around them.

The moving patterns create the concept of ‘motion,’ not behaviour, not action, just motion. *Motion is only a change in locations, from one point to another point. Mere motion is first created when humans move patterns to make things.* Then mere motion comes to seem basic. But behaviour is prior to motion by billions of years. We make wonderful things by considering things in motion-space. The only way we can be misled is if we explain the body, behaviour, and perception in no other way than within the empty motion-space.

Motion-space separates itself, and separates everything else from itself

If behaviour is viewed as motion,¹² the motion separates itself from the rest of behaviour. What it cuts away from itself seems unobservable. The behaviour space disappears and is replaced by two new segments, one observable and one unobservable. Both are new products made by the way motion splits them. Now the environment seems to be something ‘external’. The rest has to be considered ‘internal’.

The implying of behaviour comes to seem not to be environmental interaction. Rather it seems to be merely something inside an externally-observed body. *We have derived the external and the internal.*

¹² There are current proposals for a ‘sensorimotor coupling’. Current researchers are looking for a tie between perception and motion, not between perception and behaviour. But living things never just change location; there is always more involved and perceived in behaviour (O'Regan & Noë, 2001)

Motion-space splits body from 'mind'

The leftovers from the externalized body become 'the mind'. The 'mind' seems hidden, 'internal.' But we can derive this split from the empty space made by moving patterns.

We need not uncritically assume the external and the internal as two givens. They are both products from the human activity of making things. The activity of making *produces* external and internal spaces; making is not itself within external or internal space.

Of course we don't deny the externally-observed body, medicine, organic chemistry, and neurology. We need only to recognize that behaviour space is prior. *Behaviour space does not happen within 'external' motion-space. The analysis in 'external' motion-space develops within behaviour space.*

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We design the machines and their parts in the empty motion-space of moving patterns, but we build the machines in behaviour space. And behaviour space is also where we test what we have built. There is no empirical testing of concepts. We only test operations. We operate machines which were designed in the concepts of motion-space. We turn the machines on and let them operate directly in environmental interaction. That is why the results can differ from what we logically inferred from the concepts alone.

In modern quantum physics for more than a century, the empty space of motion-locations has not been the conceptual map. But empty location space continues to be assumed in all the other sciences.

There is much puzzlement over the fact that physics has a different conceptual map than the other sciences. But in an explication model the conflicting conceptual systems pose no problem. We don't assume that there has to be only one, since conceptual systems do not represent nature; they are explications within the body-environment interaction.

The objectivity of our concepts

Elsewhere I have shown that our concepts have a kind of objectivity which is still largely misunderstood. No loss of objectivity results from knowing that nature is an implicit intricacy, not a system of self-identical units that could be represented by one conceptual system.¹³

Our concepts are truly the patterns *of things*, because the things reveal their patterns on our patterns. Seen through our patterns, the things cast their profile — *their* patterns on ours. That is why our analyses are really about the things, even though on our patterns.

Two different patterns can both have that objectivity. Conflicting systems don't leave us in limbo. Different patterns bring different results, but always more data from the direct environmental interaction than could ever follow from the conceptual patterns alone.

Since it was not understood that operations are environmental interaction, it was for a long time the great puzzle of Western philosophy, why nature upholds our concepts. Malbranche said that thought and nature are like two wound-up clocks that show the same time (no interaction between them). The current assumption of 'correspondence' and

¹³ This is discussed at more length in my 1997 paper 'The responsive order'.

‘representation’ is not very different. This epistemology has been endlessly criticized, but there has been no alternative. Now we are developing an alternative model.

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People have long felt they had to assume that nature consists of the unit parts science has made — this year’s version. Supposedly our representations approach ever closer to nature’s one set of unit parts; we were just wrong last year. But we were not wrong. We would still obtain the result we predicted last year, if we performed the old operations with the old equipment. But this year we can build and do more, and predict the outcomes of more complex operations and concepts.¹⁴

The explication model explains why the computers we design really work, and the airplanes really fly. *The results of analysis are not ‘only’ constructions.* The Postmodernists were wrong to deny the objectivity of scientific concepts (especially when they wrote the denial on computers, and took airplanes to conventions to say it). Their real contribution was destroying the representational assumption. But since they saw no alternative, they glorified ‘limbo’. We see exactly how logic builds the world further, and how logical consequences add to implicit understanding. We see why our two systems must be kept apart, and also how they relate.

It does not take away from the objectivity of concepts that they came from first-person process, from implying–occurring–implying. On the contrary, we can only explain their objectivity within the explication system we are developing. The unit concepts cannot supply the overall model of nature. We need not only unit concepts, but also what I call ‘process concepts,’ some of them directly about implying–occurring–implying, many more about various kinds of organismic events. In the next section we will consider how process concepts enable new kinds of research.

The first person process is not a ‘perspective’

First person process has been widely misunderstood as being inside an externally-observed body.¹⁵ I have tried to show that first person process is bodily-implied environment interaction. Our conceptual systems are explications developed from within environmental interaction, and then tested in it.

In the usual view there is an unbridgeable gap between first and third person ‘perspectives’. But only the third person is a *perspective*, a view (the ‘view from nowhere’, the observed without the observer).

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The word ‘perspective’ assumes that the environment is something merely viewed, not interacted with and behaved in. First person process is not a perspective.

¹⁴ See Robert Crease’s ‘Interview with Feynman,’ cited in his article ‘Philosophy of science’ (1997). See also his *The Play of Nature* (1993). Scientists play in the lab till they do something that has some regular result. ‘If we do x we get y’ creates an ‘it’. Then attributes ‘belong to it’.

¹⁵ Along these lines, phenomenology is often misunderstood as if it were limited to the ‘inside’ of a person in a little corner of the encompassing externalized world.

If first person process is understood *from first person process*, we can explicate how it is bodily, implicitly conscious, far exceeding the objects of attention (of viewing), always an implicit understanding, needing no added observer.

Everyone is a first person process. IU is used by everyone all the time, but certain procedures are necessary to refer to it directly and to use it systematically. They are discussed in the next Section. Then Section IV concerns working in a theoretical or research field when we sense a new concept which cannot be formulated in the current terms of that field.

III. Training and New Territories

Training

With training, people become able to go from no direct reference at all, to reference just in passing, to palpable direct reference. This range is measurable by characteristic modes of language. What people can tell us with training is not what was there before. Direct reference carries the IU forward. But now we can study this ‘carrying forward’ itself. At first most people don't report much of what happens. We don't need to trust what the reports are *about*. Talking is not only about something; talking is behaviour and can be studied.

In any kind of research, if we ask subjects to describe what happened when we administered a measure, we may be shocked. We may discover totally unsuspected variables. Then we can measure those directly. *Measurable indices can be found for any experience, however ‘internal’ it might seem. External and internal are not actually divided.*

Researchers also need to refer directly to their own IU. Administering a measure to oneself can quickly reveal what it really measures. This is needed to choose a measure. For example, if one hypothesizes that the variable one is studying is affected by anxiety, just choosing any measure of ‘anxiety’ isn't sufficient. Without taking the measure oneself, one cannot find out if it taps *the kind* of ‘anxiety’ that would have the effect one predicts. Very different variables are called ‘anxiety’.

There is a tendency just to assume that a unit event corresponds to one's concept. But assuming it isn't enough. One needs independent indices of what the measure makes happen.

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It is often assumed that operational variables must come only from ‘external’ observations. But by referring directly to IU, researchers can distinguish many variables which can *then* be operationally defined and quantified. Without direct reference these variables will never be found.

Direct reference can also save one from arbitrary measures that have little hope of success. For example, in one study ordinary dream reports were compared with reports from survivors of sexual abuse. No differences were found. The measure was the frequency of 100 common words. But someone familiar with abuse victims could recognize phrases such as ‘they didn't believe me’. Measures often fail to correlate when they have no experiential relation to what one wants to measure. Meaningless syllables may not produce the kind of process that significant words would produce. Taking the measure yourself might reveal, for

example, that deciding a 'preference' between a lovely and an ugly picture is not the same process as between two equally attractive ones.

Once identified, new variables will have observable indices. It is certainly not more 'objective' to remain lacking in distinctions and variables only because they must first be found by direct reference.

The skill of directly referring can be developed thorough training. There is now an international network of such training (www.focusing.org) which offers two practices 'Focusing' and 'TAE', each with precise steps. 'Focusing' teaches referring to the implicit. It has many uses in many fields. 'TAE' (Thinking at the Edge) is based on Focusing, and is a new way of thinking and concept formation.

The instructions for Focusing grew out of quantitative studies of tape-recorded psychotherapy. The studies used a scale of observable linguistic indices of the degree to which clients directly referred to something implicit during therapy. We predicted that clients would move up on the scale during the course of therapy, but they did not. If they began low, they failed in therapy even after years. (Currently we integrate Focusing into therapy so that starting low on direct reference no longer predicts failure.)

We first identified this variable from directly referring to our own IU. Then we were able to define and quantify its observable indices, and produce findings which contradicted our prediction.

Direct reference opens many different territories

Direct reference opens quite a large territory, in which many advances have already been made. They need to be collected, interrelated, and

evaluated. We need a new Bacon to create a public science from these advances.¹⁶

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I call it them a 'territory of territories'. People sometimes want to think of them all as one thing, but that would confuse different territories. Focusing and TAE (concept formation) constitute only one such territory. Another includes meditation, autogenic training, deep relaxation, and hypnosis. Still others are Feldenkrais, hands-on body work, and movement. I don't know enough to classify. Even within one field the specialties may utterly differ.

There are also very different ways of relating to IU. For example, in one kind of meditation we merely observe and welcome what 'comes up the stairs' without identifying with it. This opens a different territory than Focusing does. In Focusing we welcome without identifying, but we 'go down the stairs' to the murky edge where a new felt sense of 'all that' can come. We enter and go a few steps, or many. The relaxation is not nearly as deep as in meditation.

In Focusing the felt sense brings a larger and stronger kind of 'I'. 'I' am here; the felt sense of my whole situation is over there. In contrast, some kinds of meditation can bring an 'absence of self'. But meditation can also build resilience in the face of whatever comes. There are different territories, and there is no reason to lose any of them.

¹⁶ Don Johnson and I called for the creation of such a science in our 2004 article.

Body sensations are not all of one kind

What we refer to may at first seem just bodily, ‘just’ the physical discomfort, excitement, or nameless physical quality. But one soon senses when it is implicitly complex. A beginner might ask: ‘Is this a felt sense or just indigestion?’ Either is possible in the same bodily location, but implicitly they exist very differently.

Of course we want all physiological and neurological analysis of experiences. Every analytic advance also makes further advances in IU possible. But a given instrument may or may not define what happens.

We cannot cut the bodily sensations off from the IU if they carry it. We may describe them in the same words at first, but we must guard against dividing them according to the current units and categories. The intricacy of what happens does not fit under the units of the current conceptual model. If these factors are considered, the study of bodily variables in direct reference is very promising.

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IV. Training in Concept Formation

In theoretical and research situations it pays to keep track of what we sense but cannot yet conceptualize. Of course we want to do this, I argue. My usual example: If your lab equipment is acting funny today, would you ignore it because you don't know what the problem is?

One doesn't want to be the kind of scientist or philosopher who ignores unclear edges and says only what is already well known. To think something new, one must often enter a murky physical feeling which might not seem promising at first.

When a felt sense comes from something that we cannot formulate, we may be excited about it. Why is a palpable ‘edge’ sometimes so exciting? The coming of a felt sense is a bodily event in which a great many implicit statements that have not occurred have all just been carried forward. Of course that can be bodily exciting.

And, why is becoming able to explicate such an edge even more exciting? The explication creates a whole field in which we can do and make new things and create new analyses. That is so much more, and we still have the felt sense (now carried forward) as well.

TAE is designed for people who are tracking something they sense, but have been unable to say. This is usually because what they sense involves a new kind of conceptual pattern, a kind that cannot be subdivided into self-identical units like the usual concepts.

With the first eight of the TAE steps, people become able to say what they had been unable to say. They report telling about it everywhere, both at length and briefly. Many people report the exciting discovery: ‘I can think!’ What most of us learned in school was not thinking. We learned to use already-formed concepts without our whole IU.

Then, if a formal theory is needed, there are more steps, which I will discuss below. The fourteen steps and an introduction are available at www.focusing.org. Here I only want to mention a few points.

Partnership helps one say what one didn't know

Along with Focusing we teach a 'listening' which lets each thing be and be heard just as it was intended. There is room to refer to and wait for the felt sense. People soon say more than what they have already thought. In TAE we have a partner who listens in this way and writes down what we say verbatim. We need this because the precision of the new phrases that come is so quickly forgotten. ('How did I just say that?' It's written down.)

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Why 'facets' (particular events) are necessary

TAE requires recalling at least one actual instance (later four or five). Such an instance is called a 'facet,' anything that actually happened and has the hue of what we are tracking. People often say, 'Oh, it happened many times', but TAE requires recalling a specific occasion.

For example, we need a facet when someone writes: 'I want my words to *match* my experience.' The word 'match' will derail any further thinking because it assumes the old representational model. When we can separate what we mean from the old way of saying it, we can refer directly to the facet, and examine what it actually consists of in that real instance. Then new phrases come and can lead to new concepts.

Why words won't do; phrases are necessary

We often think something new, but our old words bring only the old conceptual model. Then we cannot go further. Only new phrases can say new meaning. Even if people don't understand the new phrase, they notice that something new is being said.

A way to get new phrases when none come

At one stage in TAE we use a simple way to get new phrases to come. The new meaning is usually immersed in old statements and concepts. How can we separate it out? Write a sentence however insufficient. We look up a major word in it (like 'match' in the above example) in the dictionary, and vividly discover that it doesn't mean what we intended. Then we ask — very gently — 'What did you want that word to mean?'

Another word may come. Looking it up leads us to reject it as well. And so with a third. We see that every word says much that we didn't want it to mean. As we replace words one after the other, they make what I call a 'slot' in the sentence. If we say the sentence with the slot left empty (for example, if we put a hand-gesture or a '. . .'), then the sentence seems oddly close to saying what we mean.

Once the slot works, it can do more. Now the slot can change what the words mean, if we put them back (but only for us and only for now). Each word we tried now has a different new meaning, because it crosses with the slot. And, if we say more about these meanings, the further words that come will also have acquired new meanings.

Now, if we invite them, odd new phrases come easily. Why easily now? Because now what we are tracking no longer implies the old phrases.

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Building a theory

About building a logical theory from direct reference, let me briefly state just the principle: in the early TAE Steps (1-5) we phrase many ‘terms’ from the felt sense. Each of them is implied by the felt sense. Therefore they imply each other. Their already existing implicit connections can yield a theory of logical connections between them.

In TAE Steps 6-8, which I don't have room here to describe, we find a new conceptual pattern and allow it to stand. It can be stated in three or four of the terms. Now we can write a precise definition for each term by stating its connections to the other terms in the pattern. Then we can also write definitions for all the others by using the already-defined terms. The pattern expands into a logical theory.

Now there are logical connections between the terms, which explicate the implicit connections they already had. The terms are now connected not only implicitly, but by logic as well.

In any context, if we want theory, a retroactive logic can always be explicated from implicit functioning. That possibility is always already implicit. (We saw that possibility when we saw that the logical consequences of each chess move were already implicit in the coming of the new move.)

The theory can develop further and further by using the pattern and the logically connected terms to define anything in its own field. The theory can also generate new statements on any other topic by crossing that topic with our pattern.¹⁷

Once the theory is formulated, we can use it with or without directly referring. Of course we also still have the (much carried forward) felt sense. That allows us to create a second terminology, which we may want for various reasons. Varying terminologies enable us to see different aspects of the implicit. Having more than one terminology is not a relativistic variety, but rather two explications with direct reference.

V. Two Kinds of Speech

Why don't we always speak directly from what our whole IU implies? This is because speech first forms as a cultural system of sayings and

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doings which can capture us. Please notice: I am not saying that this system *must* capture us, only that it can, and usually does. I deny most current theories which say that capture is the inherent nature of language.

¹⁷ I call this ‘reversal’. A new meaning (or the new pattern implicit in it) can cross and apply also to major topics, for example ‘biology’, ‘evolution’, ‘human nature’, ‘nature’, ‘beauty’, or ‘value’. Instead of being subsumed under the large old topic, the new pattern provides a new way to think about biology, or evolution, human nature, etc. A new pattern can bring the large topic a new possibility which could not be seen from the usual unit model.

I will show *why* speech captures — but need not. (We teach what makes the difference. Every segment of the population likes learning it. And once having learned, no one wants to go back to nearly automatic capture.)

Many children close the access to their IU between the ages of six and ten. Very small children have empathy with all children and animals but later most of them have none for children and animals whom the culture rejects.

Some people cannot easily feel more than the cultural situation. For example, a man's brother died. You ask him what he feels and he says 'sad'. You ask for more and he says, 'I am mourning him.' You ask him what his brother's death means to him, and he answers 'Well, what are you asking me? How would you feel if your brother died?'

Similarly, some rituals are bodily important to some people for extremely varying reasons, but if asked about it, they give the same standard account.

However, everyone has also changed or elaborated some of what the culture teaches. The deliberate part of that can be told, but direct reference to the IU is more difficult. It always includes the culture, but goes far beyond it.

The cultural system is implied by the human body. Let us first see why. Human bodies imply behaviour including speech possibilities. Most human behaviour is speech, and all human behaviour involves implicit speech. In humans the behaviour context is called the 'situation'. We have seen that the bodily-implied behaviour context — the situation — is not external nor is it internal. Situations are our bodily-implied behaviour contexts. Language is not a separated system of mere words about things. It is part of the body-process in situations.

We can see the bodily nature of language if we ask: How do the words come to us to say? I open my mouth and the words come. They come already organized in phrases and sentences that say what I want to say in this situation without my having to consider all possible words and combinations.

We see that 'a situation' is something the body has. It is not a puzzle why the words fit the situation, since a 'situation' is the bodily implied behaviour possibilities. This provides an explanation for how words

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come. The situation is the bodily behaviour context of possible next moves, largely speech.

Situations don't first exist and are then 'signified' by language. We don't 'symbolize' by attaching 'signifiers' to external things. The explication model we have been building explains the old seemingly artificial relation of 'signifier and signified'. Symbols (words, concepts, gestures) are not a separate system of tags pasted onto things by convention. *The symbols and the situation are internally connected because a situation is inherently the implying of a cluster of possible sayings and doings.*

Language is how cultural situations developed. Each culture consists of its typical kinds of situations and word-uses in them. Each kind of situation is a bundle of stories, scenarios, ready alternative actions and sayings.

All our doings are defined by words and by gestures like signing papers and earning money. (If you didn't sign the cheque, you didn't pay.) Situations come in kinds defined by their implicit speech and ritual.

We rarely speak directly from our own whole IU because our behaviour context implies this elaborate system of already-defined situations with already-formed sayings. I will try to show why going beyond this system has seemed impossible.

Always the same words

It can seem that we are trapped by the words. Of course we always have only the same old words of the language. We can combine words or syllables. Occasionally we add a foreign word. Otherwise we must always use the same old words.

Each word has its uses, its own meanings in certain kinds of situations. Even when we want to say something directly from our own more intricate situation, it seems we cannot. The words say their own standard meanings instead. Language is 'discursive'. The words bring their own story and carry *that story* forward. We can only hope that our words will also, indirectly, as a by-product, carry forward the situation in which we are actually living. Language seems never to say as much as our own whole situation would imply, sometimes not even anything like it.

Elsewhere I have quoted a man who said: 'Where I grew up, no matter what I really felt, it had to be one of two or three things.' Then he said 'If there is another way to talk, *I want it!*' That man keenly felt how much more his own situations implied.

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Currently most philosophers say that there is no other way to speak. Words can only say what *they* mean. What *we* meant is lost, and language is blamed. They say that language can only be discursive. I deny it. There is another way:

How language can say something new; three remarkable facts about phrases

- (1) A word has many uses, but a phrase may have only one.
- (2) Words come to us already arranged in phrases. Phrases belong to situations; they come to the specific juncture, now.¹⁸
- (3) In a new situation a new phrase gives the words a new use and meaning.

Usually new phrases don't come because we don't speak from direct reference to the IU of our own situation and our own thought. We move from one already-formed phrase to another. People assume they must use old phrases. Even when they sense the edge directly, they tend not to let a new phrase come. But they could.

New phrases may take a minute to form. At one moment only familiar ones may come. One needs to notice what the old ones *do not* say.

¹⁸ How words come in phrases (old or new) involves four considerations at once. Syntactically the words implicitly cross along with their possible relations to each other (as adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.). Pragmatically all their uses function implicitly to let just this one use emerge. Thirdly these two crossings must cross to be able to say just this, not something else. Fourthly, the words must belong to this particular situation, now. Philosophers have distinguished syntactic from pragmatic, but have only recently wondered how they happen in one occurring (Goldberg *et al.*, 2007). See also my 'Crossing and dipping' (1995) and 'Reply to Johnson' (1997c).

Wittgenstein demonstrated that the same word could have new meanings in new uses. He invented situations to show this (for example, many new meanings of the word 'reading'). He didn't explain it. He only wanted to show that meaning depends on use. He said he was not telling, 'only showing'. He did not explain what is involved in 'only showing'. He didn't try to make a theory from what he 'showed', because he was sure that theory must use representations, which would falsify the actual use and working of language to which he pointed.

My philosophy demonstrates that words *can* say how they are working in the saying they're doing. New phrases can let words acquire new meanings *from and about* how they work in this fresh happening of language. Wittgenstein was right that the working of

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words cannot be said in representations, but words can refer to the saying they are doing.¹⁹

We can speak freshly because our bodily situation is always different and much more intricate than the cultural generalities. A situation is a bodily happening, not just generalities. Language doesn't consist just of standard sayings. Language is part of the human body's implying of behaviour possibilities. Our own situation always consists of more intricate implyings. Therefore new phrases can come when we refer directly to the IU.

Fresh speech from direct reference is a learned skill for most people. But once we have learned it, we can do it at any time. Then we see that our situation implies much more than the cultural kinds.²⁰

The usual view is mistaken, that the individual can do no more than choose among the cultural scenarios, or add mere nuances. The 'nuances' are not mere details. Since what is culturally appropriate has only a general meaning, it is the so-called 'nuances' that tell us what we really want to know. They indicate what the standard saying really means here, this time, from this person. Of course we would know much more if the person would directly refer to that meaning, and speak from there.

Speech coming directly from IU is trans-cultural. Every individual incorporates but far transcends culture, as becomes evident from direct reference. We train people in many countries and cultures. The process is largely the same. A man briefly describes the role of

¹⁹ I show this in 'Words can say how they work' (1993), as well as in 'What happens when Wittgenstein asks "What happens when. . .?"' (1997b)

²⁰ Thinking is both individual and social. The current theory of a one-way determination by society is too simple. The relation is much more complex. Individuals do require channels of information, public discourses, instruments and machines, economic support, and associations for action. The individual must also find ways to relate to the public attitudes so as to be neither captured nor isolated. In all these ways the individual is highly controlled. Nevertheless, individual thinking constantly exceeds society.

[The following paragraph was inadvertently omitted from the published version] The relations between science and society cannot be understood in one inquiry. About basic research: In what way could human concerns and choices relate to it? And, who owns the results and determines its uses? How is it influenced by social expenditures in certain directions? Differently, we need to study how innovations are so often reversed, or misused. Can we differentiate between brave new projects that last, and those that do not? Still another inquiry is needed about public applications to humans of a science which is currently nothing more than a few biased and irresponsible 'studies'. For further discussion, see my 'We can think with the implicit, as well as with fully formed concepts' and 'The responsive order: A new empiricism'.

Japanese fathers at some festival, just enough to take me across the culture at that one spot. Then I perfectly understand his pain from his father's neglect at that festival, and always.

Of course I understand only this individual, not the culture. During group activities I know that I don't know what is happening.

One's culture is recognizable by posture, style of movement, and much else. Culture deeply structures the body but it is never enough to live on. Communication from implicit understanding reveals that culture gives us only generalities that are largely oblivious of what it is to be a person.

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Both old and new are implied

Both the old phrases and the new situation are always functioning. In the coming of new phrases the old ones function implicitly (like old chess moves). If old phrases come, our present IU has functioned implicitly to determine which old saying came, why it came, and what it actually means in this situation here. (One can discover this with direct reference.)

But society is changing. Direct reference to IU is becoming easier and more prevalent. Individuals have been developing. The culturally defined roles have become more inadequate than ever. We innovate all day. There is more and more need to express new meanings directly from implicit understanding.

We can foresee a society in which people live more often from implicit understanding (IU) and recognize that others do. Then society won't waste so much of what a human being can be. Already we are can study and measure the difference between disconnected and IU-connected talking. Many variables correlate with it. It is widely recognized that there is always novelty, and that positive new steps and healing can come from the implicit when we are in direct contact with it.

Currently most of society's efforts fail to improve schools, churches, jails, businesses, and policy planning. This is because the efforts don't reach and interact with what is implicitly happening in people. We find that if a person becomes able to refer directly to IU, then social efforts can *reach there where* they connect with implicit functioning and make something new possible. Children are excited to discover where in them fresh thinking can happen. Violent jail inmates no longer just 'act out'. Having learned Focusing they find where and how the situation 'gets to them'. 'Each time it's different!' they report (Bierman, 1999). Business meetings usually go round in circles, but with Focusing and listening people discover a kind of meeting in which they can say things they themselves have never thought before.

But with the new ways one can also go horribly wrong. New developments can make some old ways of coping impossible without supplying effective new ones. Focusing is by no means the only skill we need to learn. We need to develop along many other avenues, but Focusing does enable all other instructions to be more effective.

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VI. The Changed Ground

The unit model and the explication model contrasted:

In the unit model existence is thought of as just occurring—occurring—occurring. Each occurring is a discrete event. In the explication model the discrete events are also implicit intricacies with a more intricate continuity. Objects exist within the process of body–environment interaction, not just in empty space.

The unit model generates an ‘external’ space, a viewed space. Environmental interaction is misunderstood. The body seems to consist of views from the outside. The organism’s implying seems to happen ‘inside’ the externally-viewed body. First person process is considered ‘internal,’ ‘subjective’.

Consciousness is cut away and seems to be a separate thing. But this thing-consciousness can never be added to logical concepts, since their inferences depend on their working alone. The concepts *require* cutting consciousness away, so an artificial ‘hard problem’ about consciousness is created, if consciousness is to be added to them. But consciousness cannot be understood as a separate thing.

In the old model our concepts seemed to be ‘representations’ which needed ‘corresponding’ entities in an ‘external’ reality. Logically connected concepts explain things and let us build new machines and technology. But something goes wrong when the concepts are taken as the overall model of reality (instead of as explications of the wider process which includes concept-formation). Then the universe seems to be the space of mere views, and we seem to exist inside a body that consists of external views. This foundation of science has long seemed absurd, and its objectivity was a puzzle.

The famously questionable ground of science has been criticized for centuries but there was no alternative. Since we are now developing the explication model, we can completely shift this shaky ground. The objectivity of concepts can be explained and established in an explication system about concept-formation and empirical testing within environmental interaction.

Which of the two models can include both? The explication model can let us think about itself as well as about the derivation of the unit model. It can show how the two models expand each other. The explication model can refer both to first person process *and* to third person views.

The third person views are products of explication within the first person process. *All concepts are explications from first person process,*

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including the unit-concepts and the process-concepts I present. (People will soon make better and better concepts of the new kind.)

The reciprocity of the two models

Logic depends on keeping the units the same. Therefore it can never explain how new thoughts come. In contrast, explication freshly ‘carries forward’ at every step. Therefore it can

never have the inferential power of logical formation. We can see clearly that neither system can undercut or minimize the other.

We have to let our concepts have their own inferences. These can lead us to new places, new interactions with the environment. There we look around. What the computer did might have been too complex for our IU to follow, but we look around from the result. Then our IU may enable us to think more than the computer can follow. The implicit connections in our IU are retroactively capable of logical explication which sometimes leads to building new computers.

What we study and test in interaction must never be assumed to consist only of the conceptual units. It is a false metaphysics which has taught students to assume that a research subject is nothing but the units of the current science system.

There was always reciprocity between the two systems, but there was no way to employ it systematically. Now there is. Many advantages are gained for analysis if the wider system is available as well. New units can be generated and tried at any point.

Empirical testing is vital but we have to recognize that we cannot test the concepts themselves. We test the outcomes of *what we do*. The operations happen directly in the implicit intricacy of nature. That is why we always get more findings than our hypotheses projected, never only what confirms or disconfirms them.

Empirical testing requires replication by many independent groups. We need not believe just one. Science is a social process, but society-wide testing takes a while. Entrenched groups hold on to their views and slow things down even more.

Because of slower social process, there is always an 'established' picture of nature. Nature seems reduced to one set of concepts. What remains to be discovered seems 'not yet' reduced, as if it soon will be. But there is absolutely no chance of this. Even a single new concept or new doing can make innumerable changes in the implicit possibilities. Nature is never only the units we make and combine. Everything in nature is an implicit intricacy.

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